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Hostile acts of maritime piracy and terrorism have increased 
worldwide in recent years, and the global impacts of a successful attack on 
commercial shipping in the Straits of Malacca make it one of the most 
tempting target locations for maritime terrorism.  In an attempt to develop 
a system of systems to defeat and prevent terrorism in the  
Straits of Malacca, this study developed three significant commercial 
shipping attack scenarios (Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
shipment, Ship As a Weapon (SAW), and Small Boat Attack (SBA)), and 
used a Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) to design alternative 
architectures that offered promising ways to defeat these attacks.  
Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) architecture alternatives combined 
five separate systems:  a Land Inspection System, a Sensor System, a 
Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) System, a 
Response Force System, and a Sea Inspection System.  Individual models 
for each system were developed and combined into overarching integrated 
architecture models to evaluate overall performance.  The study results 
showed that solutions tended to be threat-specific, and current capabilities 
were mixed.  While solutions were found to effectively reduce risk in all 
threat scenarios, these sometimes came at great expense.  Alternatively, 
cost-effective solutions were also found for each scenario, but these 
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The 2005 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Cross-Campus Integrated Study, 
titled “Maritime Domain Protection in the PACOM AOR,” was the result of the 
combined effort of 21 NPS Systems Engineering students, 26 Singaporean Temasek 
Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) students, 4 students from other NPS curricula, and  
21 NPS faculty members from different NPS departments.  Utilizing tasking provided by 
the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and 
Programs (OPNAV N7) to the NPS Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, 
the study examined ways to defeat and prevent terrorism in the Maritime Domain.  The  
OPNAV N7 tasking directed the Meyer Institute to conduct a study to design and assess 
conceptual integrated architecture alternatives for large ship security and inspection in the 
Straits of Malacca.  The NPS Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 7 (SEA-7), in 
conjunction with the Singaporean TDSI students, used the Systems Engineering Design 
Process (SEDP) shown in Figure 1 as a systems engineering framework to conduct the 
multidisciplinary study (the “Implementation” phase of the SEDP was not performed due 



































Figure 1.  SEDP 
 
The SEDP was an iterative process used to scope and bound the MDP problem, 
determine requirements, and to design architecture alternatives to meet stakeholder 
needs, wants, and desires. 
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The highest value of oil, container, and bulk cargo pass through the 500-mile-long 
Straits of Malacca.  Unfortunately, this critical and susceptible shipping channel exists in 
a region of the world where piracy and terrorism thrive in a geographically vulnerable 
and limited-infrastructure environment.  Hostile acts of maritime piracy and terrorism 
have increased worldwide in recent years, and although no large-scale maritime attacks 
have occurred to date in the Straits of Malacca, the global political and economic impacts 
of a successful attack on commercial shipping in this region make it one of the most 
tempting target locations for acts of maritime terrorism. 
The SEA-7 Study developed three significant commercial shipping attack 
scenarios and designed several architecture alternatives that offered promising ways to 
better defend against these possible future attacks in the Maritime Domain.  Scenario 1 
was a Small Boat Attack (SBA) by an explosives-laden speedboat against an oil tanker in 
the shipping channel.  Scenario 2 was a Ship As a Weapon (SAW) attack in which an oil 
tanker rammed into a pier in Singapore.  Scenario 3 was a Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) attack involving the shipment of a 20-KT, Russian-made, nuclear device.  In 
order to defend against these attacks, the cohort defined an MDP architecture alternative 
as a combination of five systems:  a Land Inspection System, a Sensor System, a 
Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) System, a Response 
Force System, and a Sea Inspection System. 
Using the SEDP as a guide, the SEA-7 Cohort defined the problem, created threat 
scenarios, generated requirements, identified alternative system solutions, developed and 
executed an integrated modeling and simulation plan, and conducted analyses to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations.  The cohort initially estimated the economic 
impact of a successful attack for the three threat scenarios and identified the cost and 
capabilities of the current “As-Is” MDP architecture, centered on Singapore, to defend 
against these attacks.  These results are shown in Table 1, along with the desired 
probability of defeat values presented to the Pacific Command (PACOM) stakeholder. 
 xxxiii
 
Probability of Defeat 
Scenario Current Ten-Year Total MDP System Cost (FY05M$) 
Unmitigated 
Attack Damage 
Cost (FY05B$) Current Desired 
1 – SBA N/A 0.8 - 3.6 ~0% 80% 
2 – SAW 38 - 40 2.5 - 4.9  ~80% 90% 
3 – WMD 638 - 715 180.1 - 215.9 ~2% 60% 
    
N/A = Not Applicable.    
Table 1.  Maritime Attack Defense Status and Damage Estimates 
 
This table shows estimates of the current MDP system cost, the estimated attack 
damage cost, and the current and desired defeat probability for three threat 
scenarios.  Varying gaps exist between the current and desired probabilities  
of defeat. 
 
The SEA-7 Cohort developed generic system alternatives and evaluated them for 
their ability to improve on the current system within a five-year time horizon.  By 
direction, the MDP Study did not consider political and legal ramifications, and assumed 
full cooperation of participating nations surrounding the Straits of Malacca.  The study 
compared the “As-Is” MDP architecture to these potential alternative architectures based 
on performance, risk, and total system cost.  Architecture performance was defined as the 
probability a given architecture would defeat each attack scenario.  Risk was defined as 
the expected damage cost for a single attack in each scenario.  The estimated total system 
cost for each architecture included the procurement cost of MDP System components, the 
procurement cost of required commercial system components, operating and support 
costs, and shipping delay costs.  These costs were not a determining factor in the design 
of the various system alternatives, but the total system cost was used as a tool to make 
relative comparisons. 
In order to quantify the performance of the different system alternatives and 
multifaceted architecture combinations, SEA-7 developed an integrated modeling plan 
using a modular approach.  The modeling plan had the different system groups first 
develop individual models which were used to evaluate and optimize the system 
performance for each system alternative.  Integrated architecture models were then used 
to link the different system model outputs together and evaluate the performance of the 
entire system of systems.  This approach allowed numerous modeling tools to be used 
 xxxiv
throughout the modeling effort, including EXTEND™, Microsoft Excel™,  
Naval Simulation System (NSS), and Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA). 
 




• Commercial shipping involved various international participants in a 
largely unregulated, vulnerable industry that was critical to the worldwide 
economy.  As a result of the multidiscipline, interrelated nature of the 
MDP problem, a Systems Engineering approach was critical—there was 
no other approach that would necessarily focus on the entire problem as an 
integrated whole. 
 
• No single solution existed to the extremely difficult MDP problem.  
Solutions tended to be threat-specific, and current capabilities were mixed, 
depending on the threat.  In all threat scenarios, solutions were found to 
effectively reduce risk, although sometimes at great expense.   
Cost-effective solutions were found to reduce risk in all threat scenarios, 




• The largest gain in architecture performance in a WMD scenario came 
with the addition of a Cargo Inspection System installed in the highest 
volume ports-of-origin for cargo destined for the area of interest.  The 
Land Inspection System alternative that was evaluated also relied on 
industry participation, using qualified “Trusted Agent” shipping 
companies to help find or deter WMDs from being loaded in their 
shipping containers.  This allowed resources to be focused on 
nonparticipating shippers, since they were deemed more likely to transport 
illegal cargo.  The cost to the shipping industry was significant for this 
Land Inspection System alternative. 
 
• A less costly architecture alternative offered a significant improvement 
over the “As-Is” architecture in a WMD scenario, although the overall 
improvement was marginal.  This lower-cost architecture alternative used 
an improved Sensor System and a Sea Inspection System that searched 
suspect ships en route.  Due to the incidence of false alarms, this  
Sea Inspection System was only cost-effective when used with a  
C3I System that could accurately correlate positive detections with a 
source (i.e., radiation due to pottery, medical equipment, etc.) and 





• The “As-Is” Force System that loaded Sea Marshals on high-value 
contacts of interest (COIs) at five NM with the harbor pilot was effective, 
given the specifics of the scenario.  Only slight improvements in 
performance were attained with longer engagement times; however, 
increasing Sea Marshal training and armament significantly improved 
close-in performance. 
 
• The Rapid Response Force alternative was not effective when COI hostile 
intent was determined at five NM—there simply was not enough response 
time to brief and deploy the forces.  However, if hostile intent was 
determined at or before ten NM, the Rapid Response Force was  
highly effective. 
 
• Throughout this scenario, improvements in performance were possible by 
increasing the amount of time the response forces had to counter the 
attack.  The largest increase in time-to-respond was achieved by 
improving the Sensors’ capability to detect large ships out to 250 to  
300 NM.  Improvements in C3I capabilities resulted in more timely 
decisions, but the increase in response time was less than that obtained by 




• Loading Sea Marshals on high-value COIs transiting an area of interest 
was a cost-effective solution alternative to counter the small boat suicide 
attack scenario.  This method of point-defense was one active means of 
hardening the target against the attack.  Methods of passive defense also 
showed promise, such as only permitting double-hull ships into a threat 
area or installing blast-resistant coating on ships’ waterlines.  Although 
both passive and active defenses would require some level of cost, they 
both served to minimize the damage resulting from a small boat  
suicide attack. 
 
• Friendly force patrol craft were not effective when used to randomly 
patrol the Straits.  This alternative was also considerably more costly than 
using Sea Marshals, although it would serve to indicate presence and 
potentially deter some attacks. 
 
• Although defeating a suicide boat attack in progress was very difficult, an 
increase in Sensors’ ability to track small boats in the area of interest 
could give additional benefits.  Intent or anomaly detection software could 
potentially detect trends or aberrant behavior by small boats that could be 
the precursor to, or preparation for, an attack.  Additionally, if SBAs were 
 xxxvi
to become commonplace, being able to backtrack to find the port of origin 
for attacking boats could allow resources to be focused in a region that 
could find terrorist bases, thereby halting attacks before  
they occur. 
 
The threat scenarios, assumptions, and results of this study were only a  
point-evaluation of the very complex MDP problem.  All of the models used in the study 
were intentionally created with variable inputs that could be changed to suit other 
geographical, force, or threat situations.  The approach and analysis used in this study, 
coupled with the adaptability of the models, gave decision makers a tool to use for  
future analysis. 
The 2005 NPS Cross-Campus Integrated Study was an academic exercise and was 
not endorsed by any branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Examining MDP in its entirety 
was extremely challenging due to the immense scope of the problem.  The SBA, SAW, 
and WMD scenarios were used to facilitate analysis and do not represent official views or 
policies of the Navy or any government.  Although all elements of MDP were not 
evaluated to the maximum extent possible, they were evaluated to the extent practical 
given the limited time available for this study.  SEA-7 nonetheless concluded that the 
results are informative and provided insights to decision makers involved in addressing 





























1.1.1 Worldwide Shipping and Commerce 
The import and export of oil and goods on a scale large enough to sustain the 
modern global economy would not be possible without seaborne shipping.  Over 90% of 
world trade is carried by the international maritime shipping industry, with the remaining 
10% being delivered via expensive air cargo and fixed path land/rail routes.1  In 
particular, the geography of Asia dictates that most international trade moves by sea, 
since interior land transport infrastructure has not been highly developed. 
Commercial shipping is characterized by a blend of dense traffic through straits 
and along coasts accompanied by long-distance, open-ocean transit.  The global pattern 
of commercial goods shipments consists of large tonnages of low-value resources 
shipped throughout Asia to industrialized economies, which add value via manufacturing 
processes.  These industrial economies then ship out relatively smaller tonnages of  
high-value consumer goods, creating a two-way path through the Malacca Straits.2  
Global economic growth is contingent on this free flow of commerce along Asian-Pacific 
trade routes.  Additionally, oil is the key energy source powering the modern economic 
sectors of the Asian-Pacific region and the world.  The dependency on oil imports from 







                                                 
 1 Industrial College of the Armed Services, “Spring 2001 Industry Study:  Final Report 
Transportation,” Industrial Studies 2001, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2001/transportation.htm, 
(accessed 22 January 2005). 
 2 Review of Networked Economies, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 2004 (Source:  Institute of Transport and 
Maritime Management Antwerp-University of Antwerp (ITMMA-UA) based on People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) Statistics Ministry of Communication, American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), 
and port authority data). 
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Figure 2.  Oil Transit Routes (Millions of Barrels Per Day) 
 
The constricted Straits of Malacca and the dependency on oil imports from the 
Middle East emphasize the strategic importance of strategic shipping lanes.3 
 
The major sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are constricted at several key 
straits, the most important of which are located in Southeast Asia:  the Malacca, Sunda, 
Lombok, and Makassar Straits.  These transit routes cross the waters of several countries 
including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, with Singapore’s port facilities serving as 
a major node for refueling and transshipment.  The United States and many concerned 
nations in the international community are proactively addressing potential vulnerabilities 
with regard to protection of vital SLOCs.  An indication of this trend is the demand for 
military naval and air capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region. 
 
1.1.1.1 Shipping Volume 
The overall shipping industry has seen a generally increasing trend in total 
trade volume.  Over the last 40 years total seaborne trade estimates, in units of tonnes of 
cargo by miles traversed, have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6 thousand billion 
                                                 
 3 Jean-Paul Rodriue, “Straits, Passages, and Chokepoints:  A Maritime Geo-Strategy of Petroleum 
Distribution,” Hofstra University, (2004). 
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tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003.4  The international 
shipping industry transported 6.2 billion tonnes of cargo in 2003, with a fleet of  
26,280 deep-sea cargo ships (see Table 2).5  This trend is expected to continue, especially 
for oil shipments.  China’s oil consumption is expected to grow 93% in the next 20 years, 
while the rest of developing Asia will increase 53%, as compared to the U.S.’s expected 
growth of 22%.6 
 
 
Table 2.  World Seaborne Trade (Million Tonnes) (Source:  Clarkson Research Studies) 
 
The total tonnes of cargo transported by the international shipping industry have 
increased by over 42% since 1986 (from 3.6 billion to 6.1 billion).  The growth rate 
has been higher in the recent past (e.g., 4.3% growth from 2002 to 2003 as 
compared to 2.9% from 1986 to 2004). 
 
1.1.1.2 Shipping Chokepoints 
A common concept in transport geography is a “chokepoint” that refers to 
a location that limits the capacity of circulation and cannot be easily bypassed.  This 
implies that any alternative to the chokepoint involves a level of detour or the use of an 
alternative that amounts to substantial financial cost and time delays.  Chokepoints are 
                                                 
 4 http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtradeindex.htm. 
 5 http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/Clarkson%20Report_Final%20Draft.pdf. 
 6 United States Pacific Command, Asia-Pacific Economic Update, Vol. 2, (2002). 
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defined by several characteristics that impact voyage time, cost, and risk.  These 
characteristics include location, physical geography, usage level, and access/port-canal 
infrastructure.  Chokepoints are particularly susceptible to pirate attacks and shipping 
accidents in their narrow channels. 
There are nine major chokepoints throughout the world.  Figure 3 
identifies the Malacca Straits as one of these key chokepoints.7 
 
 
Figure 3.  Geographical Chokepoints and Pirate Activity 
 
The primary shipping routes throughout the world pass through nine major 
chokepoints, of which the Malacca Straits is one.  This exemplifies the importance of 
the Maritime Domain Protection, especially in the Malacca Straits. 
 
Table 3 identifies the aggregate global shipping value estimate by prioritized 
chokepoint or critical routes.8, 9  Although the Strait of Hormuz is the largest transit for 
crude oil shipments, the Straits of Malacca have the highest shipping value for oil and 
                                                 
 7 John H. Noer and David Gregory, “Chokepoints – Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia,”  
Center for Naval Analyses, (1996). 
 8 Jean-Paul Rodriue, “Straits, Passages, and Chokepoints:  A Maritime Geo-Strategy of Petroleum 
Distribution,” Hofstra University, (2004). 
 9 Erik Kreil, Country Analysis Briefs, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” 
http://www.eia.doe.fov/emeu/cabs/choke.html, (accessed February 2005). 
Vulnerability of navigation:  major world maritime routes, bottlenecks, and areas of pirate activity 
 5
container/bulk cargo combined.  Total crude volume through the Straits of Malacca is 
more than three times that of the Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times that of the 
Panama Canal. 
 















Straits of Malacca  50,000 30,500,000 $331.4 11.0 $160.6 $492.0
Strait of Hormuz  25,455 9,545,455 $103.7 15.0 $219.0 $322.7
Bosphorous/Turkish Straits 50,000 14,625,000 $158.9 3.0 $43.8 $202.7
Suez Canal  16,000 9,900,000 $107.6 3.3 $48.2 $155.7
Panama Canal 13,000 9,495,455 $103.2 0.4 $5.8 $109.0
Bab el-Mandab 3,920 840,000 $9.1 3.3 $48.2 $57.3
Russian Oil and Gas Export Ports 2,545 1,145,455 $12.4 1.2 $17.5 $30.0
Table 3.  Global Shipping Critical Chokepoints Comparison 8, 9 
 
More ships, carrying more net value cargo, transit the Straits of Malacca than any 
other chokepoint in the world. 
 
1.2 THREATS TO COMMERCIAL SHIPPING 
With three-quarters of the earth’s surface covered by water, commercial shipping 
vessels must use shipping lanes that transit vast expanses of desolate ocean area.  These 
shipping lanes pass through marine territory that is barely, if at all, monitored or policed 
by forces that could protect or assist any merchant vessels that become distressed.  This 
vulnerability, coupled with the quantity and value of cargo that is shipped on the open 
seas, provides a tempting target for pirates.  Additionally, the dependence of world trade 
on commercial shipping provides an attractive target for terrorists intent on disrupting the 
global economy.  It is easy to connect the dots between the two, especially in geographic 
areas such as the Straits of Malacca where both piracy and terrorism not only survive, but 
thrive in a geographically vulnerable and limited-infrastructure environment. 
 
1.2.1 Maritime Piracy 
According to statistics published by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), the number of pirate attacks on commercial shipping has increased almost  
five-fold since the mid-1990s (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  Pirate Attacks on Commercial Shipping 1984-2003 (Source:  IMO) 
 
The number of pirate attacks on commercial shipping has increased almost five-fold 
since the mid-1990s.  Most attacks usually occur in the Malacca Straits region or the 
South China Sea. 
 
These attacks predictably occur primarily in shipping lanes that are close to land, 
as unpopulated shorelines give cover and sanctuary, and security infrastructure is weak or 
non-existent.  The Straits of Malacca are one such place in eastern Asia, where many 
pirates “belong to organized crime syndicates comprising corrupt officials, port workers, 
hired thugs, and businessmen who dispose of the booty.”10  An example of such piracy is 
summarized in the following incident, reported in the International Maritime Bureau’s 
(IMB) Weekly Piracy Summary. 
In a typical incident, on 21 September (2000), 21-masked pirates raced 
two speedboats alongside and boarded the Malaysian-flagged tanker,  
MT Petchem (passing through the northern Malacca Straits  
towards Singapore). 
                                                 
 10 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, (2004):  p. 62. 
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The ship was sailed to a location south of Johore where the pirate 
transferred the Petchem’s cargo of 3,000 tons of diesel oil to an  
unknown tanker.11 
These types of attacks, occurring on a regular basis and with increasing 
sophistication in the Malacca Straits, have caused Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister 
Tony Tan to warn, “Piracy is entering a new phase; recent attacks have been conducted 
with almost military precision.  The perpetrators are well-trained, have well laid out 
plans.”  The financial impact that maritime piracy imposes on the global economy is 
estimated to be $16 billion per year.12 
 
1.2.2 Maritime Terrorism 
Osama bin Laden has warned, in no uncertain terms, “By God, the youths of God 
are preparing for you things that would fill your hearts with terror and target your 
economic lifeline until you stop your oppression and aggression.”  This direct threat of 
attacks against the global economy was reiterated by senior members of the  
al Qaeda-linked Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, who “have admitted that 
the group has considered launching attacks on Malacca shipping.”13 
One terrorist attack that achieved mixed results occurred in October 2002, when 
the French tanker LIMBURG was rammed by a speedboat loaded with explosives in the 
Gulf of Aden off the coast of Yemen.  Although the new double-hulled ship remained 
afloat (see Figure 5), the force of the impact “left an oval-shaped hole about 26 feet wide, 
with the edges indented inward, in the ship’s hull which was charred on the starboard 
side.”14  If more attackers had been involved, or if the cargo had been more volatile, the 
outcome could have been far more severe. 
 
                                                 
 11 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Weekly Piracy Summary, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Maritime 
Liaison Office, Newsletter, (January/February 2001). 
 12 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, (2004):  p. 62. 
 13 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, (2004):   
pp. 63-64. 
14 Abeidoh, Rawhi, ABC News Website,  
http://www.vic-info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/0/b55fcf7a272859580a256c4c006ce233?OpenDocument, 




Figure 5.  Damage to the French Tanker LIMBURG, October 2002 
 
The vulnerability of high-value cargo vessels has been illustrated by numerous 
attacks using small speedboats and explosives.  Increased coordination and 
effectiveness is very likely in the future, therefore more severe outcomes can  
be expected. 
 
Another foreboding attack occurred in March 2003: 
The Dewi Madrim, a chemical tanker off the coast of Sumatra, was 
boarded by ten pirates from a speedboat.  They came at three o’clock on a 
moonless morning; armed with machine guns and machetes and carried 
VHF radios.  They disabled the ship’s radio, took the helm and steered the 
vessel, altering speed, for about an hour.  Then they left, with some cash 
and the captain and first officer.15 
Although the attackers used the pirate-tested means of driving speedboats 
alongside to board the tanker, their intention was clearly not to steal cargo from the ship.  
This situation was eerily reminiscent of the 9/11 hijackers, who only learned to fly large 
airplanes while airborne, but not to takeoff or to land. 
                                                 
 15 Simon Elegant and Kuala Sepetang, “Dire Straits.  Ships That Pass Through Some of the Busiest 
Waterways in Asia are Often the Target of Pirates.  Is a Terrorist Attack Next?” Time Asia, 
http://www.time.com/, (accessed 17 April 2005). 
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1.3 U.S. AND SINGAPOREAN MARITIME DOMAIN PROTECTION (MDP) 
INITIATIVES 
1.3.1 U.S. Initiatives 
The Global War on Terrorism caused the United States and other nations to assess 
and analyze their strengths and weaknesses as related to Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense.  The maritime domain has been recognized as one area that contains 
many opportunities for terrorist attack.  MDP initiatives represent attempts by 
government agencies and organizations to reorient within their areas of responsibility and 
focus resources on the numerous vulnerabilities of the maritime domain.  A list of MDP 
initiatives was compiled by the Maritime Domain Protection Group.16  These initiatives 
represent the capabilities of current U.S. MDP efforts.  They also represent simultaneous 
efforts at the national and local level, often independent and uncoordinated.  This 
“stovepipe” architecture significantly degrades the rapid collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of actionable intelligence to decision makers. 
Current MDP initiatives can be categorized into a MDP Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Act (OODA) loop.17  “Observe” initiatives are concerned with acquiring as much data 
and information from as many sources as possible, as quickly as possible.  They represent 
a shift in the “intelligence gathering” paradigm away from focusing collection efforts on 
specific threat countries, organizations, or geographic regions.  Situational awareness in 
the maritime domain requires knowing everything all the time, i.e., maritime 
omniscience.  “Orient” initiatives address gathering, fusing, disseminating, and sharing 
information.  They cover issues including databases and shared information, 
dissemination and cooperation, and a common intelligence picture.  “Decide” initiatives 
address identifying and assigning responsibilities as opposed to identifying decision 
makers.  This category contains the fewest initiatives as identifying decision makers 
presents the biggest challenge in an information system.  “Act” initiatives represent 
                                                 
 16 The initiatives are excerpted from “‘As Is’ National Maritime Domain Protection System,”  
Naval Postgraduate School Maritime Domain Protection Task Force, December 2004. 
 17 Ibid. 
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anticipation of possible missions derived to protect assets that are open to attacks from 
the maritime domain. 
 
1.3.2 Singaporean Initiatives 
Several Singaporean initiatives of note are their National Security Architecture, Armed 
Navy escorts for suspect ships, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (MALSINDO), and 
harbor Automatic Identification System (AIS).18, 19  Singapore’s National Security 
Strategy integrates and synergizes the work of different national security agencies in the 
operations, intelligence, and policy domains.  It includes establishment of the National 
Security Task Force (NSTF), staffed by both police and military elements, to maintain a 
comprehensive watch over the island and to integrate operational responses on land, in 
the air, and at sea.  The Armed Navy escorts involve the deployment of armed security 
teams by the Republic of Singapore Navy onboard some merchant ships.  The uniformed 
security teams will escort vessels entering or leaving the port, but only within 
Singaporean waters.  MALSINDO is a trilateral initiative by countries bordering the 
Malacca Straits, which involves year-round coordinated armed maritime patrols.  
Seventeen ships from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore conduct around-the-clock 
naval patrols in the countries’ respective territorial waters.  A “hotline” has been setup 
linking the three naval command centers in Batam, Lumut, and Changi to improved 
coordination.20  Another Singaporean effort includes accelerated implementation of the 
AIS to ensure that ships over 300 tons were fitted by the end of 2004.  The AIS is an 
autonomous, self-synchronizing, Interrogator-Transponder System analogous to the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-required Identification Friend or Foe (IFF).  The 
transmissions include identifiers, cargo codes, speed, heading, and other pertinent 
                                                 
 18 National Security Coordination Centre, Fight Against Terror, Singapore’s National Security 
Strategy, (2004). 
 19 The Straits Times Interactive, “Armed Navy Escorts for Suspect Ships,” 
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/, (accessed 28 February 2005). 
20 “Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia,” International Institute for Strategic Studies,  
Vol. 10, Issue 6, (July 2004):  pp. 1-3. 
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information.  In addition, mandatory fitting of ship alert systems will see all vessels 
operating in the port of Singapore fitted with the AIS by 2006.21 
 
1.4 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study was to serve as the Systems Engineering and Analysis 
(SEA) Integrated Project for SEA Cohort 7 (SEA-7).  This cross-campus capstone effort 
for the SEA students is sponsored biannually by the NPS Wayne E. Meyer Institute of 
Systems Engineering.  The tasking memorandum, dated 9 November 2004 (Appendix A), 
entitled this study “Maritime Domain Protection in PACOM,” and gave the following 
initial problem statement: 
Design a conceptual System of Systems to defeat and prevent terrorism in 
the Maritime Domain.  Design and assess integrated alternative 
architectures for sensor, communications, command and control, and 
reactive force for a coalition of nations, focusing on large ship security, 
and threats to and from large ships, in the Straits of Malacca.  
Additionally, design and assess alternative architectures for cargo 
inspection to include a total ship inspection sub-system that could detect 
and identify explosive and other dangerous materials so to prevent the use 
of a large cargo ship as a terrorist vehicle. 
The study was directed to remain outside of the political and diplomatic realms, 
assuming full international cooperation in the Southeast Asian region.  The study focused 
on a generic solution, with capabilities transferable to other geographic areas with 
necessary modification.  Additionally, the study focused on achieving a technical solution 
within a five-year timeframe.  Thus, only technologies with a Technical Readiness  
Level 4 (“technology component and/or basic technology subsystem validation in 
laboratory environment”)22 or greater were considered.  With Pacific Command 
(PACOM) as a key stakeholder, the study sought to answer two questions:  1) What is the 
most effective use of current resources in theater? and 2) Where should resources be 
focused for the most future cost-effectiveness? 
                                                 
 21 “Security Alert, Comprehensive Measures Set to Enter Force in 2004,” IMO News, No. 1, 2003, 
www.imo.org, (accessed 12 March 2005). 
 22 U.S. Department of Defense, Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook,  
September 2003. 
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1.5 REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Although the geographic location was given in the problem tasking document, no 
specific threat scenarios were identified.  SEA-7 performed a threat analysis and 
identified three plausible threat scenarios to use for the MDP Study. 
 
1.5.1 Geography 
The Malacca Straits are located between Sumatra and the Malaysian Peninsula 
and serve as a major international navigation route linking the Indian Ocean with the 
South China Sea.  The Straits are 500 miles long and from 10 to 220 miles wide.  The 
relatively narrow and shallow shipping channel varies in width, containing three stretches 
that are less than 24 miles wide.  At these points, the 12-mile territorial waters claimed by 
each of the coastal states, Indonesia and Malaysia, overlap and together cover the whole 
width of the Straits.  In addition, the shipping channel sometimes runs through the 
territorial water of one or the other of the coastal states, even when the overall width is 
more than 24 miles. 
The Straits of Singapore are the eastern continuation of the Malacca Straits, 
linking them to the South China Sea.  They run between the Indonesian Islands on one 
side and the southern coast of the state of Johor, Malaysia and the island of Singapore on 
the other.  They are 75 miles long from east to west and are never more than  
12 miles wide.  The navigation passage frequently runs within the 6-mile limit of the 
waters of the littoral states. Phillips Channel, located in the Singapore Straits, is only  
1½ nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, forming one of the world’s most significant 
traffic bottlenecks.  The Malacca Straits can be bypassed through the Sunda, Lombok, 
Makassar and Ombai-Wetar Straits, which are all within Indonesia’s  
archipelagic waters.23 
                                                 
 23 Yaacov Vertzberger, “The Malacca-Singapore Straits:  The Suez of the South-East Asia,”  
The Institute for the Study of Conflict, (1982):  pp. 57-63. 
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1.5.2 Meteorology 
Due to its geographical location and maritime exposure, the climate in the  
Straits of Malacca region is characterized by uniform temperature and pressure,  
high humidity, and abundant rainfall.  The average daily temperature ranges from a 
minimum of 73°-79°F (~23°C) to a maximum of 88°-93°F (~34°C).  Temperature 
extremes can go as low as 67°F (~19°C) and as high as 101°F (~30°C).  Typical pressure 
variations are 4hPa, with pressure extremes recorded at 1016.9 hPa and 1002.0 hPa.  
Relative humidity averages 84%, with daily fluctuations from above upper 90% in the 
early morning to around 60% in the midafternoon.  Rainfall is heavy, with an average 
annual rainfall of 92.8” (South Florida, by contrast, receives 56”).  Although there is no 
distinct wet or dry season, rainfall maxima occur in December and April, while the drier 
months are usually February and July.  The high humidity conditions existing in the 
Malacca Straits makes radio frequency (RF) ducting an issue of concern.  Surface-based 
ducting (occurring 15% to 20% of the time) and evaporation ducting (occurring all the 
time) are of concern for RF propagation above 3GHz.24 
 
1.6 MARINE CHARACTERISTICS 
The Straits of Malacca are narrow and shallow straits that are sheltered by land 
masses to the northeast and southwest.  As a result, the marine characteristics are 
relatively mild and uniform.  Generally, the Malacca Straits do not experience extreme 
sea states or typhoons, though the seas can be choppy, at times ranging up to Sea State 3.  
The sea state in the more expansive Andaman Sea to the northwest and South China Sea 
to the east can reach Sea State 5.  The weather and wind direction is mostly dictated by 
the northwest (December to April) and southeast (June to October) monsoons.  Average 
water temperature is around 88°F (~31°C) during the day and 79°F (~26°C) during the 
night.  The water temperature is quite constant and isothermal, and it is very closely 
associated with the air temperature as expected, due to the shallow depths of the water.  
The currents in the Straits of Malacca are quite constant, averaging around 1/3 to 2 kts 
                                                 
24 Data from the National Environmental Agency’s Website, http://app.nea.gov.sg/, (accessed  
17 February 2005. 
 14
through the year.  The monsoons control the currents elsewhere, driving inflow waters 
from the Bay of Bengal through the western channels from June to August during the 
northwest monsoon.  When these winds die, southeastward currents gradually form and 
are maintained and enhanced by the southeast monsoon from December  
through February.24 
 
1.6.1 Shipping Traffic Density 
The Straits of Malacca provide passage to nearly 700 ships per day, 135 large 
transport vessels per day, two-thirds of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
shipments, and approximately 80% of China’s imported crude oil.25  Annually, more than 
1,100 fully laden super tankers pass eastbound through the straits, many with only a 
meter or two of clearance between keel and bottom.26  More than 30% of all seaborne 
commercial traffic navigates the Malacca Straits, providing a vital source of income for 
millions of Asians. 
Since the busiest commercial routes flow through the Straits of Malacca, its 
crowded, shallow, and narrow passages are a concern for maritime and environmental 
safety.  The 1½-mile wide Phillips Channel in the southeast entrance to the  
Malacca Straits makes these straits a highly vulnerable chokepoint.  If the  
Straits of Malacca were closed, transit time and distance for nearly half of the world’s 
fleet would divert through the Sunda or Lombok Straits, adding four sailing days.  
Additionally, tanker demand would increase beyond its current near-capacity condition, 
and freight rates would rise for a period of time.27  All excess capacity of the world fleet 
would be absorbed, with the strongest effects on oil and dry bulk shipments. 
                                                 
 25 John H. Noer and David Gregory, “Chokepoints – Maritime Economic Concerns in  
Southeast Asia,” Center for Naval Analyses, (1996). 
 26 United States Pacific Command, Asia-Pacific Economic Update, Vol. 2, (2002). 
 27 Erik Kreil, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” Country Analysis Briefs, 
http://www.eia.doe.fov/emeu/cabs/choke.html, (accessed February 2005). 
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1.7 THREAT SCENARIOS 
Three threat scenarios were developed to encompass current and potential future 
threats to the maritime domain in the Straits of Malacca.  The threats were based on 
either proven threats, similar to the small boat attack against the French tanker 
LIMBURG, or known potential threats, such as the smuggling of a nuclear weapon into a 
congested port.  Research and brainstorming uncovered the majority of the major terrorist 
threats to shipping (see 
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Figure 6.  Potential Maritime Domain Threats to Shipping 
 
The SEA-7 Cohort developed this list of potential major terrorist threats to 
maritime shipping in the Straits of Malacca. 
With the focus on that region of the world, three major threat scenarios were 
selected:  the SBA against a large merchant vessel, a SAW attack against a port facility 
(specifically liquid natural gas tankers), and the smuggling of a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) into the region.  These scenarios were deemed to include the most 
credible shipping threats in the region, but they also included many of the factors that 
were found in other threats. 
A threat risk graph was developed to show the relative likelihood of an attack 












Ship As Weapon (SAW)
 
Figure 7.  Threat Risk Comparison 
 
The WMD scenario became more critical than a SBA or SAW.  Even though there is 
a higher probability of a SBA or SWA, the severity of a successful attack using a 
WMD is higher. 
 
It showed that the most likely type of attack was the SBA; however, this type of 
attack had the lowest level of consequences.  This type of attack has been successfully 
conducted twice:  first against USS COLE while in port in Aden, Yemen, and then 
against the French tanker LIMBURG off the coast of Yemen.  In both cases there was 
substantial damage to the hull of the ship, and in the case of COLE there was loss of life.  
However, in each case there were limited consequences.  With COLE, the U.S. Navy was 
forced to raise its security measures, and was denied the use of one of their warships for 
several months.  The LIMBURG suffered significant damage to the hull, and lost several 
thousand gallons of oil from the cargo hold; however, it was back in service within 
weeks.  Both of these attacks gained notoriety in the media because they were successful, 
yet they had very little lasting impact on either the Navy’s operational policies or the 
shipping company’s practices. 
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The second type of attack considered was the SAW.  The potential for this type of 
attack has been demonstrated to be within the capabilities of current terrorist 
organizations, and an attack of this type would have a significant financial impact on the 
target country.  In a documented incident in the Straits of Malacca, a group of terrorists 
took control of a large merchant vessel, had one of their operators maneuver the vessel 
for several hours, and then debarked the vessel, taking only the captain and first mate of 
the merchant ship.  This proof of concept operation showed that the terrorists were 
capable of taking and operating a large merchant vessel for their attack.  This type of 
attack could be devastating if the hostage vessel were rammed into either port or 
refueling facilities, which would render the port inoperable for a prolonged period of 
time.  Scuttling a vessel within the approach to a major port was not considered because 
salvage crews could clear the obstruction in less than 24 hours. 
The third major category of attack was the WMD attack.  It is a stated goal of  
Al Qaeda to gain control over a nuclear device for the purpose of detonating it in a highly 
populated area.  This threat could be further extrapolated to include the introduction of 
chemical or biological agents into a region with the intent to distribute them.  A WMD 
attack would have the most significant financial and political impact on the target region. 
 
1.7.1 Scenario 1 – Small Boat Attack (SBA) 
The first scenario was a SBA scenario, designed to demonstrate the quick reaction 
capabilities of the maritime domain protection system.  It was based on the French tanker 
LIMBURG attack off the coast of Yemen, where a speedboat carrying explosives 
rammed and blew a hole in the side of the tanker.  The SBA scenario called for an  
explosives-laden small boat to attack a merchant vessel transiting the Straits of Malacca.  
The small boat was approximately seven meters long, capable of 30 kts, and loaded with 
1,000 pounds of TNT armed with both an impact fuse and a remote detonator.  The SBA 
scenario was set around midday with standard environmental conditions for the region.  
The scenario had the small boat exiting from the area around Pulau Assan, a fairly narrow 
portion of the Straits that is frequently congested.  This allows the maritime domain 
protection system to be tested against a very time-critical target, in a congested traffic 
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area.  The SBA scenario forced the system to react in a timely manner and to be selective 
enough to define not only the attack, but also to determine which ship is the target of the 
attack so that it can be defended. 
 
1.7.2 Scenario 2 – Ship As a Weapon (SAW) 
The SAW scenario focused predominantly on port security.  This scenario was 
designed around a terrorist “ghost ship,” or a ship that was reregistered and carries 
sufficient paperwork to be overlooked as a terrorist vessel.  In the SAW scenario, 
JADEGAS was a “ghost ship” loaded with 5,200 m3 of oil tanker tasked with ramming 
the Mobil Oil facilities on Palau Pesek in the Jurong Island Petrochemical Complex, a  
12-square mile complex comprised of seven small islands in the port of Singapore.  
JADEGAS was a 113-meter vessel of 5,000 GT, and capable of speeds up to 14 kts.  This 
scenario was set at night, with cooler temperatures and moderate environmental 
conditions.  The SAW vessel was responsive to initial VHF hails, and compliant with all 
good seamanship practices.  It was not until communications were severed with the 
onboard harbor pilot that there was any indication of danger from the vessel.  When the 
vessel reaches the final breakwater, it accelerates at its maximum rate, and turns directly 
toward the piers.  This scenario is designed to flex the maritime domain protection 
system’s capabilities to work at night, in a limited time period to defend a high value unit.  
The threat of terrorists commandeering a vessel while at sea with the intent of using it as 
a SAW was not chosen as an alternative because of the current capabilities resident 
within U.S. and Singaporean forces to combat that situation.  The U.S. Navy’s capability 
to retake a vessel at sea has existed for several years, and the Singaporean defense forces 
have a special reaction force that has been trained for this purpose.  The Special Tactics 
and Rescue (STAR) Unit is a tactical armed unit of the Singapore Police Force (SPF).  Its 
“Maritime Assault Capability (MAC)” includes combating armed and dangerous 
criminals on vessels smuggling illegal immigrants or pirated goods.28  Instead, a later 
detection of the attack was chosen, because it was a much harder problem to solve. 
 
                                                 
 28 Muhd Juffry Bin Joihani, “MAC for the Men in Black,” Police Life, The Singapore Police Force 
Magazine, Vol. 31, No. 2, (February 2005):  p. 37. 
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1.7.3 Scenario 3 – Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
The third scenario was a WMD scenario, in accordance with the current threat of 
WMD throughout the world.  In this scenario, a legitimate merchant vessel inadvertently 
transported a 40-foot container containing a 20-KT Russian-made nuclear weapon.  The 
container housing the weapon was loaded in the port of Shanghai, China, with an ultimate 
destination of Singapore.  The target container was one of 32 containers loaded at the 
Apple Ipod plant in Shanghais.  All paperwork was valid and in order for the shipment.  
This scenario was chosen because of the existence of Russian-style nuclear devices  
(some of which are missing), the stated desire of terrorist organizations to negatively 
impact world trade, and the belief that if terrorist organizations were to get their hands on 
a WMD they would not hesitate to use it.  This scenario tests cargo inspection on both the 
land and sea sides of the inspection process. 
 
1.8 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
A CONOPS was written in order to establish an operational framework for 
potential solutions to prevent and defeat the terrorist threat in the Straits of Malacca.  The 
initial Maritime Domain Protection CONOPS was similar to the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) system, with a force response 
capability.  This system was divided into four subsystems: 
 
1. Sensor capability. 
2. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) capability. 
3. Force Response capability. 
4. Cargo Inspection System. 
The underlying structure to this system architecture resembled Network Centric 
Warfare, to include three overlapping “layers”: 
 
1. Sensor Network. 
2. C3I Network. 
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3. Force Network. 
 
Where possible, existing forces in theater were used to the maximum  
extent practical. 
 
1.8.1 Sensor Network 
A network of space, air, surface, or subsurface sensors (active and/or passive), 
either single or in combination, is used to locate and track surface contacts within the 
Area of Regard (AOR).  The Sensor Network would effectively track all surface contacts 
above a minimum gross weight (initially 300 GT).  This information is fed into the  
C3I Network, and its accuracy contributes to minimizing both Force and Inspection 
response time. 
Two Cargo Inspection Systems were included.  Both were capable of searching 
bulk and container cargo for WMDs.  Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and 
conventional explosives are viable threats.  A “port” system inspected the cargo either in 
port or as it is loaded onboard a ship.  A “ship” system inspected both the cargo loaded 
on a ship and the ship itself.  Two levels of “ship” inspection systems exist:  one quick, 
less thorough inspection for general or random ship inspections, and another slower, 
more detailed inspection for suspect/high risk ship inspections. 
 
1.8.2 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Network 
Regional C3I Command Center(s) assimilated information from the Sensor Net.  
An effective Command and Control (C2) capability enables the timely, accurate display 
of maritime domain information to the relevant commander.  A redundant  
Communications Network ensures quick, reliable, two-way information flow throughout 
the AOR.  Computers processed information for threat recognition and display, and a 
computer database tracks historical and expected shipping data.  Intelligence was 
gathered from outside organizations, but will be fed into the C3I Net. 
 
1.8.3 Force Network 
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An active and passive response capability was included to counter maritime 
terrorist attacks in the AOR.  This response capability consisted of a layered defense, and 
possessed both destructive and nondestructive reaction options.  Consideration was also 
given to cutting off the source of terrorist attacks by forcibly or nonforcibly taking out 
terrorist bases of operation and supply chains when intelligence or other means located 
them.  The CONOPS also assumed that the response forces would provide transportation 
for active WMD Inspection Teams to a COI, when directed, in response to intelligence, 




The Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering and Analysis 7th Cohort (SEA-7) 
consisted of 21 NPS students from a variety of backgrounds, including 13 U.S. Navy,  
1 U.S. Army, 2 U.S. civilian (Northrop-Grumman), 2 Turkish Air Force, 1 Singapore 
Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Argentinean Army, and 1 Mexican Navy.  
The SEA-7 Cohort began work on the cross-campus Integrated Project in October 2004, 
with a requirement to be completed with the study, final presentation, and final paper by 
their 17 June 2005 graduation day.  SEA-7 was joined by 26 students from Singapore’s 
Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) in January 2005.  These students arrived at 
NPS following a six-month course of study in Singapore, and would continue work on 
individual theses following their participation in the SEA-7 Integrated Study, in order to 
graduate in December 2005. 
The SEA-7/TDSI students organized and coordinated the work and expertise of 
fellow students, professors, industry experts, and stakeholders from the NPS campus, 
U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. National Laboratories in order to incorporate 
leading-edge technologies and capabilities to develop and meet the system requirements.  
In addition to the entities shown in Figure 8, representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NSWC), and Office of Homeland Defense (OHD) were consulted on topics that were 




Figure 8.  NPS MDP Study Participants and References 
 
The SEA-7 project exemplifies the monumental effort involved with integrating the 
work of various groups and individuals, representing different areas of expertise 
and skill sets, from various locations.  The project integrated students from 
Singapore’s TDSI, incorporated the work of students from various curricula across 
the NPS campus, industry experts (Lawrence Livermore National Lab),  
and USPACOM. 
 
1.9.2 Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) 
The SEDP was used to guide and facilitate the many facets of work done in 
support of the MDP project.  An iterative process, the SEDP allowed for constructive 
generation and organization of ideas based on continuous feedback.  Progression through 
the SEDP was indicated by four phases:  Problem Definition, Design and Analysis, 
Decision Making, and Implementation.  The relationship among the phases is shown in 
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Figure 9.  SEDP Flow Diagram 
 
Supporting each phase was a unique subset of steps that focused on achieving the 
individual phase’s goals.  Similar to the iterative relationship between the phases, the 
subsets of tasks were also cyclic.  The iterative steps contained within the iterative phases 
allowed for constant refinement and improvement during the process. 
The goal of the Problem Definition phase was to unambiguously define the 
challenge at hand.  Needs Analysis and Value System Design were the main steps in this 
phase.  The Needs Analysis step attempted to identify system requirements by involving 
system decomposition, stakeholder analysis, affinity diagramming, Pareto analysis, 
functional analysis, and futures analysis.  The Value System Design step attempted to 
arrange and rank the system requirements through the creation of a value hierarchy, 
followed by the determination and weighting of measures of evaluation. 
The goal of the Design and Analysis phase was to generate and examine potential 
solutions to the problem.  Alternative Generation and Modeling and Analysis were the 
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steps in this phase.  The Alternative Generation step used morphological charts and 
structured brainstorming to develop multiple potential solutions to the problem.  The 
Modeling and Analysis step sought to compare the alternatives by using technical 
performance models, agent-based models, and statistical analysis and modeling tools in 
an integrated overall modeling plan. 
The goal of the Decision Making phase was to compare the modeling results for 
the alternatives and recommend the best course of action.  The SEDP was only completed 
through the Alternative Scoring step for this conceptual study, since a decision 
recommendation was the desired final outcome.  Therefore, the Decision step was not 
accomplished.  Alternative Scoring ranked the alternatives based on five factors:  cost, 
schedule, performance, risk, and commercial impact. 
The goal of the Implementation phase would have been to execute the selected 
solution, monitor its progress, and solve the determined problem.  This phase in the 
SEDP was beyond the scope of the project and, therefore, was not performed. 
Throughout the application of the SEDP, changes and adjustments were made, 
and past work was revisited and revised as new information and insights became 
available.  This constant modification resulted from the continual feedback inherent in 
the SEDP, and led to a more robust solution than would be available with a  
one-time-through approach.  Thus, the SEDP served as an extremely useful framework to 
organize and structure the work that was done in the MDP Study. 
 
1.9.3 Organization 
Based on the MDP operational concepts, the SEA-7 Cohort was ultimately 
divided into four main groups:  Sensors; Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence (C3I); Force; and Sea/Land Cargo Inspection.  Smaller groups of  
TDSI students were assigned to each of these main groups based on which of the six 
TDSI specialization areas they belonged to:  Sensors, Communications, Information 
Assurance (IA), Operations Research (OR), Weapons Systems, and Land Systems.  This 
organizational structure and the associated interfaces with external organizations are 
shown in the organizational chart in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  MDP Study Group Organizational Chart 
 
The SEA-7 Cohort was organized according to the functions of the MDP System; 
Sensors, C3I (Command and Control, Communicate, and gather Intelligence), 
provide a Response Force, and Inspect.  Students from Singapore’s TDSI, 
represented Communications, Sensors, Weapons Systems, and Operations Research 
tracks that easily integrated into the functions-based organization. 
 
The Sensors Group was responsible for designing a sensor network architecture to 
search, detect, and track surface vessels entering the AOR by providing real time data and 
information to the C3I Centers.  The C3I Group was responsible for a communications 
network that could relay the information throughout the system, and for a  
C2/Intelligence Center to monitor activity in the AOR, and to process data and 
information to classify the intention of the vessels entering the AOR and facilitate 
decision-making to the operators.  If a hostile, unfriendly, or unknown contact was 
identified, a force deployment strategy devised by the Force Group would be 
implemented to intercept the contact of interest (COI) for further inquiries or follow-up 
actions before any undesirable catastrophic or hazardous events occurred.  On the other 
hand, if suspicious cargo was onboard on a vessel, a full-scale inspection would be 
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reinforced as dictated by the Sea/Land Cargo Inspection Group, and carried out by 
personnel from the Force Group. 
 
1.10 METHOD 
SEA-7 had two initial tasks:  1) to design a conceptual System of Systems to 
“defeat and prevent terrorism in the Maritime Domain,” specifically focusing on the 
Straits of Malacca, and 2) to design and assess alternative architectures for cargo 
container inspection, including a total maritime inspection subsystem that could detect 
and identify explosives and other dangerous materials.  The original group of 21 SEA-7 
students was initially divided evenly into two groups that would handle the two tasks.  
The “MDP Group” would study the broader systems integration effort and focused 
primarily on Sensors, C2, and Force architecture.  The “Cargo Inspection Group” focused 
mainly on a critical subsystem geared toward a total maritime inspection capability for 
WMD and explosive materials. 
After dividing into the two research groups, an organizational structure was 
devised in which the MDP Group was responsible for the overall architecture, with the 
Cargo Inspection Group contributing as a functional component of the larger system.  
The MDP Group divided into three functional subgroups:  Sensors, C3I, and Force  
(see Figure 10).  The Cargo Inspection Group also separated into two subgroups:   
Sea Inspection and Land Inspection.  Although the organizational structure was broken 
up into a system of subordinate groups, the original two groups (MDP and  
Cargo Inspection) stayed intact through the Needs Analysis phase.  Following the  
Needs Analysis phase, each subordinate group then conducted individual work through 
the remainder of the SEDP. 
The 26 TDSI students participated with the SEA-7 Groups in the final portion of 
the Problem Definition phase, through Requirements Generation and Alternatives 
Generation.  With detailed requirements and alternatives to work on, the TDSI Groups 
broke off to perform individual work, while remaining in close contact with their SEA-7 
lead group.  At the completion of the Modeling and Analysis step of the Design and 
Analysis phase, the work of the TDSI Groups was combined with that of the  
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SEA-7 Groups into an integrated whole.  This allowed the work of the Decision Making 
phase to be done with information from all groups, including student theses from  
across campus. 
The entire process thus began with a large group and a common goal, divided into 
smaller and smaller groups to perform individual work, while maintaining close contact 




In July 2004, SEA-7 received preliminary information concerning the topic of the 
integrated project.  In conjunction with a class project in the Systems Engineering and 
Architecture course, SEA-7 began a groundwork problem study of the broader topic of 
MDP.  Following the phases of the SEDP, the preliminary study phase was concluded in 
October 2004 and progressed to a more focused Needs Analysis of “Maritime Domain 
Protection in PACOM.”  During this phase, a video teleconference was conducted with 
students from the TDSI program in Singapore to study methods and preliminary focus 
areas that would be covered when they arrived at NPS in January 2005. 
The official tasking document was written in November 2004, and sent to 
stakeholders for comment.  The Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
officially approved the tasking document for the Office of the Deputy Chief of  
Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (OPNAV N7) in  
December 2004.  Following tasking approval, SEA-7 conducted a campus-wide, open 
invitation briefing to generate interest for collaborative and follow-on thesis research. 
Objective tree hierarchies for the overarching system and sublevel systems were 
designed and presented for the first in-progress review (IPR) in January 2005 and for the 
second IPR in February 2005.  These IPRs generated important feedback from 
stakeholders, and were instrumental in beginning the Alternatives Generation phase of 
SEDP, which was concluded in March 2005.  During the period of time between  
IPRs 1 and 2, SEA-7 students worked closely with their TDSI associates; organizing 
research efforts, planning meetings, and defining requirements that would prepare them 
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for IPR 2 and further reviews.  Following IPR 2, in March 2005, notional inputs were 
generated for the Modeling and Analysis phase.  On 16 March 2005, a design review 
meeting was held with all groups to determine the overall metrics and the focus of the 
modeling approach. 
The third IPR, conducted on 29 April 2005, showcased initial modeling results 
from each team within SEA-7 and TDSI, and generated additional feedback on what 
analysis efforts should be advanced.  The month of May 2005 saw continued refinement 
of models and analysis methods, while portions of the final paper were compiled for peer 
review.  The final SEA-7 presentation of results and conclusions was conducted on  
1 June 2005 at NPS in Ingersoll Auditorium before an audience of defense contractors, 
military professionals, professors, and fellow students. 
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2.0 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Needs Analysis was the first step in the Problem Definition phase of the  
Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP).  The primary purpose of Needs Analysis is 
to develop a Revised Problem Statement, or Effective Need Statement, that reflects 
critical stakeholder concerns.  It provided justification for proceeding further and 
expending time, effort, and other resources in the design process.  The resulting  
Effective Need Statement was the cornerstone on which the entire subsequent design and 
decision process was built. 
 
2.1.1 Needs Analysis – Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) Group 
The Initial Primitive Need Statement presented to the MDP Group in the tasking 
memo (Appendix A) was to “Design a conceptual system of systems to defeat and 
prevent terrorism and piracy in the Maritime Domain.”  The intent was to design and 
assess integrated alternative architectures for a coalition of nations, potentially focusing 
on the Straits of Malacca.  The group conducted Needs Analysis by utilizing a variety of 
tools including System Decomposition, Stakeholder Analysis, Input/Output Model, and 
Functional Analysis to determine an Effective Need Statement from the Initial Primitive 
Need Statement. 
 
2.1.1.1 System Decomposition – MDP Group 
System Decomposition enabled the group to identify a hierarchical 
structure and the major functions and components of a MDP system.  The three levels of 
the hierarchical structure were super, lateral, and subsystems.  The super systems relative 
to the MDP system were national defense, command, commerce, security, and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).  Lateral systems included ground and air 
antiterrorism/security systems, nonorganic intelligence network, and maritime tracking 
networks.  MDP subsystems included global positioning system (GPS) tracking systems, 
identification systems (e.g., the Automatic Identification System (AIS)), sensors, 
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response/inspection teams, Command and Control (C2) Systems, force, communication 
networks, and organic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). 
The system included structural, operating, and flow components.  The 
structural components consisted of force (including patrol and inspection assets), ISR,  
C2 Centers (including analysis/response teams), Communications Systems, and decision 
support.  Operating components included sensor networks, Inspection Teams,  
C2 Centers, Intelligence Centers, and communication networks.  Flow components were 
MDP information, threats, and vessel status (i.e., hostile, unknown, friendly). 
 
2.1.1.2 Stakeholder Analysis – MDP Group 
Stakeholder Analysis began with the identification of critical assumptions 
and constraints on the problem.  These assumptions and constraints set the boundary 
conditions for the problem and framed the range of problem solutions.  These 
“boundaries” came from variety of sources and included assumptions ranging from 
strategic to tactical.  In many cases, there was insufficient stakeholder access, based on 
the broad scope of this problem and the international implication of its results.  
Stakeholder Analysis was conducted primarily through research and interviews with 
“potential” stakeholders.  The need for accurate and timely intelligence was a common 
need, want, or desire of each MDP stakeholder.  An interview with a United States  
Coast Guard (USCG) operational intelligence officer provided insights into the 
operational issues of actual implementation.29  He also identified limitations of current 
capabilities such as lack of operational intelligence, data fusion, sharing, and 
disseminating information.  These current issues and limitations provided a basis for 
determining “what an MDP system should do (i.e., its functions).” 
 
2.1.1.3 Input-Output Model – MDP Group 
A basic system Input-Output Model was designed utilizing the 
information gained from the Stakeholder Analysis, in order to visualize the MDP 
                                                 
 29 Phonecon interview with CDR Barry Compagnoni, USCG Intelligence Officer, (East Coast),  
Key West, FL; current Masters thesis student in the Homeland Defense (HD) program at the  
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (13 March 2005). 
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architecture as a system with Inputs and Outputs.  The Input-Output Model developed by 





























Figure 11) shows the Controllable and Uncontrollable Inputs and the 































Figure 11.  MDP System Input-Output Model 
 
The Input-Output Model separated the MDP system from its surroundings, giving a 
different perspective of the system.  This was useful for determining which 
parameters could be used to influence the system outcome, and which system 
outcomes were undesirable. 
 
System design and performance would be affected by both  
Controllable and Uncontrollable Inputs.  The Controllable Inputs (sensor coverage, 
communications, shipping data, traffic flow, manning, training, and force) led to the 
system’s C3IS (C2, Communications, Intelligence, and Sensors) function.  The  
Sensor and Intelligence Coverage Inputs indicated a requirement for an intelligence 
subsystem to provide the commander with relevant and timely information.  Three types 
of Uncontrollable Inputs were identified:  unknown such as threat event or cargo/vessel 
type; estimable such as threat information, agency cooperation, or traffic level; and 
random such as weather or sea state.  The primary Intended Output of the system was to 
create a high level of situational awareness and response capability that would deter and 
prevent attacks.  The nature of the threat was such that the intelligence “subsystem” 
would take Uncontrollable Inputs and develop a desirable Output through the analysis 
and fusion of data.  Unintended By-Products included disruption of commerce, political 
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ramifications, and collateral damage.  The costs associated with delays and/or rerouting 
led to the adoption of minimizing the impact on commercial entities as a system measure 
of effectiveness (MOE). 
 
2.1.1.4 Functional Analysis – MDP Group 
The Functional Analysis step of the Problem Definition phase determined 
what the system should do to meet the stakeholders’ needs, wants, and desires.  It 
provided a system overview of the process being designed.  From this overview, 
objectives and metrics could be linked to functional areas in order to develop a value 
systems design for the system.  The MDP Group identified what needed to be 
accomplished, established a hierarchy of these needs, and identified resources  
and components. 
The components of the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop30 
best described the basic functions of the MDP system.  The system had to Observe and 
Orient based on threats in the maritime domain, and then Decide on an appropriate 
action.  The Observe function included collecting, searching, tracking maritime traffic, 
detecting hazardous material, and providing early warning.  These functions could be 
generalized as surveillance and intelligence.  Orient, Decide, and Act could be 
generalized as C2.  Subsequently, OODA evolved into C3IS by combining the Orient and 
Decide functions into the Communications, Command and Control, and Intelligence 
(C3I) function, and associating Observe and Surveillance.  The Decision component was 
further divided into C3I supporting functions.  Each of these C3I Decision-supporting 
functions had associated subfunctions determined by asking the question, “What does the 
system component do?,” while ignoring “how” the system would perform the function. 
A Functional Flow Diagram (Figure 12) was developed as part of  
Functional Analysis in order to delineate the logical functional process of what the system 
would do. 
 
                                                 

















ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
COA = Course of Action 
 
Figure 12.  MDP System Functional Flow Diagram 
 
The Functional Flow Diagram gave a chronological view of the way top-level 
functions related to each other.  This perspective was useful for determining how the 
outputs from some functions served as inputs to other functions. 
 
Stepping through the Functional Flow Diagram provided a picture of how 
the system would work.  Once installed, the ISR system would actively “detect” by 
searching and identifying contacts.  Intelligence would be collected while the contact was 
monitored.  Analysis would provide information to enable the decision maker to choose 
the appropriate COA. 
The Functional Flow Diagram was used as an aid in the creation of the 
Functional Hierarchy (Figure 13).  The Functional Hierarchy delineated “what” the 























Figure 13.  MDP Architecture Top-Level Functional Hierarchy 
 
In order to effectively defeat an attack in the maritime domain, the MDP 
Architecture was required to perform these top-level functions with the  
associated subfunctions. 
 
It also identified “how” the system accomplished each function.  For 
example, C3I was accomplished by identification, analysis, and monitoring contacts of 
interest.  The FHD also completed the evolution of the OODA loop to the C3I and 
Sensors subsystems. 
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     -Voice
     -Data
     -Image
Sort
     -Filter
     -Fast Track
Interpret
     -Language
     -Data Type
Encrypt/Decrypt
Network  
Table 4.  Communications Subfunctions 
 
This list of Communication Subfunctions was the basis for upper-level system 
requirements to enable the C3I System to operate in the overall MDP System. 
 
The Communications architecture was required to be capable of 
transmitting and receiving multimodally, with the capability to process voice, data, and 
image exchanges.  In addition to transmitting and receiving relevant data, the 
communications architecture needed to sort information—filtering communications to 
prevent data overload at one node or on one platform and ensuring actionable information 
did, in fact, receive appropriate action in a timely manner.  Additionally, fast-tracking 
time critical, priority information to the correct decision and action components was 
required.  Receiving timely and relevant information ensured a shared situational picture 
and common situational awareness between the C2 elements and the action elements. 
Since the Communications architecture was designed for a coalition of 
nations, there would be a need for language translation during transmission and/or at 
reception.  In addition, data type would need interpretation at various nodes to ensure 
proper display and relevance.  Another concern was the “symbology” differences 
associated with developing a system for multinational use.  The communications network 
would not be effective unless relayed information could be readily understood such that 
individual action elements, regardless of nationality, had a clear operational picture and 
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the same understanding of C2 decisions that determined actions.  Another consideration 
arising from the design of architectures for use within a multinational force structure was 
the difference among the nations in technology development and existing commercially 
and militarily available and incorporated technologies.  Because of these inherent 
differences, data sorting and processing would differ from nation to nation, possibly 
requiring data conditioning between communications nodes or platforms.  Security was a 
consistent concern in multinational operations and it necessitated encryption and 
decryption capability at transmission and reception nodes. 
The Communications architecture would network a variety of 
communications equipment, nodes, platforms, and other applicable technologies.  
Therefore, a function of the Communications architecture was to effectively network any 
existing technologies included in the design architecture as well as any newly developed 
or designed technologies specific to the overall MDP architecture.  Function-specific 







     -Between services
     -Between coalition countries
     -Display characteristics and symbology
Coverage
     -Ship to ship
     -Ship to shore
     -Space and Satellite 
     -Nodes/platforms
Capable Bandwidth
Connectivity
     -Between systems
Redundant
     -Multiple nodes
     -Multiple paths
Robust
     -Recovery
     -Absence of  critical nodes or paths




     -Pfail (nodes, total architecture)
     -Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
     -Weather  
Table 5.  Communications Characteristics 
 
This initial list of characteristics would help define design and engineering 
requirements, help determine objectives, help determine and apply Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs), and further develop the overarching MDP System 
throughout the design process. 
 
Information Assurance (IA):  Successful integration of C3I was vital to 
the success of the mission.  The extensive application of digital communication and  
inter-networking in modern operations required communication links to be protected to 
prevent exploitation by adversaries.  This section aimed to describe IA and the 
application of IA mechanisms in MDP communication needs. 
IA was defined as:  “Information operations that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.  This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection and  
reaction capabilities.”31 
IA study focused on establishing an IA plan to protect and defend the 
information and information systems of the MDP forces, to ensure their confidentiality, 
                                                 
 31 Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, (9 October 1998):  pp. 1-9. 
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integrity, availability, authenticity, and nonrepudiation.  The information systems 
encompassed the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that 
collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.  The IA 
challenge involves protecting these in an integrated and coherent manner.32 
The key IA functions were reliability, authenticity, confidentiality,  
data integrity, and access control. 
Elements of the system needed for operational readiness or fighting were 
required to be continuously available.  Reliability was the ability of a system to maintain 
or restore an acceptable level of performance during operations by applying various 
restoration techniques.  It was also the mitigation or prevention of service outages due to 
system failures by applying preventive techniques.  It was a measure of the availability 
and performance of the system. 
Authenticity validated the identity claims of the sender and the data.  It 
was the ability to know that the data received was the same as the data sent and the 
claimed sender was in fact the actual sender.  Authorization was the act of granting rights 
and/or privileges to users permitting them access to an object. 
Confidentiality prevented disclosure of data (entire message/selected 
fields/traffic characteristics).  The ability to communicate such that the intended 
recipients could know what was being sent, but unintended parties could not determine 
what was sent. 
Data integrity ensured data was unchanged from its source and not 
accidentally or maliciously modified, altered, or destroyed during the transmission, 
storage, and retrieval.  In doing so, data integrity safeguarded the condition of data to 
ensure accuracy, currency, consistency, and completeness. 
Access control was a means of enforcing these authorizations based on 
some pre-defined security policies and by comparing the user’s authorizations with the 
policy to determine whether access to a managed object should be allowed. 
                                                 
32 Department of the Navy, IA Pub-5239-01, Introduction to Information Assurance Publication,  
(May 2000). 
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Command and Control (C2):  The definition of C2, as documented by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, included four main functions:  organize, plan, coordinate, and 
identify lead agency.33  For the purposes of this MDP System, our group identified two 
additional functions necessary for the C2 System to perform:  direct and control forces. 
The primary function of the C2 System was to organize.  Before any 
action could be taken, the Command system must first organize a hierarchy of decision 
makers with a clearly delineated chain of command.  This effort established the lines of 
communication and responsibility that would be necessary to carry out further functions. 
The second function of the C2 System was to plan.  Any scenario or 
mission required a plan to give meaning to the organization.  Organization was the 
primary function because the components of the system (the planners themselves) were 
required first to be in place before any plan could be constructed.  Sufficient time devoted 
to the development of a plan was important, because a bad plan could be linked to failure.  
Planning was also the first instance when ideas and information were sorted and filtered 
by decision makers.  The filtering of ideas and information was the essence of  
decision-making. 
The third function of the C2 System was to coordinate.  This function 
involved the coordination of a coalition between nations, action groups, and elements of 
technology tasked with carrying out the plan. 
The fourth function was to identify the lead response agency, coalition, or 
elements.  A characteristic of the lead response agency would be identifying jurisdiction, 
or the region in which operations might be carried out. 
The fifth function, directing (addresses both interoperability and 
compatibility), involved managing all aspects of the system, including performance.  
Interoperability ensured integration between major systems, ranging from coalition forces 
to intelligence networks outside the system.  Compatibility ensured there was no 
                                                 
 33 Interview with Senior Lecturer Thomas Hoivik, “C4I MOEs and MOPs,” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, (3 February 2005). 
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interference between components within the system, such as the fusion of sensor data 
within the Data Fusion and Intelligence Center. 
The directing function was not synonymous with the sixth function of 
controlling forces.  Controlling forces involved both leadership and tactical influence that 
was required to be tailored for each scenario.  Because each scenario for the C2 System 
would likely be different, it would be important to devote time to maintain the resources 
and readiness of the systems employed by the MDP System. 
Intelligence:  The Functional Analysis of the Intelligence System yielded 
five main functional areas.  These areas were planning and directing, collection, 
processing and exploiting, analyzing and integrating, and disseminating.  These main 
functional areas outlined the Intelligence System process that transformed the inputs and 
created the outputs from the model.  The first functional area of the Intelligence System 
was planning and directing.  The planning could be described as strategic, operational, 
and tactical.  The level of planning corresponded to the time constraint on the Output.  
The strategic level of intelligence planning dealt with the allocation of resources and 
assets such as sensors, satellites, and data collection platforms.  The operational level of 
planning involved the daily operations of the Intelligence System.  The normal daily 
operations for an Intelligence Center included the monitoring and tracking of threats and 
all intelligence gathering and fusion.  The tactical level of planning involved the  
mission-specific intelligence and the near-real-time (NRT) directing of collection assets. 
The next main functional area of the Intelligence System was the 
collection of data.  Technical collection could be very expensive and the collection 
process was considered to have limited resources.  One important consideration for the 
collection process was determining how much information should be collected.  
“Increased collection also increased the task of finding truly important intelligence.”34  
Another important consideration for the collection function was the amount of data 
collection devoted per source type.  There were different capabilities and limitations to 
                                                 
 34 Interview with LT Lowenthal, USCG Data Fusion Center Alameda, CA, 9 March 2005. 
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the various types of collection methods.  A collection mix was important to cover all the 
different sources of data collection. 
After collection, the data needed to be processed and exploited before any 
analysis could be completed.  The intelligence collected by technical means did not arrive 
in a ready to use form.  Lowenthal states, “Processing and Exploitation are key steps in 
converting technically collected information into intelligence.”35  There was a great 
disparity between the emphasis on collection and exploitation.  The result is that much of 
the collected data and information was never used because there were not enough assets 
to process and exploit the information into useable forms for analysis.  The ratio between 
collection and processing should have been one that ensured the information out there 
could be collected, but also maintained enough processing such that large amounts of 
information were not lost. 
The next step in the intelligence process was the analysis and integration 
of the processes information.  There were two major types of analysis that were 
completed at this step.  The first was the short-term or current analysis and the second 
was the long-term or future analysis.  Depending on the policy maker’s needs and the 
situation, there could be more emphasis placed on either type of analysis at any  
given time. 
The final function in the intelligence system was the dissemination of the 
intelligence.  This process of delivering the information from the intelligence side of the 
house to the operators was highly standardized.  The lines of communication to the 
commanders in the field were required to be open such that priority information could be 
passed.  This would provide the commanding authority with the most up-to-date and 
relevant information on which to base decisions. 
 
2.1.1.5 Effective Need Statement – MDP Group 
The product of the Needs Analysis step is a revised problem statement, 
called the Effective Need Statement, reflecting the most significant needs and desires of 
                                                 
 35 Interview with LT Lowenthal, USCG Data Fusion Center Alameda, CA, 9 March 2005. 
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the stakeholder.  After iterative analysis of all components and tasks in the  
Needs Analysis step, the MDP Group Effective Need Statement evolved to read: 
“An adaptable architecture that prevents maritime domain acts of piracy 
from supporting terrorism.  Objectives include increasing security of 
maritime assets while minimizing impact on commerce.” 
This statement encompassed the project goals and was in accordance with 
the problem statement.  The objective of minimizing impact on commercial maritime 
traffic ensured that needs identified in Stakeholder Analysis were covered. 
 
2.1.2 Needs Analysis – Total Maritime Inspection System (TMIS) Group 
The TMIS Group performed the Needs Analysis step in order to transform the 
Initial Problem Statement into an Effective Need Statement.  The Initial Problem 
Statement presented to the TMIS Group from the Tasking Memo (see Appendix A) was: 
Design a conceptual System of Systems to defeat and prevent terrorism in 
the Maritime Domain… design and assess alternative architectures for 
cargo inspection to include a total ship inspection sub-system that could 
detect and identify explosive and other dangerous materials so to prevent 
the use of a large cargo ship as a terrorist vehicle. 
The TMIS Group performed Needs Analysis using the following tools:  System 
Decomposition, Stakeholder Analysis, Input-Output Model, and Functional Analysis. 
 
2.1.2.1 System Decomposition – TMIS Group 
The first Needs Analysis tool the TMIS Group used was  
System Decomposition, which broke the system down into the major functions that 
would be used in determining the solution to the problem.  As a result of  
System Decomposition, the following main functions were established: 
 
• Search designated containers or container ships. 
• Detect appropriate materials. 
• Locate the detected materials. 
• Identify the materials. 
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• Communicate findings to appropriate decision makers. 
 
In order to accomplish these functions, several component structures were 
defined.  The structural portion of the TMIS consisted of the various land and  
sea inspection equipment.  The operational portion consisted of the individual system 
operators and their respective prime movers.  The flow portion of the component structure 
was primarily concerned with the flow of shipping traffic, cargo, and information. 
For further definition of the TMIS structure, the system was described in 
relation to a system hierarchy of Superlative, Lateral, and Subordinate Systems.  This 
perspective showed how the TMIS interacted within a system of systems architecture.  
The primary Superlative System of the TMIS was considered to be the  
SEA-7 MDP Group.  Other Superlative Systems include groups such as customs 
agencies, immigration agencies, and other law enforcement or military groups.  The 
Lateral Systems were established as land and sea inspection operations in other ports 
around the world.  These Lateral Systems should work as a team with the TMIS to 
prevent the export of WMDs before leaving their areas of interest (AOIs).  If necessary, 
these Lateral Systems should share intelligence with the TMIS to prevent weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs) from entering the port of interest (Singapore).  Identification 
and assessment of the Subordinate Systems in the overall structure revealed that the 
TMIS Group would be better divided into the two subordinate system groups:   
Land Inspection and Sea Inspection. 
 
2.1.2.2 Stakeholder Analysis – TMIS Group 
The Stakeholder Analysis performed by the TMIS Group was better 
illustrated in two parts:  first, by defining the stakeholders and then addressing the 
specific questions asked of the stakeholders and their subsequent responses.  The initial 
list of potential stakeholders began with members of the Maritime Domain Study Group 
at the NPS.  Interviews with these initial stakeholders led to additional points of contact, 
all of which were potentially useful sources of information.  An attempt was made to 
contact as many stakeholders as possible, especially those from outside of academia.  
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Unfortunately, time constraints and the complexity of the maritime shipping industry did 
not support interaction with the entire list of stakeholders.  Comprehensive research was 
an essential instrument to understanding the needs and concerns of those involved.  Other 
stakeholders, though not all inclusive, include shippers, carriers, port authorities, the 
World Shipping Council, port operators, customs, the USCG, port security, local police, 
transport vehicle operators, and local responders. 
The information received from the stakeholders as part of the analysis was 
invaluable.  Major differences among the stakeholders on many different levels of the 
problem were recognized.  Each stakeholder had specific concerns that were often 
dissimilar depending on their background or specific area of expertise.  Even agreements 
on limitations of the current system, or concerns regarding the study’s focus, often 
resulted in more specific disagreements in the alternate systems. 
After initial conferences with several stakeholders, the TMIS Group 
recognized a deficiency of knowledge concerning current technologies available for the 
study.  The TMIS Group contacted Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories for an 
informational course in sensor technology.  Following the session, Lawrence Livermore 
became a significant contributor to the rest of the study.  They established the baseline of 
current and potential capabilities and limitations accessible to the potential TMIS. 
 
2.1.2.3 Input-Output Model – TMIS Group 
The TMIS Group used results from the system decomposition and 
information gained from the Stakeholder Analysis process to develop an  
Input-Output Model (Figure 14).  This model provides a better understanding of what 





















•Positive detection of WMD
•Prevention of WMD attack
•Increased awareness/Security





•Negative effects on commerce
•Increased change in regulations
 
Figure 14.  TMIS Group Input-Output Model 
 
The Input-Output Model separated the TMIS from its surroundings, giving a 
different perspective of the system.  This was useful for determining which 
parameters could be used to influence the system outcome, and which system 
outcomes were undesirable. 
 
The Inputs were defined as either Controllable or Uncontrollable, while 
the Outputs were delineated as Intended Products or Unintended By-Products.  The 
Controllable Inputs included the sensor architecture (position and type of sensors) as well 
as the time spent searching.  Three types of Uncontrollable Inputs were identified:  
unknown such as cargo content/shielding, estimable such as amount of cargo to be 
searched, and random such as weather and available intelligence.  The primary  
Intended Output of the system was to create a high level of security and an inspection 
process that would positively detect WMDs.  Unintended By-Products included shipping 
delays and other negative effects on commerce, along with their associated costs. 
 
2.1.2.4 Functional Analysis – TMIS Group 
The Functional Analysis of the TMIS System was performed by iteratively 
decomposing the system functions into their component parts and arranging the system 
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functions into a Functional Hierarchy and a Functional Flow Diagram.  The functional 
decomposition for the TMIS system resulted in four required functions:  search, detect 
(this function incorporates the locate function), locate/identify, and report.  Each function 




















Figure 15.  TMIS Functional Hierarchy 
 
In order to effectively search cargo, the TMIS was required to perform these  
top-level functions with the associated subfunctions. 
 
In order for the cargo inspection system to perform inspections on targeted 
vessels, the system was required to search the ship.  The search function defined the 
system’s ability to inspect the vessel and cargo.  The move subfunction defined the 
system’s ability to maneuver throughout the ship, while the scan subfunction included the 
ability to methodically examine desired locations on the ship.  The scan subfunction 
included the sensor holding in position for a certain “soak” time to enable a  
thorough search. 
The detect function defined the system’s sensitivity to hazardous material.  
The sense subfunction more specifically defined the required sensitivity for the different 
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sensors.  The image subfunction described the ability of the sensors to display the output 
in a graphical or picture-type format.  The signal process subfunction defined the ability 
of the sensors to give an output to the operator, whether automatic or requiring human 
interpretation.  The locate/identify function described the system’s ability to determine 
the position and makeup of any hazardous material onboard.  Subfunctions included 
being able to recognize the material by type and classifying the material as dangerous  
or not. 
The system was also required to report the status and results of the 
inspection at any time.  This function included the communicate subfunction for 
transmitting and receiving results among Inspection Team members and to higher 
authority.  The record/display subfunction was also included for the system to display 
data and findings to the operators and generate reports to be communicated to the  
C2 element for the system. 
The TMIS Group developed a Functional Flow Diagram (see Figure 16) 



























Figure 16.  TMIS Functional Flow Diagram 
 
Initially, the Inspection System received its tasking and transited to the 
COI.  From there the search process began.  During the search process the  
Inspection Team would maneuver to scan the container cargo and various parts of the 
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ship.  A detection was made by the use of sensors or other imaging devices for the 
materials of interest.  If a detection was made, the team continued to use their sensors to 
localize the source to a specific container or area of the ship.  This was done by analyzing 
the data received from the sensors and human interpretation.  During the location phase 
of the process, the team was also required to use their sensors to identify the material.  
Identification of the material included classifying the material as hazardous or not, and 
determining whether the material was supposed to be there.  Finally, during the process, a 
report concerning inspection progress and completion was required to be made to  
C2 elements.  The functional flow for the Sea Inspection System ended with the system 
returning to a state where it was awaiting tasking for the next inspection. 
 
2.1.2.5 Effective Need Statement – TMIS Group 
After analysis of all components and tasks in the Needs Analysis step, the 
TMIS Group’s Effective Need Statement was developed as follows: 
“Design and assess alternative architectures for a total ship inspection 
system that will detect and identify explosives, chemical agents, biological 
agents and radiological sources before loading onboard ships or at sea to 
prevent the use of a large cargo ship as a terrorist vehicle for weapons of 
mass destruction while minimizing the economic impact on commercial 
shipping.” 
This statement encompassed the TMIS Group’s goals and was in 
accordance with the problem statement. 
 
2.2 OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
2.2.1 Objectives Hierarchy – Overall 
The Objectives Hierarchy provided detailed analysis of the functions the system 
must perform and the objectives the system must satisfy, and linked directly to basic 
quantitative measures.  The Objectives Hierarchy delineated the different system 
functions, which it further broke down into subfunctions, objectives, and evaluation 
measures.  The end product of the Objectives Hierarchy was an organized pictorial 
representation of the system breakdown, from top-level functions and objectives down to 
the evaluation measures that would determine system performance.  The metrics 
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developed in the Objectives Hierarchy would be used to help generate  
system requirements. 
 
2.2.2 Objectives Hierarchy – Sensors Group 
The Objectives Hierarchy for the Sensor System was derived from the functional 
decomposition performed during the Needs Analysis step (see Figure 17).  A number of 
sources were consulted and correlated to produce an adequately detailed functional 
breakdown for the system.  The overarching requirements of collective exhaustiveness 
and mutual exclusiveness were of primary concern in this process. 
 
 
Figure 17.  MDP Sensor System Top-Level Functional Decomposition 
 
Only the first tier of the functional decomposition is shown.  It is not necessary for 
all sensors to implement all the different functions (some sensors might implement 
just a subset); nevertheless, it is comprehensive across all possible Sensor Systems. 
 
For each of these top-level functions, one or more objectives and subfunctions 
were developed as necessary.  For example, tracking individual contacts using 
continuously scanning radar is a “Track-While-Scan” function that includes standard 
search radar functions, but also requires added mechanical orientation, signal processing, 
and software operations.  Similarly, preprocessing functions include “interface 
requirements” associated with Communications Systems.  Finally, specific metrics—
MOEs and Measures of Performance (MOPs)—were designated for each objective.  
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Table 6 includes the functions, objectives, and MOEs/MOPs developed for the  
Sensor System. 
 
FUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
SEARCH 
• Provide overlapping coverage of Area of Regard 
(AOR) [area] (maximize) 
• Provide continuous and persistent coverage of 
AOR [time] (maximize) 
• Range (max) 
• Search rate (max) 
• Scan pattern efficiency (max) 
• Dwell time (max) 
• Target revisit rate (max) 
• Time on station [for mobile sensor platforms] 
(max) 
DETECTION 
• Provide accurate and timely determination of 
presence of surface Contact of Interest (COI) 
within search volume of sensor (maximize) 
• Probability of Detect PDET  (max) 
• Probability of False Alarm PFA (min) 
• Detection range (max) 
• Time to detection (min)  
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATION 
• Establish the value of “observables” to the required 
level of accuracy (maximize) 
• Number of observables (max) 
• Accuracy [parameter dependent] (max) 
• Update frequency (max) 
TRACKING 
• Maintain seamless “track vector” information of 
surface COIs as they move through the AOR 
(maximize) 
• Accuracy (max) 
• Update frequency (max) 
• Handover integrity (max) 
IMAGE 
GENERATION 
• Provide accurate two- or three- dimensional 
imagery of surface COIs within AOR (maximize) 
• Resolution (max) 
CLASSIFICATION 
• Perform accurate unitary, binary, etc. classification 
of surface COIs at the sensor node level 
(maximize) 
• Discrimination resolution (max) 
• Time to classification (min) 
• Single-sensor probability of correct 
identification (max) 
PREPROCESSING 
• Perform as much sensor node level manipulation of 
locally generated data as possible [sensor 
dependent] (maximize) 
• Data reduction ratio (max) 
• Synchronization accuracy (max) 
• Processing time (min) 
TRANSFER 
• Perform data/control interface operations at the 
local node to maximize communications efficiency 
(maximize) 
• Data compression ratio (max) 
• Buffering capacity (max) 
• Latency (min) 
Table 6.  MDP Sensor System Functions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table captures in summary representation the arrangement of functions, 
objectives, and metrics (both MOPs and MOEs), defined for the sensor system. 
 
For each of these metrics the desired direction of attainment is also expressed: 
maximize (max) or minimize (min).  The complete graphical depiction of the  
Objectives Hierarchy for the Sensor System is shown in Appendix B.  As part of the 
overall Sensor System suitability, a Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability analysis 
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will be executed, including a technology risk assessment for the applicable  
architecture alternatives. 
 
2.2.3 Objectives Hierarchy – C3I Group 
The Objectives Hierarchy for the C3I System was derived from the functional 
decomposition performed during the Needs Analysis step (see Figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 18.  MDP C3I System Top-Level Functional Decomposition 
 
In addition to identifying functions and subfunctions, the Objectives Hierarchy 
identified objectives, MOPs, and MOEs for the functions.  The objectives, MOPs, 
and MOEs provided a means for comparative analysis of various architectures 
consisting of different system alternatives. 
 
For each top-level function, specific objectives and subfunctions were developed 
to support the overall objectives of the C3I System.  For example, subfunctions of C2 
included plan, coordinate, and control forces.  Complete graphical depictions of C3I’s 
Objective Hierarchy are in Appendix C (APPENDIX C IS THE “FORCE SYSTEM 
GROUP OBJECTIVE HIERARCHY”---IS THAT THE SAME THING?). 
C2:  The baseline MOEs/MOPs for the C2 element of the Maritime Domain 
Protection System were derived from a capability requirements analysis of service 
doctrine provided by Senior Lecturer Thomas Hoivik.  In addition to these broad 
measures, scenario specific MOEs/MOPs were developed to facilitate full definition of 
the operational environment.  C2 MOEs and MOPs are shown in Table 7. 
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SUBFUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
PLAN 
• Translate decisions into plans and orders 
• Contribute to the commander’s perception of 
the enemy 
 
• Tactical picture quality (max) 
• Percent action initiated by time ordered 
(max) 
• Dissemination time (mean) 
• Percent orders clarification requested (min) 
• Percent planning time forwarded (min) 
• Time from mission to order (min) 
• Time to decision ratio (min) 
• Percent of personnel informed (max) 
• Display processing time (min) 
COORDINATE 
• Filter, fuse, and prioritize information 
• Provide vertical, lateral, and diagonal 
redundancy 
• Satisfy the commander’s critical information 
requirements, and make those elements of 
information available in a timely fashion, in the 
most useable form, supporting both supply-push 
and demand-pull 
• Reconfigurable, adaptable, scalable 
• Accessibility (max) 
• Tactical picture quality (max) 
• Tactical picture consistency (mean) 
• Measure time from mission to order (min) 
• Time to decision ratio (min) 
• Percent of communications with alternate 
routes (max) 
• Dissemination time (mean) 
• Percent informed (max) 
• Number of orders issued (min) 
CONTROL FORCES 
• Supervise the execution of  plans and orders 
• Possess the characteristics of survivability and 
sustainability 
• Provide rapid simultaneous access of multiple 
users throughout the chain of command and to 
external commands and agencies as appropriate 
• Display a scaleable, near real-time, shared 
picture of the maritime environment 
• Operational capability during transit and 
mobility 
• Facilitate rapid and frequent displacements 
• Organizational structure solidifying unity of 
command 
• Time to execute control measures 
• Information refresh Rate 
• Time to react to displacement orders 
• Time to reorganize 
  
Table 7.  C2 System Subfunctions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table captures in summary representation the arrangement of C2 subfunctions, 
objectives, and metrics (both MOPs and MOEs), defined for the C3I System. 
 
Communications/IA:  The objectives, MOEs, and MOPs for Communications 
and IA, were developed as an integrated effort between the SEA-7 and  
TDSI Communications and IA tracks.  The professional expertise the TDSI students 
brought into the process assisted greatly in the development of an effective  
Objectives Hierarchy that included functions applicable to the IA domain.  
Communications/IA MOEs and MOPs are in Table 8. 
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SUBFUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
TRANSMIT/RECEIVE 
(COMMUNICATIONS) 
• Maximize successful and correct transmission 
and reception of data 
• Minimize data/transmission loss  
• Minimize the need for retransmission of data, 
images, or voice communications 
• Average packet retransmission rate  
(x retransmitted packets per sec) 
• Error correction and recovery capability 
• Percentage of packet lost 
• Maximum/Average Latency (x sec) 
• Maximum/Average available bandwidth  
(x bits per sec) 
• Maximum/Average link utilization rate  
(% over time period) 
• Link redundancy per node 
NETWORK 
(COMMUNICATIONS) 
• Minimize network down time (inactivity or 
failure) 
• Efficient number of nodes required for data 
level and transmission level traffic 
• Maximize network robustness and redundant 
capability 
• Maximize network capability between sensors 
and communications nodes 
• Minimize data corruption due to overflow on 
links and/or collisions 
• Minimize nodal failures 
• Successfully reroute transmissions around 
failed nodes 
• Average Throughput (bits per sec) 
• Percentage of Dropped Messages  
(for best-effort delivery) 
• Voice Call Completion Rate (CCR) 
• Average Time to Establish 
Communications between Major Nodes  
(x sec) 
• Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 
Major Nodes (x sec) 
• Average set-up time per node (x sec) 
• Average downtime per node (x sec) 
• Average node recovery time (i.e., time for 
node to recover connectivity after outage) 
• Average Network Utilization Rate  
(% of nodes utilized) 
• Average Time to Reroute Communications 
Service (x sec) 
• Percentage of Successfully Rerouted 
Service 
• Scalability of Network (maximum number 




• Maximize system redundancy in order to 
mitigate or prevent service outages from 
system failure 
• Data display and upload rate 
• Refresh rate 
SORT/FILTER 
• Maximize time relevant transmission of time 
critical data 
• Prevent unauthorized disclosure and safeguard 
the condition of data to ensure accuracy, 
currency, consistency, and completeness 
• Grant rights and/or privileges to users 
permitting access 
• Enforce authenticity 
• Average time for dissemination of time 
critical information 
• Data prioritization precision and accuracy 
• Percent of time critical data dropped 
• Proportion of data erroneously filter (and 
hence received at the incorrect node) 
• Data prioritization precision and accuracy 
• Minimize data transmission of 
nonapplicable information 
SECURITY 
• Maximize security of transmissions between 
coalition platforms/nodes/command and 
control/action elements 
• Maximize transmission and encryption  
of data 
• Maximize correct decryption  
• Probability of failure of encryption 
• Probability of network exploitation due to 
encryption failure or dissemination  
Table 8.  Communications/Information Assurance System Subfunctions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table captures in summary representation the Communications and 
Information Assurance subfunctions, objectives, and metrics (both MOPs and 
MOEs), defined for the C3I System. 
 
Intelligence:  The objectives, MOEs and MOPs for Intelligence were developed 
based on operational user feedback and correcting deficiencies highlighted by recent 
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national Intelligence Systems failures.  In addition to the measures of intelligence 
processing, scenario specific MOEs/MOPs were developed to facilitate full system 
evaluation of the effectiveness between our C3I System’s architectures, based on 
measurable and quantifiable parameters in the subsequent modeling phase.  Intelligence 
MOEs and MOPs are at Table 9. 
 
SUBFUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
PLAN AND DIRECT • Provide relevant information 
• Planning time (min) 
• Prioritization time (min) 
• Ensure unity of intelligence effort (max) 
COLLECT 
• Utilize variety of sources, e.g., 
HUMINT, electronic intelligence 
• Coordinated informational 
processing 
• Maximize the systems availability 
• Systems shall be dynamically 
adaptable 
•  Maximize all-source collection 
•  Optimize use of collection assets 
• Ensure 24/7 operation 
• Query time (avg.) 
• Proportion of collection tasking completed 
• Time (min) 
• Schedule error (avg.) 
PROCESS AND 
EXPLOIT 
• Provide situational refinement 
• Minimize time 
• Maximize accuracy/trustworthiness 
• Maximize thoroughness of 
information 
• Minimize processing time (max) 
• Minimize assessment time (max) 
• Multiple correlation (max) 
• Systems automation (max) 
• Residual/unused collected data (min) 
• Collection and exploitation for combat 
(max) 
• Secondary indications (max) 
ANALYZE AND 
INTEGRATE 
• Maximize threat refinement 
• Maximize objectivity 
• Unbiased analysis 
• Analysis time (min) 
• Situational awareness (max) 
• Accurate assessment of adversary/threat 
(including capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 
intentions/motivations) (max) 
DISSEMINATE 
• Maximize process refinement 
• Maximize usability for the 
commander 
• Maximize satisfying commander’s 
information requirements 
 
• Ensure capability of disseminating  
• 250 to 500 reports/min 
• Ensure information sharing “push/pull” 
capability 
• Support 10 to 25 C2 decisions per minute 
• Minimize percentage of unmet commanders 
Essential Elements of Information (EEI) 
(avg.) 
• Identity determination (max) 
• Timely accurate threat assessment (min) 
• Control, feedback, and resource 
management (max) 
Table 9.  Intelligence System Subfunctions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table captures in summary representation the Intelligence subfunctions, 
objectives and metrics (both MOPs and MOEs), defined for the C3I System. 
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2.2.4 Objectives Hierarchy – Force Group 
The development of the Objectives Hierarchy involved the generation of the 
objectives, MOEs, and MOPs for the Force System.  The initial layout of the  
Force System objectives was based on the Navy’s Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, 




Figure 19.  Force System Functions 
 
This figure shows the overarching functions of the Force Group.  These functions 
later dictated the metrics that would be used to evaluate the Force System 
architectures. 
 
Staging, Deploying, Committing, and Recovering functions were determined to 
encompass all capabilities that the reaction force was required to perform.  The Staging 
function was comprised of the Planning and Equipping subfunctions.  Planning was 
defined as choosing the preplanned response that was best suited to the tasking received 
from the C2 Group.  It was assumed that the C2 Center would assign the reaction force 
with a target and tasking to either engage or inspect.  The Equipping subfunction was 
designed to include the selection and collection of the correct equipment for the mission.  
The Deploy function was comprised of both Embarkation and Transportation 
subfunctions.  Embarkation was intended to include the safe and expeditious on-load of 
the transportation vessel.  The Transportation subfunction was derived to include the 
speed of transport as well as minimizing susceptibility of the reaction force while in 
transit.  This led to the necessity of self-defense capabilities embedded within all of the 
transportation vessels.  The Commit function was formulated to include either the 
Inspection of a suspect vessel or the Engagement of an SBA or SAW vessel.  Finally, the 
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Recover function was designed to include either the Recall of the forces or the 
Redirection of the forces onto their next target. 
For each of these top-level functions and subfunctions, one or more function 
objectives were developed, and specific metrics—MOEs and MOPs—were designated 
for each objective.  Table 10 includes the functions, objectives, and MOE/MOPs 
developed for the Force System.  The complete graphical depiction of the  
Objectives Hierarchy for the Sensors System is shown in Appendix B. 
 
FUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
STAGE 
• Minimize time required to select correct preplanned 
response 
• Minimize time required to equip correct gear 
• Time to select plan 
• Percent of gear needed for 
mission available 
• Percent of incorrect gear issued 
• Average time to equip force 
DEPLOY • Minimize time required to Embark force • Minimize transportation time to objective 
• Average time to embark 
• Percent of gear and personnel 
damaged 
• Average time to transport force 
• Average amount of damage 
sustained by force during transit  
COMMIT • Neutralize threat • Find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
• Ratio of ships damaged vs. ships 
attacked 
• Amount of damage to high value 
unit 
• Percent of missions completed 
• Percent of targets neutralized  
vs. engaged 
• Percent of WMD located 
RECOVER 
• Minimize time required to return reaction force to 
staging area 
• Minimize time required to reallocate force to new target 
• Average time to recall 
• Percent of equipment lost per 
mission 
• Average time to redirect 
• Percent of equipment and 
personnel out of service after 
mission 
Table 10.  Force System Functions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table shows functions and objectives were used to evaluate the Force 
architectures’ performance. 
 
2.2.5 Objectives Hierarchy – Land Inspection Group 
The overall Land Inspection objective was to detect hazardous materials, while 
minimizing impact on the economy.  The challenge for the Land Inspection Group 
simplified down to determining whether inbound cargo was legitimate, legal, and 
matched the manifest.  A secondary consideration was whether or not dangerous 
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materials were added to the cargo in transit and/or shipment.  To address these two 
concerns, the system was required to maintain accountability of containers, target suspect 
containers, detect hazardous materials within the cargo, and finally communicate the 
results both internally and externally.  Figure 20 illustrates the top-level functional 
decomposition for the Land Inspection System. 
 
 
Figure 20.  Land Inspection System Top-Level Functions 
 
This figure depicts the top-level functions of the Land Inspection System.  The  
Land Inspection System must be able to maintain container accountability, target 
suspect containers, detect hazardous material and contraband, and communicate 
the results to a Data Fusion and Analysis Center as well as a C2 unit. 
 
For each top-level function, specific objectives and subfunctions were developed 
as necessary to support the overall objectives of the Land System.  To maintain 
accountability of containers, the system was required to track changes of custody and 
location of containers throughout their shipment.  Also, targeting suspect containers 
required the system to assess and validate the origin, manifest, destination, and integrity 
of each container, determining whether specific containers were suspect or not.  The 
detection of hazardous materials was to be accomplished through searching the cargo and 
locating and identifying hazardous material.  Finally, the results and information were 
required to be communicated through transmission, receipt, recording, and display to 
appropriate personnel.  Table 11 shows the functions, objectives, and metrics of the  
Land Inspection System.  The complete graphical depiction of the Objectives Hierarchy 
for the Land Inspection System is shown in Appendix D. 
 60
 
FUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
MAINTAIN 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
• Provide custody and location information of 
containers 
• Average time container location is 
uncertain 
• Number of discrepancies in 
custody chain 
• Number of containers not in 
database 
TARGET • Establish procedures and triggers for classifying suspect containers 
• Number of containers targeted for 
inspection 
• Number of targeted containers 
with negative inspection results 
• Average classification time of 
containers as suspect/not suspect 
DETECT 
• Increase probability of detection of hazardous 
materials 
• Detect 80% of WMD 
• Number of hazardous materials 
located and identified 
• Average number of false alarm 
rates of system and sensor 
subsystems 
• Average search times of sensor 
employed 
• Number of containers inspected 
• Percent of containers never 
inspected 
• Probability of detection of each 
threat type 
• Number of WMDs missed 
COMMUNICATE 
• Provide integrated information to both internal 
and external agencies for assessing cargo 
containers 
• Maximize accessibility of information by 
applicable agencies 
• Maximize accuracy of database entries 
• Minimize time delay in reporting detection of 
hazardous materials 
• Delay time in notification of 
suspect containers 
• Average response time to detection 
of hazardous materials 
• Number of agencies able to access 
information 
Table 11.  Land Inspection System Functions, Objectives, and Metrics 
 
This table shows each function of the Land Inspection System, along with the 
objectives and subfunctions associated with that function.  Included are the metrics 
used to evaluate how well the system performs each function. 
 
2.2.6 Objectives Hierarchy – Sea Inspection Group 
The Sea Inspection Group developed the Objectives Hierarchy from the  
Effective Need Statement and the Functional Analysis (see Figure 21).  The group started 
with the main functions categories of Search, Detect, Locate/Identify, and Communicate.  
These terms come directly from the functional analysis and describe the major functions 
of the system.  The group then developed subfunctions from each of the main functions.  
For example, the Search function was broken into the subfunctions of searching the ship 
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and searching the cargo.  A further breakdown revealed that the system needed to search 







Figure 21.  Sea Inspection System Top-Level Objective Hierarchy 
 
This figure depicts the top-level functions of the Sea Inspection System.  The  
Sea Inspection System must be able to search a ship, detect the hazardous materials, 
locate and identify those materials and then communicate those results to a  
C2 entity. 
 
From the main functions and subfunctions the team developed the objectives for 
the system.  These objectives were intentionally selected to be general but measurable, as 
the team needed to measure how well each proposed alternative met an objective.  For 
example, the objective of the Search function was to maximize the search efficiency of 
the system.  The Sea Inspection Group further defined this objective by the use of a 
subobjective.  For the Search function, the subobjectives determined that the system 
should be able to search as much of the ship (inside and outside) and cargo as possible, as 
quickly as possible while maintaining a high level of thoroughness, a high level of 
mobility, and using the appropriate level of manpower to most efficiently complete  
the task. 
In order to measure the effectiveness of each alternative, the group identified at 
least one metric for each objective.  These metrics were used to evaluate how well the 
system accomplished the objective.  These metrics would be used in the modeling and 
analysis phase to select the best alternative for the system and are included in Table 12.  
The complete graphical depiction of the Objectives Hierarchy for the  




FUNCTION OBJECTIVES MOE/MOP 
SEARCH 
 
• Minimize manpower necessary to facilitate search 
• Provide man-portable, highly sensitive sensor 
devices 
• Provide for a thorough and complete search of 
containers and vessel (maximize volume 
searched) 
• Maximum operators and  
team size 
• Average search rate of teams 
• Maximum search time allowed 
for inspection 
• Minimum shipping delay time 
DETECT 
• Maximize effective detection range (maximize) 
• Maximize effective detection time (minimize) 
• Maximize efficient sensor sensitivity 
• PDET (max) for specific weapon 
or explosive 
• PFA (min) for specific weapon or 
explosive 
• Detection range (max) 
• Time to detection (min) 
• Shipping delay time 
• Number of detections 
LOCATE/ 
IDENTIFY 
• Provide identification capabilities in gear (max) 
• Locate material in timely manner (minimize) 
• Locate material accurately (maximize) 
• Maximize human factors objectives, including sea 
environment accommodation, indicator readings 
for day and night at-sea conditions, etc. 
• Minimize training time 
• Maximize training effectiveness  
• Maximize sensor flexibility (max) 
• Provide quick identification after detection  
and location 
• Average location time from 
detection 
• Average location error 
• Positive location ratio 
• Process execution time (min) 
• Usability rating for gear  
(from teams) 
• Successful identification ratio 
• Identification time (min) 
• Shipping delay time (min) 
COMMUNICATE 
 
• Maximize high data rate for external 
communications 
• Provide long distance communications 
• Provide communications onboard ship 
• Provide secure communications 
• Provide report generation format 
• Data security (high) 
• Average data rate (max) 
• Data range (max) 
• Timeliness of reports (max) 
• Average signal range 
• Ratio (jammed/total 
transmission) 
• Ratio (intercepted/total 
transmission) 
Table 12.  Sea Inspection System Metrics 
 
This table shows each function of the Sea Inspection System, along with the 
objectives associated with that function.  Included are the metrics used to evaluate 
how well the system performs each function. 
 
2.3 REQUIREMENTS GENERATION 
2.3.1 Requirements Generation – Overall 
Since the SEA-7 Cohort did not receive specific requirements from any clients or 
stakeholders, the Requirements Generation step was especially important to establish 
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guidance and direction for follow-on work.  The cohort began generating top-level 
system requirements by looking at the threat scenarios, and determining estimates for 
both the probability each attack would occur and the resulting probability of defeat a 
stakeholder would logically desire versus each attack (see Figure 22). 
 
Small Boat Attack (SBA) 
• Probable – Demonstrated 
• Defeat 80%  
 
Ship As Weapon (SAW) 
• Probable – Proven capability 
• Defeat 90%  
WMD – Chem/Bio 
• Occasional – Likely to occur 
• Defeat 90%  
 
WMD - Nuclear 
• Remote – Unlikely, but possible 
• Defeat 60%
 
Figure 22.  Threat Scenario Likelihood and Defeat Requirement Estimates 
 
Without specific client requirements, the SEA-7 Cohort proposed likely estimates 
and defeat probabilities for each threat scenario.  These proposals were accepted 
and used for the remainder of the study. 
 
In addition to threat-specific requirements, overall system requirements were 
derived, which applied regardless of attack type.  These top-level overall requirements 
were as follows: 
 
• Ninety percent operating capability no later than December 2010  
(five years). 
• 24/7 capability. 
• All-weather capability. 
• Interoperable with existing systems. 
• Daily system operational availability ≥ 0.9. 
 
These top-level requirement proposals were presented to the PACOM stakeholder 
for approval, and they were not changed.  In all of these top-level requirements, “defeat” 
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was defined as countering a single attack such that damage was $100,000 or less.  Also, 
these estimates all used a 95% confidence interval. 
In addition to top-level system requirements, top-level system objectives were 
generated to give a reference starting point for follow-on work.  As objectives, these 
criteria were flexible and could be changed, if required, in order to meet the top-level 
requirements.  Similar to the top-level requirements, top-level objectives were defined for 
each scenario and for the overall system.  The top-level system objectives for each threat 
scenario are shown in Figure 23. 
 
Identify Hostile Intent with 90% accuracy 
Engage SBA by 250m from target Small Boat Attack  (SBA) 
Neutralize SBA by 65m from target 
Identify 99% of high-risk SAW threats (hazardous cargo) 
Identify SAW attack with 95% accuracy 
Engage SAW by 2,000m from pier 
Ship As a Weapon  
(SAW) 
Neutralize SAW by 500m from pier 
WMD Detect Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) material prior to Critical Area 
Figure 23.  Top-Level Scenario-Specific System Objectives 
 
Derived from the top-level system requirements, the SEA-7 Cohort derived top-level 
system objectives for each threat scenario.  These objectives, while flexible, were 
useful as a starting point for further study. 
 
The overall top-level system objectives were defined as: 
 
• Evaluate MDP system cost. 
• Evaluate commercial system cost. 
• Evaluate commercial delay cost. 
• Evaluate expected damage cost for each threat scenario. 
 
These top-level, overall system objectives eventually translated into the MOEs 
and metrics that were used to evaluate the performance of the different integrated  
system architectures. 
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2.3.2 Requirements Generation – Sensors Group 
Requirements generation for the Sensors System utilized the Effective Need 
Statement, Needs Analysis, and the Sensors Group’s Objectives Hierarchy.  These 
combined artifacts provided the seed material for collaborative efforts in discussions and 
brainstorming sessions attended by SEA-7 and TDSI personnel.  These sessions 
combined a system-level perspective from the SEA Sensors Group and a well-developed, 
discipline-specific perspective from the Sensors Track TDSI professionals to give a large 
collection of system attributes and “desirables.”  In addition, the CONOPS  
(Section 1.8.1) provided general guidance for the Sensors System: 
“A network of space, air, surface, or subsurface sensors (active 
and/or passive), either single or in combination, will be used to locate, 
track and classify surface contacts within the Area of Regard (AOR).  
Design parameters will be chosen so the sensor network will effectively 
track all surface contacts above a minimum gross weight (initially  
300 tons).  This information will feed into the C3I system, and its 
accuracy will contribute to minimizing both Force and Inspection  
response times.” 
From this guidance and analysis of the particular sensor system-level implications 
of the overall top-level objectives, a preliminary document was developed by the  
Sensor Group, working in conjunction with the other MDP Groups—particularly the  
C3I Group—and the newly assimilated TDSI students.  This document included the 
following statement: 
 
Sensor system-level objective and overall concept:  To provide a 
persistent, real-time, all-weather capability to locate, track and classify all 
defined contacts of interest (COI) within the AOR to support situational 
awareness and C2. 
 
In order to satisfy these system-level objectives, the following attributes were 
determined to be required from the sensor system: 
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• 24/7, all-weather, real-time (RT)/near real-time (NRT) capability. 
• Fully networked and dynamic tasking (Network Centric Warfare (NCW)  
basic tenets). 
• Highly automated. 
• Achieve multiple “sensory views” of each COI. 
• High sensor data integration and association (fusion). 
• Overlapping sensor coverage to provide seamless coverage over the  
entire AOR. 
• High scalability/modularity. 
• High connectivity (communications requirement). 
• High information assurance (IA requirement). 
• Very high operational availability (reliability, supportability, 
maintainability). 
 
In order to attain these required attributes, the following basic system-level design 
requirements were identified: 
 
• A combination of sensors (and platforms) networked to provide a 
common operational picture (COP).  No single sensor type/platform could 
provide all of the necessary data. 
• Radar as primary provider for COP.  The specific “all-weather” 
requirement made this mandatory in a heavy-rainfall environment. 
• Augmented by other sensor capabilities to meet classification and 
identification (ID) requirements, i.e., electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), 
sonar, magnetic and also cooperative means (particularly vessel tracking 
systems like the Automatic Identification System (AIS)).  Although radar 
was selected to be the primary sensor, the specific observables that can be 
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obtained by radar were of lower resolution than that required to provide 
classification and identification for most COIs. 
 
From these system-level design requirements, the Sensors Group derived the 
following technical requirements for the Sensor System: 
 
• Sensitivity (minimum detectability requirements). 
o Locate and track 99.9% of “large ships” (≥ 50m length – 300 gross 
registered tonnes (GRTs). 
o Locate and track 80% of “small boats” (≥ 7m length). 
• Area Coverage. 
o Range:  within the defined AOR. 
o Coverage:  overlapping coverage within AOR. 
• Accuracy of Measurements (position). 
o SAW (large ship):  50m Circular Error Probable (CEP). 
o SBA (small boat):  10m CEP. 
• Time Latency. 
o Ability to meet C2 decision cycle timing constraints. 
 
2.3.3 Requirements Generation – C3I Group 
Requirements Generation for Communications and Information Assurance was 
primarily conducted by the TDSI Communications and Information Assurance tracks.  
Requirements were derived from the scenario (use case) descriptions, CONOPS, 
Effective Need Statement, and the Objectives Hierarchy. 
Communications was the common thread that determined how all the other 
systems interfaced with the C3I System.  Communications and Information Assurance 
requirements generation began with sensor interface requirements: 
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Interface Requirements (from Sensors) 
• Bi-directional communications (from C2 to Sensors and from Sensors to  
C2 and Intelligence). 
• Digital (analog-to-digital conversion for some existing legacy systems). 
• Asymmetric bandwidth; less bandwidth will be needed to communicate 
directions and tasking from the C2 Center than to communicate constantly 
gathered information to the C2 Center from the sensor(s).  This may also 
be priority-based. 
• Time latency must be RT or NRT. 
• Sensor or communications equipment self-test can be latent. 
• Two operational modes (broadcast and query/interrogation and polling). 
• Transmissions must be secure (Information Assurance concern). 
• Topology (hierarchical, mesh, or other). 
• Deployment to isolated sites. 
• Mobile link capability. 
• Deployed forces communications. 
• Twenty-four hours a day/seven days a week. 
• All-weather. 
• Ability to meet C2 decision cycle times. 
• Time to sense. 
• Time to transmit. 
• Time to apply applications and algorithms. 
• Time to transmit any decision. 
• Update rate. 
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Communications Requirements 




o Accommodate mobile nodes. 
o Interoperable with existing systems. 
o Bi-directional channel. 
o Unicast and multicast. 
o Asymmetric bandwidth. 
o Digital. 






o Control on accessibility. 
o Ensure integrity of information exchange. 
o Maintain confidentiality of classes of information. 
o Availability of information. 
o Interoperability across different protocols. 
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C2 Requirements 
“Network centricity” and situational awareness drove C2 and intelligence 
requirement generation: 
 
• Achieve Interoperability:  Leads to self-synchronization and shared 
awareness. 
o Coalition Environment. 
• Achieve Sensibility:  The ability to make sense of a situation. 
• Orchestrate a means to respond. 
• Support Agility:  Represent future threats and operational environments 
through foresight. 
• Robustness:  The ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, 
situations, and conditions (to measure must examine effectiveness of  
C2 Systems across full range of operating environments and  
relevant missions). 
• Resilience:  The ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune, damage, 
or a destabilizing perturbation in the environment (to measure how the 
system [commanders, force, and support systems] responds to stress, 
force, number of nodes (self-healing networks), collaborative decision 
making (more resilience = can withstand greater stress, disrupted for  
less time)). 
• Flexibility:  The ability to employ alternative ways to succeed and the 
capacity to move seamlessly between them (shift seamlessly to other 
alternatives).  The ability to see changes in battle-space more rapidly 
(measure how fast decisions can be disseminated and implemented). 
 71
• Responsiveness:  The ability to react to a change in the environment in a 
timely manner (the ability to control tempo rather than simply speed  
of response). 
• Innovation:  The ability to do new things and the ability to do old things 
in new ways (keeps enemy from adapting and learning how to thwart) 
denies the enemy an advantage due to learning (use experts to measure 
whether system is innovative). 
• Adaptation:  The ability to change work processes and the ability to 
change the organization methods: 
o Alter how information is distributed and how coalitions  
are organized. 
o Create new ways of dealing with coalitions. 
o Flatten organizational structures-modularity. 
o Develop more efficient work processes. 
• Provide an operational intent. 
• Be scenario independent. 
 
Intelligence Requirements 
The system requirements for an Intelligence System were typically very general 
and less technical.  The two key requirements for the Intelligence System were timeliness 
and relevance.  It was important for the decision makers to have pertinent information in 
the shortest amount of time.  The other requirements of the system could be tied directly 
to the functional areas. 
 
• Plan Function. 
• Relevant:  There must be a developed plan in order to ensure the correct 
information is given to the correct decision makers. 
 72
• Collect Data. 
• Available:  It is critical that the system be readily available through 
continuous operation and all source involvement. 
• Dynamically Adaptable:  This requirement ensures a level of completed 
tasking as well as the ability to handle tactical collection in an  
RT environment. 
• Process/Exploit. 
• Timely:  Key factor in determining the effectiveness of the system.  The 
intelligence can be relevant and accurate, but if it does not reach the  
decision maker with enough time to properly act on that intelligence, then 
the system has failed. 
• Accurate:  Correct processing of the raw data so analysts can make 
confident recommendations.  Raw data is converted to information at this 
stage in the intelligence process. 
• Thorough:  The ability to process and exploit a large percentage of the 
collected data.  If the system is unable to process enough of the collected 
data, collection assets are wasted and the system is inefficient. 
• Analyze/Integrate. 
• Objective:  Unbiased look at the collected information and fuse the data 
together such that the most reliable intelligence is being disseminated to 
the decision maker.  The analysis cannot be affected by any political or 
personal agenda because this would discredit the value of the intelligence 
to the operator. 
• Disseminate. 
• Relevant:  There must be a developed plan in order to ensure the correct 
information is given to the correct decision makers when it is time to 
disseminate the intelligence. 
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• Usable:  It is important for the system to be able to handle the high 
volumes of intelligence reports.  Also, it is necessary for everyone 
involved in the situation to have access to those intelligence reports. 
 
2.3.4 Requirements Generation – Force Group 
The functions of the Force System determined how to meet the security needs of 
the maritime shipping industry at sea, specifically defending both existing infrastructure 
as well as transiting vessels from various attacks.  The Force System was a necessary 
addition to forces in theater, because it represented a persistent threat to the terrorists in 
the AOR.  To meet the objectives, the Force System had the following requirements: 
 
• All-Hours Capable:  The reaction force must be able to respond during 
both day and night crises. 
• All-Weather Capable:  The reaction force must be capable of responding 
to SBA attacks in weather up to Sea State 3 and SAW and WMD attacks 
in weather up to Sea State 5. 
• Self Sustaining:  All reaction forces must be capable of carrying all 
necessary equipment and inspection gear. 
• Long Range Response:  Inspection team must be capable of intercepting 
a suspect vessel at ranges exceeding 250 NM. 
 
2.3.5 Requirements Generation – Land Inspection Group 
The functions of the Land Inspection System determined how to meet the security 
needs of the maritime shipping industry on shore, specifically for the world’s busiest 
ports.  The Land Inspection System was necessary to increase the number of containers 
inspected in order to prevent hazardous materials from being shipped between countries 
or to be smuggled onto a large merchant ship.  It was impractical to stop and thoroughly 
inspect every container without adverse economic effects.  To meet the objectives, the 
Land Inspection System had the following requirements: 
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• System components available for implementation in five years. 
• Detect hazardous materials to include chemical, biological, nuclear, 
radiological, and explosive (CBNRE) materials. 
• Screen and inspect IMO standard 20-foot containers. 
• Validate manifest for container processing and shipping. 
• Be flexible for use in different port structures. 
• Provide adequate present and past information about containers, shippers,  
and carriers. 
• Communicate results. 
• Use active and passive inspection technologies to increase the number of 
containers inspected and minimize delay. 
• Provide targeting logic for determining which containers to inspect. 
• Take ten minutes to initially scan containers. 
• Have dedicated personnel for inspection analysis of sensor results. 
• Improve intransit security of containers. 
 
The following system attributes were also determined: 
 
• Secure:  The information used to target and inspect containers could not 
be susceptible to infiltrators or inadvertent receipt by unauthorized 
personnel. 
• Efficient:  The Inspection System was required to not unduly hinder the 
volume of container throughput.  This would have a local affect as well as 
worldwide economic impact. 
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• Cost Effective:  The benefit of having an inspection regime was required 
to provide a heightened level of security that outweighed adverse impacts 
on commercial shipping and port operations. 
• Minimize Risk:  The motivation of an Inspection System was to detect 
potentially illicit materials that could be used as WMD.  The system was 
required to reduce the vulnerability of the commercial shipping industry to 
such an event. 
• Adaptability:  Shipping of containerized cargo was a detailed, complex 
industry that operated continuously.  Since there were a wide range of 
variables that made each port unique, the system was required to be 
flexible in order to be implemented over a large range of various  
sized ports. 
 
2.3.6 Requirements Generation – Sea Inspection Group 
The Sea Inspection Group derived the system requirements from the  
Objectives Hierarchy and other inputs, especially the Stakeholder Analysis.  The  
WMD scenario was used as a basis for the analysis.  For each of the alternatives, the 
following detailed Sea Inspection System requirements were generated: 
 
• Search a minimum of 80% of each ship in six hours; equal to  
10½ containers/minute. 
• For bulk carriers, to search 80% of each ship in six hours; equal to  
373 cubic meters/minute. 
• A source capable of supplying power for nine hours to sensors and 
communications equipment (150% of max search time). 
• Sensor packages were required to be man-portable. 
• Inspection teams were required to be available 24 hours a day. 
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• Sensor packages were required to operate effectively in the  
maritime environment. 
• Communications were required to be established between Inspection 
Team members. 
• Status and results of inspections were required to be transmitted to  
C2 elements. 
• System components were required to be in existence or viable within the 
next five years. 
• Other factors that were considered included:  flexibility of technology  
(i.e., components that included several sensors in one unit), physical size 
of the technology, and redundancy of sensors. 
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3.0 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS PHASE 
Design and Analysis was the second phase in the Systems Engineering Design 
Process.  The objective of the Design and Analysis phase was to create and evaluate 
several potential solutions to the problem.  Progress through the Design and Analysis 
phase was divided into the Alternatives Generation step and the Modeling and Analysis 
step.  During Alternatives Generation, multiple system solutions to the problem were 
constructed and the current systems were analyzed.  Under the Modeling and Analysis 
step, the feasible alternative solutions and the current systems were modeled and then 
analyzed with multiple trials based on predefined scenarios.  All the data from the trials 
was recorded and evaluated.  The Design and Analysis phase resulted in feasible 
alternative solutions and an analysis of the benefits and trade-offs of each potential 
solution as well as current systems. 
 
3.1 ALTERNATIVES GENERATION STEP 
The Alternative Generation step involved the “creative mental process of 
producing concepts and ideas in order to solve the problem.”36  Brainstorming of 
potential solutions was based on system requirements and objectives.  These 
requirements and objectives bound the design space, and a feasibility screening process 
imposed realistic limitations on the physical and technological characteristics of the 
possible system solutions.  In addition to creating new solutions to the problem, the 
current system (or recognition of the lack of a current system) was also included as a 
possible solution to the problem.  Following the development and selection of possible 
solutions, the alternatives were modeled and analyzed. 
 
3.1.1 Alternatives Generation – Sensors Group 
Sensor System alternatives were developed based on system-level requirements. 
Initially, technological solutions were considered, and subsequently, through an iterative 
process, they were further qualified and refined. 
                                                 
36 Eugene Paulo, “Alternative Generation,” SI4001 Introduction to Systems Engineering, 
Supplemental Class Notes, (July 2004). 
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3.1.2 Design Space – Sensors Group 
The overall Design Space for the Sensors System was captured using a 
morphological chart represented in Table 13.  This chart was created in brainstorming 
sessions and through research in order to capture the spectrum of attributes any  
Sensor System was expected to have.  Specific care was taken to be creative, innovative, 
and inclusive.  System synthesis was performed through careful and collaborative 




Table 13.  Sensor System Morphological Chart 
 
The morphological chart captures all technological alternatives considered.  Of 
those, only the ones regarded as being not clearly infeasible were carried forward. 
 
As seen in the chart, the result was a substantial number of different combinations 
of “systems.”  Nevertheless, considering the timeline for implementation and operation, 
some sensors clearly played a more probable and central role than others for particular 
missions.  After an initial survey of the technology and considering the particular 
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requirements and scenarios defined for the project, two fundamental decisions regarding 
the design space were also made and carried forward from this point: 
 
• Radar (different platforms) would be the primary asset for detection and 
tracking.  This decision is basically driven by: 
o The “all-weather” requirement.  No other Sensor System has the 
required capability to provide continuous coverage in  
adverse weather. 
o The need to detect and track both cooperative and noncooperative 
contacts.  Cooperative contacts could be detected and tracked 
effectively by other means (any global positioning satellite  
(GPS)-based fleet monitoring system or AIS for instance), but that 
solution would not work for noncooperative COIs. 
• AIS and EO/IR sensors would be augmentation assets for 
classification/identification (ID).  In this case, AIS would be the main 
Sensor System for classification/ID for cooperative contacts and  
EO/IR Systems would be used for noncooperative COIs.  EO/IR sensors, 
in particular, have severe environmental limitations, as will be seen later 
in this analysis. 
 
These decisions did not intend to imply that radar was not capable—in some 
instances—of performing classification/ID or, conversely, that EO/IR or AIS could not 
perform detection and tracking, as was previously mentioned.  They were just design 
decisions made with particular consideration of sensor-specific performance 
characteristics, advantages and disadvantages, and supported by historical data and 
operational experience. 
 
3.1.3 Summary of Alternative Architectures – Sensors Group 
Following the systematic approach, many probable, possible, and conceptual 
technological architectures were briefly explored and researched.  The intent was to be as 
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inclusive and broad as possible, the only constraint being the time horizon established for 
the project (five years out), and to include the full spectrum of attributes in the analysis 
and selection of those alternatives deemed most fit for providing the required capabilities 
and not clearly infeasible, given the design and environmental constraints. 
The following specific alternatives were initially selected from the original set for 
detailed evaluation.  All the proposed alternatives had a baseline common configuration, 
which had the following characteristics: 
 
• Sensor deployment was based on separate sectorized Area and Approach 
coverages.  Areas I and II covered the critical narrow part of the Straits 
from Kelang to Singapore (roughly 200 NM).  Areas III and IV covered 
the wider portions of the straits north of Kelang and Area V the wider 
portion south of Singapore.  The approaches extended these areas to the 
300 NM maximum ranges defined, into the Andaman and  
South China Seas. 
• Radar (different platforms) was the primary means for detection and 
tracking.  Each alternative had distinct characteristics based on the 
selection of the particular Radar System or systems that were selected in 
each case. 
• All the alternatives included the following sensors as augmentation for the 
classification/identification function: 
o Fixed and relocatable EO/IR Systems to provide additional 
observation of critical point areas (critical infrastructure,  
choke points, intelligence-cued points, etc.). 
o Maritime patrol aircraft (manned fixed/rotary wing and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs)) in either preprogrammed or cued modes; 
in both surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
o Maritime patrol vessels in either preprogrammed or cued modes; in 
both surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
o AIS base stations (ground and space-based variants explored). 
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In addition to the baseline configuration, three distinct radar alternatives were 
designed and evaluated in a first iteration, for the primary detection and  
tracking function. 
 
Ground Microwave and HFSWR Alternative: 
 
• A network of ground-based, maritime surveillance microwave radar 
stations is the primary asset for Area coverage for Sectors I and II, and 
along the coast through Sectors III, IV, and V. 
• Ground-based, High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) maritime 
surveillance radar stations are primary assets for Approach coverage and 
Area coverage for Sectors III, IV, and V. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Ground Microwave Radar and HFSWR Alternative 
 
This alternative considers HFSWR stations and microwave coastal radar stations.  
The former performs well in detection and tracking of all but the smallest crafts out 
to 200 NM; the later performs well against all vessels—including small, inflatable, 
fast boats—although only at a practical range of approximately 25 NM (antenna 
height dependent). 
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Ground Microwave and Space-Based Radar Vessel Tracking and Monitoring 
System Alternative: 
 
• A network of ground-based, maritime surveillance microwave radar 
stations is the primary asset for Area coverage for Sectors I and II, and 
along the coast through Sectors III, IV, and V. 
• A Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation of satellites is the primary asset to 
provide radar detection and tracking of maritime COIs in Area Sectors III, 
IV, and V and Approach coverages. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Ground Microwave Radar and Space-Based Radar Alternative 
 
This alternative considers the use of Space Based Radar (SBR) to cover the areas 
where coastal radar systems cannot reach due to line of sight considerations.  A 
constellation of no less than four satellites, in three orbital planes, is needed to get 
coverage and revisit times of approximately 30 minutes. 
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High Altitude Endurance Aerostat Radar - (HAEAR) Alternative: 
 
• A network of high-altitude aerostats (70,000 feet) is the primary asset to 
provide radar (microwave) detection and tracking of maritime COIs in 
both Area and Approach coverages. 
• A variation considered for this alternative includes an AIS transponder 
base station in the same aerostat platform. 
 
 
Figure 26.  HAEAR Alternative 
 
This alternative considers the use of four HAEAR stations.  These platforms are 
placed at approximately 70,000 feet—well above the jet stream region and outside 
controlled airspace—and allow coverages in excess of 350 NM from a  
single platform. 
 
3.1.4 Feasibility Screening – Sensors Group 
Sonar:  The use of acoustic means (sonar) of detection and/or classification was 
part of an initial feasibility study, which recommended the elimination of this alternative 
due to severe environmental limitations.  The specific information provided by that study 
is detailed in Appendix G, which provides detail for the Sensors Group. 
 84
HAEAR and Space Based Radar (SBR):  A second iteration of the feasibility 
screening of the previously defined set of alternatives was performed, particularly 
focusing on the five-year technology horizon.  As a result, the HAEAR and SBR 
alternatives were both eliminated from further consideration. 
For the HAEAR, consultation with subject matter experts put the initial operating 
capability in the 15- to 20-year timeframe, mainly for power and weight considerations.37  
Although SBR seemed to be a more mature technology, maritime surveillance 
applications (meeting the requirements established for our system) were determined to be 
beyond the five-year time horizon as well.  An overall assessment of technological risk 
for these two alternatives (HAEAR and SBR) showed that pouring additional dollars into 
the Research and Development (R&D) front end to accelerate the development of the 
technology to an acceptable level was not of great utility, given that other technology 
alternatives exist right now which are more advantageous (for performance, cost, and 
technology risk), as will be seen later in the detailed analysis of the selected alternatives. 
Particularly for the aerostat solution, a tethered variant at a lower platform height 
(5,000 feet instead of 70,000 feet) was subsequently reviewed, and a new alternative was 
developed which used lower altitude and endurance tethered aerostats (referred to as 
Medium Altitude and Endurance Aerostat Radar or MAEAR).  These platforms, based on 
proven technologies that are currently operational in many countries, could be used 
effectively to provide the needed capabilities out to the required maximum ranges.  
Although a significantly larger number of aerostats would be required due to the reduced 
coverage footprint, this option was considered far less technologically risky than the 
70,000-foot HAEAR variant.38 
As a result of this second and final iteration, two alternatives were defined as the 
baseline configuration for detection and tracking (radar-based).  Both alternatives also 
included the common classification/ID augmentation sensors (EO/IR and AIS) as 
                                                 
37 Dr. Kirk Evans, (Presentation at the USCG Maritime Domain Awareness Technology Forum) 
Department of Homeland Security, Santa Clara, CA, May 2005. 
38 Martin Steely, “Radar Aerostats Provide Cost-Effective Platform for Enhanced Observation,” 
Special Report:  Jane’s International Defense Review, 1 April 2005. 
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previously defined.  These alternatives, together with the “As-Is” System, are presented 
at the end of this section: 
 
• Alternative 1:  Ground Microwave Radar + HFSWR 
• Alternative 2:  MAEAR (Microwave Radar) + HFSWR 
 
3.1.5 Quality Functional Deployment (QFD) – Sensors Group 
As a measure to assure that the Sensors Group effectively met the expectations of 
the stakeholders and completely allocated system requirements, the Sensors Group 
developed Table 14, which depicts a basic QFD matrix.  This provided an explicit cross-
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(1) Limited to cooperating vessels
(2) Revisit rate is a function of orbit and # satellites  
Table 14.  Sensors System QFD 
 
The quality functional deployment matrix shows a clear cross-check reference of 
system-level requirements versus technical capabilities for each of the sensors 
considered. 
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3.1.6 2005 “As-Is” System – Sensors Group 
A limited survey and analysis of existing Sensor Systems and capabilities in the 
region was performed and is detailed in Appendix G.  This basic system included: 
 
• Twelve radar remote-stations; seven in Malaysia (X/S band) and five in 
Singapore (X band). 
• Three VTS authorities (Kelang, Johor, and Singapore). 
• Seven AIS base stations, covering 180 miles from Kelang to Tanjung Piai  
in Malaysia. 
• Two AIS base stations in the Singapore Straits. 
• Several different MPA and patrol vessels. 
• Ship’s own sensors (mainly commercial-grade radar and AIS  
mobile stations). 
 
As shown in Figure 27, there exists limited radar and AIS coverage in the  
Straits of Malacca, and the existing coverage is only available in the southern stretches of 
the Straits.  The coverage extends from the vicinity of Port Kelang, Malaysia, southeast 
through the narrow portion of the Straits to Singapore.  There is no coverage to the 




Figure 27.  “As-Is” Sensors System in the Straits of Malacca 
 
The “As-Is” System was surveyed through existing open-literature and sources.  
There exists some very limited radar and AIS coverage south of Kelang, which 
extends along the Malaysian coastline through the Singapore Strait. 
 
3.1.6.1 Alternative 1:  Ground Microwave Radar + HFSWR 
In addition to the baseline common configuration, the Sensors  
Alternative 1 utilized ground (coastal) microwave radar and HFSWR, including: 
 
• A network of ground-based (coastal), maritime surveillance microwave 
radar stations that was the primary asset for coverage in Sectors I and  
II (Area). 
• Ground-based, HFSWR maritime surveillance radar stations were the 
primary asset for coverage in Sectors III, IV, and V (Area),  
and approaches. 
• Augmented by AIS base stations (ground-based variant selected), 
collocated with each radar station. 
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• Augmented by maritime patrol aircraft (manned, fixed-wing, selected) in 
both preprogrammed and cued modes.  Reconnaissance missions with 
EO/IR payload (classification/ID) only. 
 
 
Figure 28.  Sensors System Alternative 1 – Ground Microwave Radar and HFSWR 
 
This alternative considers a slight variation of the previously defined coastal radar 
system.  Instead of placing stations all the way north to the entrance of the strait, the 
coverage is limited to the critical area south of Kelang.  HFSWR covers  
the approaches. 
 
3.1.6.2 Alternative 2:  MAEAR (Microwave) + HFSWR 
This alternative was derived from the HAEAR variant, which was 
discarded during feasibility analysis due to technological risk, as previously discussed.  In 
addition to the baseline common configuration, the Sensors Alternative 2 utilized 
MAEAR and HFSWR, including: 
 
• A network of tethered maritime surveillance microwave MAEAR stations 
was the primary asset for coverage in Sectors I, II, and III (Area). 
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• Ground-based, HFSWR maritime surveillance radar stations were the 
primary asset for coverage in Sectors III, IV, and V (Area),  
and approaches. 
• Augmented by AIS base stations (aerostat variant selected). 
• Augmented by maritime patrol aircraft (manned, fixed-wing selected) in 
both preprogrammed and cued modes.  Both surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions.  Radar (detection and tracking), AIS, and EO/IR 
payload (classification/ID). 
• Augmented by maritime local short-range surveillance microwave radar 




Figure 29.  Sensors System Alternative 2 – MAEAR and HFSWR 
 
This alternative was defined once the infeasibility of the HAEAR option was 
determined.  Trading range (coverage) for altitude, a set of lower altitude  
(5,000 feet) tethered aerostats is used to get the required coverage along the area of 
the strait, while HFSWR covers the approaches out to an additional 200 NM. 
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3.2.1 Alternatives Generation – C3I Group 
The C3I Group took an ideational approach to alternative generation.  Ideation is 
the creative mental process of producing concepts and ideas in order to solve problems.  
The group relied on conceptual analogy, brainstorming, and research on existing 
technologies, designs, and capabilities to generate alternatives.  The process was further 
divided into the Command and Control (C2)/Intelligence, Communications, and 
Information Assurance Subgroups. 
 
3.2.2 Design Space – C3I Group 
The C3I design space for technology and infrastructures ranged from existing 
systems to Technology Readiness Level 4 (TRL 4) Systems.  TRL 4 was defined as 
technology that has been proven in the laboratory and ready to be field-tested and that 
could be 90% operational within five years.
39
 
The Communications and Information Assurance technology included systems 
developed by Singapore and the United States.  The C2 and Intelligence design space 
included technology and procedures used by the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center (MIFC) West Coast in Alameda, California, and included in Singapore’s 
National Security Strategy. 
 
3.2.3 Alternatives Generation 
The MIFC West Coast was the primary analogous system for the C2 and 
Intelligence architectures.  It represented the first collocated C2 and Intelligence Center 
and served as the model for the configuration of subsequent centers.  The group did not 
design separate C2 and Intelligence architectures, but developed alternatives that 
included C2/Intelligence Data Fusion Centers that provided the decision maker with 
operational intelligence.  Operational intelligence is similar to “knowledge mobilization” 
as described by Edward R. Smith in “Effects Based Operations:  Applying  
                                                 
39 The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Section 10.5.2:  Technology Maturity and Technology 
Readiness Assessments, http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp, (15 March 2005). 
 91
Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War.”
40
  Knowledge mobilization was the 
ability to “tap” into knowledge (i.e., intelligence) wherever it was available to the 
decision maker.
41
  Knowledge mobility, along with options, agility, and coordination, 




The Communications and Information Assurance teams were composed of TDSI 
students from those respective tracks.  These teams were responsible for designing the 
communications and information assurance architectures.  It was assumed that current 
computer technology was sufficient to handle all C2, intelligence, communications, and 
information assurance requirements.  As a result, computers were only included in the 
system cost analysis. 
The communications architecture alternatives were based on the requirements of 
the Intelligence and C2 Centers.  The intent was to incorporate the redundant features of a 
“mesh” system with control of a hierarchical system. 
Information Assurance alternative generation applied a Defense In Depth (DID) 
strategy that placed multiple barriers between an attacker and security-critical 
information resources.  DID also provided added protection and increased security by 
increasing the cost of an attack.  Figure 30 is a conceptual model of DID. 
 
                                                 
40 Edward R. Smith, “Effects Based Operations:  Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, 
and War,” CCRP Publication Series, (November 2002). 
41 Ibid, p. 538. 









Defense in Depth Security Model
 
Figure 30.  DID Security Model 
 
The DID strategy places multiple security barriers between potential attackers and 
all layers of defense mechanism:  perimeter defense, network defense, host defense, 
application defense, and data defense. 
 
At the base of DID were formal security policies and procedures governing and 
protecting the entire system.  These dictated the expected behavioral and protection 
requirement of the system.  These policies were applicable to all layers of defense 
mechanism:  perimeter defense, network defense, host defense, application defense, and 
data defense. 
 
3.2.4 2005 “As-Is” System 
There was no regional C3I System integrating Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
operating at the time of this report.  Of the countries bordering the Malacca Straits, 
Singapore was best suited to react to and/or counter the threats represented in our 
scenarios.  Singapore’s National Security Architecture represented the only 









Figure 31.  “As-Is” System:  Singapore as the Only Maritime C2/Intelligence Presence 
 
As shown on the map, Singapore’s focus on Maritime Domain Protection is relevant 
to only a very small portion of the Malacca Straits region.  Current Sensor range 
restricts their Maritime Domain Awareness to the highlighted area, stretching 
northwest to the port of Kelang.  Malaysia and Indonesia only policed their 
respective territorial waters. 
 
The aim of Singapore’s national security architecture was to integrate and 
“synergize” the work of different national security agencies in the operations, intelligence 
and policy domains43.  They established the National Security Task Force (NSTF), which 
was staffed by both police and military elements, to maintain a comprehensive watch 
over the island and to integrate operational responses on land, in the air, and at sea.  The 
Ministry of Home Affairs set up the Homefront Security Center and the armed forces 
developed the Island Defense Operations Center as key components of the NSTF.  
Singapore also set up the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center for integrating intelligence at 
the national, regional, and international levels.  In contrast to Singapore’s externally 
focused security strategy, Malaysia and Indonesia were more focused on “territorial” or 
internal security.44 
                                                 
43 Tony Yam, “Fight Against Terror, Singapore’s National Security Strategy,” National Security 
Coordination Centre, http://www.pmo.gov.sp/NSCS/FightAgainstTerror.pdf, (2004):  pp.13-32. 
44 Dana R. Dillon, “Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia,” Parameters,  
(Spring 1997):  pp. 119-133. 
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The current “data fusing” architecture was determined to be highly centralized 
because Singapore represented the primary Maritime Domain Awareness System in the 
Malacca Straits.  This system provided its relevance based on top-down, centralized 
planning in a hierarchal control flow.  Vessel priority was determined to be “time-based” 
with respect to position relative to Singapore harbor.  Data fusion and analysis was 
determined to be manual and sequential based on the ability to collect and process 
valuable information.  There was a high potential for “backlog” in the sequential queue.  
The “As-Is Data Center” Systems utilized existing sensors in the area of responsibility 
(AOR) providing technical Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) collection (with only 5% 
provided from HUMINT.  Authority was never delegated, which limited the system’s 
adaptability to cope with new and diverse situations. 
A cargo vessel entering the Straits of Malacca from the northwest would be 
tracked by George Town, Malaysia.  Even though there is a submarine-laid fiber-optic 
cable (known as Sea-Me-We 3) that traverses the Malacca Straits, there was no system in 
place to ensure track information would be passed from George Town to Singapore.  
George Town could pass information to Singapore telephonically, but the lack of a 
formal intelligence sharing system impedes a common intelligence or operating picture.  
For the SAW and WMD scenarios, vessels would not be tracked by Singapore radar until 
they are in the vicinity of Kelang, approximately 400 km from Singapore.  Its situation 
could not be assessed until after the harbor pilot boards in the vicinity of Klang.  
Singapore only tracks cargo vessels destined for Singapore. 
 
3.2.4.1 Alternative 1 
The first system alternative divided the Malacca Straits into two regions, 
each containing a similar C2/Intelligence Center, one located in the port of George Town 
at the northwest entrance to the Malacca Straits and the other in Singapore  















Figure 32.  Alternative Architecture 1:  Two C2/Intelligence Centers—George Town and Singapore 
 
The regional architecture of Alternative 1 provides a common operating picture 
(COP) of the Malacca Straits Region.  However, the C2/Intelligence Centers located 
at George Town in the northwest and Singapore in the southeast have a very large 
AOR for intelligence collection, data fusion, and C2. 
 
George Town would be responsible for intelligence on traffic entering the 
straits from the northwest.  Singapore would be responsible for traffic entering from the 
southeast, for example, from the South China Sea.  Each center would be responsible for 
intelligence collection and data fusion and creation of a Common Intelligence Picture 
(CIP) of their area.  The alternative also included a “network centric” communication 
architecture to facilitate sharing information to create a COP of the entire region.  The 
COP was a result of each C2/Intelligence Center having access to each other’s CIP.  The 
communications network incorporated a fiber-optic backbone, wireless communications 
buoy stations, and Stratellites. 
 
3.2.4.2 Alternative 2 
Alternative 2 divided the AOR into four regions, each containing a 
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Figure 33.  Alternative 2:  Network Centric Architecture 
 
The intent of Alternative 2 was to segregate the AOR into smaller sections of 
distributed operational responsibility and more manageable areas for analysis. 
 
It included the same communications network as Alternative 1.  The 
primary difference between Alternatives 1 and 2 was how the region was divided into 
“analysis segments.”  Three of the four regions were augmented by two data fusion cells.  
Singapore contained three data fusion cells to cover traffic coming directly south from 
the South China Sea.  This provided nine data fusion cells spread throughout the Malacca 
Straits.  The purpose of these cells was to aggregate intelligence into a “local” CIP, which 
was aggregated by the C2/Intelligence Center into a regional COP. 
Another feature of Alternative 2 was a HUMINT intelligence network.  
Thirteen Intelligence Collection nodes, either separate or collocated with the data fusion 
centers, were spread throughout the region.  These collection nodes provided a pipeline 
of information provided by someone seeing something out of the ordinary that, when 
combined with other information, could provide a warning to potential terrorist attacks. 
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The intent of the C2 System for Alternative 2 was to be  
“Self-Synchronizing”.45  It would adapt to a method of decision making (cyclic, 
interventionist, problem-solving, problem-bounding, selective control, control-free) based 
on the situation or scenario.  This adaptability would be achieved through distributed 
authority to all regional C2/Intelligence Centers for actionable tasking and responsibility.  
A dynamic intelligence collection mix, as well as full counterintelligence based on 
information dissemination, contributed to the system’s adaptability.  Other  
self-synchronizing characteristics include clear command intent, competence among 
decision makers, and trust among decision makers at all levels.  An historical example of  
self-synchronizing C2 was exhibited by the British fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar 
(1805).46  Lord Nelson was entrusted with the main battle fleet to find and destroy the 
Spanish and French fleets.  Traditional British tactics put Lord Nelson’s vessels at a 
disadvantage when exchanging gunfire alongside the more heavily armed Spanish and 
French ships.  He adapted to the situation and attacked perpendicular to the enemy’s line, 
rather than parallel.  Once the battle began, there was little opportunity for 
communication between British captains.  The British victory was attributed to shared 
information about the battlespace, clear commander’s intent, and competence and trust 
among decision makers at all levels. 
Another feature of the Alternative 2 intelligence system was autonomous 
fusing that pushed the “track identification and classification” function down to the 
sensor domain.  This was accomplished by collocating AIS transponders with sensors, 
similar to the current aviation Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System.  Intelligence 
analysis at the regional C2/Intelligence centers utilized consequence-probability and 
time-based parameters to determining threat priorities.  Use of pattern recognition and 
intelligence agents, located at the local Intelligence Center, provided a more enhanced 
situational awareness over the “As-Is” and Alternative 1 Systems. 
                                                 
45 David S. Albert and Richard E. Hayes, “Power to the Edge,” CCRP Publication Series, (June 2003):  
pp. 98-102. 
46 Ibid, p. 28. 
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3.2.4.3 Communications Network 
Both alternatives contained a network centric communications network 
linking all the intelligence sources to the data fusion cells and C2/Intelligence Centers.  
These intelligence sources included sensor platforms (as developed by the  
Sensors Group), land inspection, and external intelligence (sources outside the  
MDP System).  The data fusion process, through aggregation and analysis, used the 
information from these sources to develop the CIP and COP.  The network consisted of a 
communications and information assurance architecture. 
Communications Architecture:  The communications architectures 
consisted of a fixed network and a last mile network.  The fixed network design consisted 
of combinations of the following: backbone (country to country), satellite (sensors nodes 
and sites to backbone), and access layers (aggregating or repeater nodes back to the 
backbone as well as role based access).  The last mile network provided connectivity to 
the backbone.  It consisted of one or more of the following:  HF/VHF/UHF radio, 
microwave radar communications, free space optics, 802.11 a/b/g broadband Ethernet 
wireless, and 802.16 broadband Ethernet wireless.  The 802.11 a/b/g can transmit 
directionally two miles and is line of sight limited.  The 802.16 can transmit 30 miles and 
is directional (but can be made omni-directional through various placement schemes), but 
it had unknown space and power requirements. 
Available technology options for long-range communications (defined as  
>20 miles) were fiber-optic networks, DWDM (dense wavelength division multiplexing), 
SONET/SDH (synchronous optical network/synchronous digital hierarchy), long-haul 
microwave links (line of sight) and satellite communications (VSAT).  Technology 
options available for short range communications (defined as <20 miles) were short haul 
microwave links (with line of sight considerations), digital radios and traditional radios 
(HF/VHF/UHF), 802.11 a/b/g and 802.16 (as described above), ultra-wide band (UWB), 
and free space optics (FSO).  Another technology used was the submarine-laid fiber-optic 
cable that ran along the Strait’s sea floor from Singapore to Malaysia, part of a worldwide 
fiber-optic link system.  A supplemental link, another submarine-laid fiber-optic cable 
known as Sea-Me-We 4, would connect George Town, Malaysia and Medan, Indonesia 
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by 2007.  This fiber-optic link was laid around the world on the oceans’ sea floor, 
providing connectivity both west and east of the Malacca Straits, as well as internally 
throughout the entire Malacca Straits.  This 20,000-km system could scale to  
terabit capacities. 
The backbone design consisted of a fiber-optics network.  A fiber-optic backbone 
was chosen because of its reliability, security, immediate availability, information 
capacity, and speed of transfer.  The overall network consisted of two loops:  the 
Indonesia loop and the Malaysia loop, with the common crossover in Singapore and 
connectivity via the submarine laid fiber-optic cable between George Town and Medan.  
The fiber-optic backbone served as the main communications highway for all Command 
and Control nodes (high degree of supportability), and this highway provided link 
protection and routing capabilities.  Each ring had its own fiber-optic network 
infrastructure that handled the connections to sensors, ground units (or sea going units), 
and command centers. Singapore and George Town served as the east-west gateways for 
fiber-optic transmissions along the submarine-laid cable.  Public networks such as port 
authorities and disaster management centers plugged into the backbone network as the 
need arose.  Fiber-optic services would be leased to participating countries.  The large 
scale of the Malacca Strait area made using fiber-optic cable the most viable alternative.  
All of the technologies in the communications architecture were scalable to areas 
including the English Channel or the Strait of Gibraltar. 
The challenge in designing the last mile network was remote sensor site 
connectivity.  The last mile access network refers to the final leg (network segment) of 
delivering communications connectivity to a customer or end-user.  The Sensor Group’s 
alternatives included sensor sites along the Malaysian and Indonesian coastline where 
fiber-optic cable did not run.  Line of sight wireless communications with repeater nodes 
connected the remote sites to the backbone network.  The high cost of laying more  
fiber-optic cable (approximately US$60,000 per km inclusive of required infrastructure 
such as man-holes and pipelines) and the longer latency of satellites made wireless the 
most feasible option. 
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Despite the average yearly rainfall and temperature extremes in the weather 
patterns in the area of the Malacca Straits, the microwave capability was not significantly 
degraded, even in the worst weather conditions.  Using the ITU-R530 model, availability 
of the microwave spectrum in the worst month for average rainfall had little degradation. 
The ITU-R530 model is the International Telecommunication Union Radio 
Communication Standard relating to propagation data and prediction methods required 
for the design of terrestrial line of sight (LOS) systems.  The microwave spectrum was 
available greater than 99.993% of the time.  This calculation assumed the following: 
 
• Climate:  maritime temperature, high humidity and coastal conditions. 
• Rainfall:  average 145mm/hour. 
• Frequency of microwave used:  7.5GHz. 
• Distance transmitted:  20 km. 
• Path loss:  atmospheric attenuation, branching, fading, multipath, and 
polarization are taken into account. 
 
Links, both wired and wireless connectivity links, were classified by three types:  
A, B, and C; and each type had associated criteria:  bandwidth, availability, reliability,  
bit error rate, recovery time, and latency.  According to these criteria, Class A links (such 
as the fiber-optic backbone) had the highest performance, followed by Class B links 
(such as the wireless links from sensor to backbone) and, finally, Class C links (land lines 
and satellite links).  Table 15 classifies the links according to the criteria. 
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Criteria Class A Links Class B Links Class C Links 
Bandwidth 
(Possibilities) 
50 Mbps, 155Mbps,  
Gigabit Ethernet (1Gbps) 
1.5/2 Mbps, 34/45 Mbps,  
155 Mbps 
2 Mbps, 384Kbps  
(ISDN line rates) 
Availability 0.9999 0.999 (affected by weather  
and ducting) 
0.9999 (varies) 
Reliability Very high Good (weather dependent) Very good 
Bit error rate Excellent (~10-9) Good (~10-6 ) Dependent on service level 
agreement (>10-6) 
Recovery time ~50ms 100ms – 10sec >1 min 
Latency Microseconds per km Milliseconds per km Tens of microseconds per 
km, or 500ms for satellite 
Redundancy Route and system Partial route and system Best effort service delivery
Table 15. Classification of Communication Links 
 
Links were classified by types:  A, B, and C. Each type had associated criteria: 
bandwidth, availability, reliability, bit error rate, recovery time, and latency.  
According to these criteria, Class A links (such as the fiber-optic backbone) had the 
highest performance, followed by Class B links (such as the wireless links from 
sensor to backbone) and, finally, Class C links (land lines and satellite links). 
 
The communications architecture was scaleable to accommodate all of the C2 and 
intelligence alternative architectures.  The existence of a backbone remained constant.  In 
each communications alternative, the last mile portion changed with respect to the 
geographical placement of the C2 and Intelligence Centers and the feasibility of 
technology employment. 
Information Assurance:  Information Assurance’s DID strategy applied layered 
defense to prevent direct exploitation of any vulnerability that existed in the system.  It 
placed multiple layers of protection to prevent attackers from directly attacking the 
system to gain access to the security critical information resources.  DID organized the 
security countermeasure mechanisms such that they were structurally implemented based 
on the purposes and degree of defense. 
The following Information Assurance prevention and detection mechanisms were 
applied to secure the networked systems. 
Prevention Mechanisms Firewalls filtered traffic to manage and reduce 
undesired types of traffic flowing into and out of the networks.  The configuration 
included a “stateless” firewall to perform basic filtering, followed by a “stateful” firewall 
to perform more intelligent filtering.  A “stateless” firewall is a firewall that treats each 
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network frame (or packet) in isolation.  It has no way of knowing if any given packet is 
part of an existing connection, is trying to establish a new connection, or is just a rogue 
packet.  A “stateful” firewall is a firewall that keeps track of the state of network 
connections (such as TCP streams) traveling across it.  The firewall is programmed to 
know what legitimate packets are for different types of connections.  Only packets which 
match a preset or known connection state will be allowed by the firewall; others will  
be rejected. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) provided confidentiality and integrity assurance 
by encrypting traffic for transmission over a shared network [Kaufman, 2002].47 
Vulnerability scanners were used to detect known potential weaknesses of a host 
configuration.  These weaknesses were patched and/or locked down accordingly to 
‘harden’ the host’s security.  Examples of such tools include NESSUS [Nessus, 2003]48 
and Retina Network Security Scanner [eEye, 2003].49 
Software patches guarded against attacks made against vulnerabilities caused by 
security software problems detected after distribution and deployment. 
Detection Mechanisms 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was used to identify potential attacks 
based on anomaly detection and/or misuse detection.  IDSs are signature-based and only 
detect known patterns of attacks.  IDSs were network-based (monitors network traffic) 
and host-based (monitors logs).  Examples include SNORT [Snort, 2003] and  
ISS Real Secure [ISS, 1998]. 
Integrity Detection:  Integrity assurance tools, such as Tripwire  
[Tripwire, 2003], were used to fingerprint the installed system and to determine changes 
that occurred following a suspected attack.  It monitored key attributes of files that should 
                                                 
47 Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike Speciner, “Network Security:  Private Communication 
in a Public World,” 2002. 
48 Nessus.org., “Nessus,” http://www.nessus.org., 2 July 2003. 




not have changed, including binary signature, size, expected change of size, etc.  It was 
also a useful tool as part of the configuration management suite. 
 
3.3.1 Alternatives Generation – Force Group 
The Force Group alternatives were developed and redefined using an iterative 
process, and considered both existing systems and suggested uses for emerging 
technologies.  Current Special Operations operators at both the Center for Anti-Terrorism 
and Naval Security Forces and the Naval Special Warfare Center Advanced Training 
Department validated the Force System alternatives.  The support given by the personnel 
in these commands was instrumental in making the alternatives viable and effective. 
50, 51, 52 
 
3.3.2 Design Space – Force Group 
The Design Space for Force System alternatives included existing and potential 
technologies that could be implemented to 90% operating capability within five years.  
This limited the Force Group to utilizing TRL 4 or better, which ensured that the 
technology was proven in a laboratory setting and could be tested in the field in the near 
future53.  The Force Group evaluated existing systems on their potential applicability as 
alternatives for the problem, initially focusing research to gain insights into generic 
capabilities that could be fielded.  Due to the availability of data on U.S. forces, research 
was refined to look primarily at U.S. military force capabilities, with a limited evaluation 
of foreign service capabilities.  Through this process, the Force Group was able to 
determine the baseline capabilities available in the Straits of Malacca region, and to 
design several viable alternatives to increase the capabilities of deterring and defeating 
terrorist acts in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR. 
                                                 
50 Interview with CDR Tom Shiblor, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Naval Special Warfare Group One, 
San Diego, CA, (10 March 2005). 
51 Interview with EN1(SWCC) Rob McKay, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Naval Special Warfare 
Center Advanced Training Department, San Diego, CA, (10 March 2005). 
52 Interview with ENC(SWCC/PJ) Hager, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Center for Anti-Terrorism and 
Naval Security Forces, Camp Lejeune, NC, interviewed by phone, (10 March 2005). 
53 The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Section 10.5.2:  Technology Maturity and Technology 
Readiness Assessments, http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp, (15 March 2005). 
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3.3.3 Alternatives Generation – Force Group 
A morphological chart showing the range of material solutions that were 
generated and evaluated is shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34.  Force Alternative Morph Chart 
 
The morphological chart captures all technology alternatives considered to perform 
the Force functions.  Of these, only those regarded as clearly feasible were  
carried forward. 
 
This chart was later refined into the working alternatives after feasibility screening.  All 
alternatives were developed with consideration of the requirements, focusing on defense 
against the specific threats named in the scenarios.  The Force System in theater at the 
time of this report was very limited.  The Singapore Navy had recently implemented a 
Sea Marshal program that was focused on maintaining the security of Singapore’s ports.  
The Sea Marshals were selected from the Singapore Navy and were trained in retaking a 
ship that had been commandeered by terrorists.  They were transported with the harbor 
pilot to escort all incoming high value vessels.  The teams consisted of an engineer, a 
seaman, and a communications manager.  This team was moderately capable of 
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establishing control of a ship as it entered Singapore waters to prevent it from becoming a 
SAW vessel.  These Sea Marshals were the only active forces in theater that were capable 
of defeating any of the threats described in the SEA-7 scenarios.  The SBA scenario was 
largely overlooked, with the exception of random, uncoordinated patrols of the Straits of 
Malacca by Singaporean Navy, Indonesian Navy, and Malaysian Navy patrol craft. 
Using the refined MOEs and MOPs for each scenario, the Force Group worked in 
conjunction with TDSI Weapons Track personnel to develop a patrol craft that would be 
capable of intercepting and defeating SBA vessels, as well as acting as a harbor patrol 
boat to defend against a SAW attack and a transportation vessel for the WMD  
inspection teams. 
 
3.3.3.1 SBA Scenario 
The first unique set of capabilities that the reaction forces needed to have 
was the ability to combat the SBA threat.  The two most difficult components of this 
problem were assessed to be the determination of hostile intent and the minimum time 
available to defeat the attack.  The determination of hostile intent was assumed to be 
externally satisfied prior to engagement, through a combination of anomaly-recognition 
C3I software, ROE, communications, warning shots, etc.  Thus, the Force Group only 
considered what would be required to physically defeat an attack in progress.  The time 
available to defeat an attack in progress was assumed to be four minutes—the time 
required for a 30-kt speedboat to cover two NM.  This narrow response time constraint 
led to alternatives which would be able to either completely cover the entire critical area, 
or to point-defend high value units (HVU) as they transited the critical area. 
The first alternative to counter the SBA threat was the TDSI-selected 
patrol craft.  The exact type of ship, deployment strategy, and weapon type was evaluated 
by the TDSI Weapons Track.  Other alternatives considered were the use of armed 
helicopters and ground-based weapon systems. 
An active point-defense alternative to counter the SBA threat was  
Sea Marshals escort teams that would be air- or surface-deployable to High Value Units 
(HVU), similar to the current procedure for all U.S. HVUs transiting through high risk 
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areas.  These escorts would board the HVU as it entered the critical area, and offload as 
the HVU departed the critical area. 
Although it was not specifically evaluated in this study, one promising 
way to passively point-defend HVUs in this scenario would be to outfit ship hulls with an 
explosive resistant coating.  Coatings of this type were commercially available from 
LineX Corporation, and had been proven to significantly reduce the blast from 
conventional explosives.  The Air Force Research Laboratory had applied the Polyurea to 
structures with an 80mm-thick coating, and it withstood blasts of 1,000 pounds of TNT 
with only minor displacement and minimal fragmentation.54  The U.S. Navy had applied 
this substance in place of nonskid surface on the decks of ships and the hulls of 
submarines.  It was determined that it could significantly improve the safety of the hull of 
a commercial ship if applied, and would reduce the fragmentation results of an external 
explosion.  This option was only briefly considered to show the improvement in safety 
that the ship owners could gain if they coated their vessels with the explosive  
resistant covering. 
 
3.3.3.2 SAW Scenario 
The second unique set of capabilities that the reaction forces needed to 
have was the ability to combat the SAW threat.  This threat could be countered in one of 
two locations.  The first, and preferred, location was out at sea, as soon as C2 System 
realized that the vessel was intended for the SAW mission.  This option allowed time for 
an assault team to be fully briefed and prepared for retaking the ship from the terrorists.  
The second location was inside the port security area, as assumed in the SAW threat 
scenario, which was very vulnerable due to the severely limited reaction time and 
reaction capabilities.  With the discovery of a SAW attack inside the port security area, 
there was little time to plan a retake of the vessel.  Instead, the SAW vessel had to be 
redirected or disabled prior to it reaching its target. 
                                                 
54 Knox, Hammons, Lewis, and Porter, “Polymer Materials for Structural Retrofit,” http://www.line-
xicd.com/bomb/AF_TEST.pdf, 15 March 2005, p. 6. 
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The baseline alternative was the existing “As-Is” System.  This 
incorporated the use of Sea Marshals loaded onboard all HVUs entering port.  These  
Sea Marshals would be transported out to the vessel prior to its port entry, and they 
would be in communication with the port control facilities at all times.  This would allow 
some increase in the limited response time associated with the SAW threat being 
recognized within port boundaries. 
Another alternative utilized the TDSI-selected vessel, which would patrol 
the harbor and would be called in to respond to the SAW attack either within the port, or 
in close vicinity to the port.  The patrol craft would try to stop the SAW vessel either 
through disabling the steering mechanism of the vessel, or through disabling the vessel’s 
propulsion equipment. 
An additional alternative for the port security force was a land-based 
patrol that consisted of an assault team that could be lifted out to retake the merchant 
vessel via helicopter.  This team would have capabilities similar to those of  
U.S. Navy SEALs, in that they could conduct a hostile environment boarding while the 
ship was at sea. 
 
3.3.3.3 WMD Scenario 
The third unique capability set that was developed was the ability to 
transport an inspection crew out to a vessel, at sea and underway, and conduct an 
inspection of the ship and its cargo.  The Sea Inspection Group developed the inspection 
equipment, and the Force Group was responsible for the transportation and operation of 
the equipment, as well as the safety of the operators while they conducted the inspection.  
This was a similar capability to the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
teams.  The MIO teams were sailors pulled from the general ship’s crew and who 
received additional training to be able to safely board ships at sea, in order to conduct 
inspections of the ship and its cargo.  These were traditionally 12-man teams, with  
ten inspectors and two personnel managers, and included adequate self-defense 
capabilities. 
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The first transportation alternative for the WMD scenario used a helicopter 
to carry the baseline 12-man team from a base in Singapore to the COI.  Following their 
inspection, the boarding team would either ride the ship into port or depart the COI by air 
or by sea.  The number of inspection teams that would be required for the active area was 
determined through analysis by the Sea Inspection Group. 
The second transportation alternative for the WMD scenario used the  
TDSI-selected patrol craft to transport the inspection teams.  The patrol craft was 
launched from a forward base located closer to the shipping lanes, such as one of the 
many islands to the northeast of Singapore or George Town on the northern approach to 
the Straits.  This offshore option had the additional security of an armed escort for the 
inspection team while they were conducting the onboard inspection, although the forward 
bases would incur additional costs. 
 
3.3.4 Feasibility Screening – Force Group 
After the alternative concepts were generated, the Force Group focused on 
Feasibility Screening, and the QFD.  Much of the Feasibility Screening was completed 
during the alternatives generation phase, but the alternatives were further refined to 
reflect feasibility drivers.  The feasibility factors that were evaluated were the physical, 
economic, environmental, technological, and social constraints of operating in the  
Straits of Malacca AOR.  One of the major factors was the physical restrictions of 
operation in the Straits of Malacca AOR such as the shallow water and narrow channels, 
the numerous coves and hiding areas in the Straits, and the abundance of traffic that was 
required to be filtered to find a SBA vessel.  A preliminary economic evaluation revealed 
that helicopters would be too expensive as an alternative in the SBA scenario, since they 
would need to be airborne 24/7 to meet the short time-to-respond constraint.  
Additionally, ground-based weapons systems were assessed to be too expensive, since 
the number of independent systems required to completely cover the critical area was 
very large, and each system would need to be maintained and guarded.   
One of the major environmental conditions was the restriction of the operating 
environment with the high humidity and high heat that restricted the amount of time that 
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the inspectors were able to function at their positions onboard the WMD COIs.  Another 
major feasibility filter for the Force Group was the technology restriction.  The 
requirement that was adopted for the project was that any technology used would be 
demonstrable at the time of the project, and could therefore be implemented within a 
five-year stand-up period.  The only technology that fell outside of these criteria was the 
TDSI-selected patrol craft, the Sparviero hydrofoil, which was developed to integrate the 
TDSI Weapons track personnel into the project.  The technology that was used in the 
development of the Sparviero was all subject to the same five-year implementation 
criteria; however, the entire system was not in existence at the time of this study, and 
therefore fell outside of the imposed feasibility criteria.  A major social filter was the 
amount of innocent shipping that was delayed or destroyed as a result of false alarms in 
the SBA, SAW, and the WMD threat scenarios.  There was a high level of importance 
placed on correctly identifying an attack, and limiting the damage to the surrounding 
vessels caused by the defense of a HVU. 
 
3.3.5 Quality Functional Deployment – Force Group 
Since the initial requirements that were developed through the Needs Analysis 
phase were the basis for the alternative concept generation, all of the nonspecific 
alternatives that had passed the feasibility screening satisfied at least some of the 
requirements.  The QFD process ensured that all alternatives were defined in enough 
detail to ensure that requirements were met.  The alternatives were refined and 
scrutinized for applicability to the scenarios, and detailed features were added.  The QFD 
for the Force System alternatives were broken down by scenario, and are shown in 
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Figure 35.  Force QFD for SBA Scenario 
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Figure 36.  Force QFD for SAW Scenario 
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Figure 37.  Force QFD for WMD Scenario 
 
This chart shows the various material solutions considered for countering the  
SAW threat. 
 
3.3.6 SBA Scenario 
 
Force SBA Scenario Alternatives
• Patrol/Escort of HVUs through AOR
• 3 Escorts per 150 NM operational area
• Onboard Sea Marshal teams for critical area 
transit






Figure 38.  Force Group Alternatives for SBA Scenario 
 
The Force Group developed two alternative solutions to counter the SBA threat.  
There was no “As-Is” System to defend against a SBA. 
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3.3.6.1 SBA 2005 “As-Is” System – Force Group 
The baseline capabilities that were in place in the spring of 2005 were 
severely limited.  The existing systems did not include any plan for persistent presence in 
the Straits of Malacca to counter terrorism; instead, it relied on intermittent patrolling of 
uncoordinated local military forces.  Thus, it was assumed that there was no  
“As-Is” System to defeat the SBA threat. 
 
3.3.6.2 SBA Alternative 1 – Force Group 
Alternative 1 for the SBA scenario incorporated the TDSI-selected vessel 
on patrol in the critical area.  The majority of the benefit in the SBA scenario would come 
in the form of active deterrence.  The belief was that not only could the TDSI transport 
intercept SBA threats, if in range, but would show a friendly force presence within the 
critical area to deter possible threats, although no attempt was made to model or 
characterize this deterrence. 
The patrol craft option was determined through interviews with both the 
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for the U.S. Navy SEAL Detachment from Naval Special 
Warfare Group One, and the Center for Anti-Terrorism and Naval Security Forces, 
Learning Site Camp Lejeune staff personnel.55  After evaluating and analyzing several 
patrol craft options, the TDSI Weapons Track team selected the Italian Sparviero 
hydrofoil as the desired patrol vessel.   
In order to enable the Sparviero to be used as an alternative, the  
Force Group included a High Speed Vessel (HSV) as a floating logistics and support 
staging base to counter SBAs in the Straits of Malacca.  The HSV would operate with the 
Sparviero patrol craft in a combination of patrolling and HVU convoy escort missions.  
The TDSI Weapons Track team determined that the best arrangement would be to split 
the AOR into two unique operating areas and have each area independently patrolled by 
the small boats in an effort to deter small boat attacks, and to react in the event of an 
attack.  Personnel from the Naval Special Warfare Center Advanced Training 
                                                 
55 Interview with CDR Tom Shiblor, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Naval Special Warfare Group One, 
San Diego, CA, (10 March 2005). 
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Department56 and the Center for Anti-Terrorism and Naval Security Forces57 were 
instrumental in formulating the escort and patrolling patterns that would best cover the 
AOR.  The counter-clockwise rotational patrol optimized the reaction times by ensuring 
uniform coverage within the AOR, while still showing force throughout the Straits.  This 
option employed technology that was available, and could be produced and implemented 
within five years.  This alternative also represented an increased capability with extended 
ranges and extended engagement thresholds that could be developed and implemented in 
the future.  Although currently unrealistic, analysis was done to evaluate the use of  
over-the-horizon (OTH) missile systems to reduce the number of ships required to patrol 
the AOR. 
 
3.3.6.3 SBA Alternative 2 – Force Group 
Alternative 2 for the SBA scenario incorporated five-man Sea Marshal teams that 
would be transported out to each HVU transiting the Straits of Malacca.  The SBA  
Sea Marshal team would be armed with two .50-caliber machine guns, one on the bow 
and one on the stern, and a control/communication station on the bridge.  This allowed 
for maximum weapons coverage around the HVU.  The Sea Marshal team would have 
Rules of Engagement (ROEs) to dictate their actions, and would be capable of operating 
independent of the onshore C2 Centers, relying heavily on visual observations and 
shipboard radar systems to identify threats.  Analysis of required engagement ranges, 
operator training, and weapon accuracy revealed that the SBA would need to be engaged 
by 150m if the single-shot probability of kill was 50%.  These escorts would board the 
HVU as it entered the critical area, and offload as the HVU departed the critical area.  If 
the HVU’s destination was within the critical area, the Sea Marshal escorts would remain 
onboard until the ship was pierside. 
                                                 
56 Interview with EN1 (SWCC) Rob McKay, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Naval Special Warfare 
Center Advanced Training Department, San Diego, CA, (10 March 2005). 
57 Interview with ENC (SWCC/PJ) Michael Hager, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Center for Anti-
Terrorism and Naval Security Forces, Camp Lejeune, NC, interviewed by phone, (10 March 2005). 
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3.3.7 SAW Scenario 
Force SAW Scenario Alternatives
• 3 Man Sea 
Marshal Team
• 3 Man Sea 
Marshal Team























Figure 39.  Force Group Alternatives for SAW Scenario 
 
The Force Group developed two alternative solutions to counter the SAW threat.  
Both of these alternatives built on the “As-Is” System, which loaded Sea Marshals 
on high value ships five NM from the destination port. 
 
3.3.7.1 SAW 2005 “As-Is” System – Force Group 
The “As-Is” Force System alternative to counter the SAW attack 
incorporated the use of three Sea Marshals loaded onboard all HVUs entering Singapore.  
The Sea Marshal team was comprised of an engineer, a seaman, and a communicator, all 
Singapore Navy sailors bearing small arms and trained to retake a ship that was under the 
control of terrorists.  A total of 16 Sea Marshal teams were required, assuming each team 
could make an average of three trips to the approximately 50 HVUs that entered 
Singapore each day.  These Sea Marshals would be transported out to the vessel five NM 
prior to its port entry, along with the harbor pilot, and they would be in communication 
with the port control facilities at all times while onboard the merchant vessel.  This 
procedure increased the time available to respond (minimum 15 minutes at 20 kts) as 
opposed to the SAW threat being recognized within port boundaries.  The Sea Marshals 
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would be a valuable intelligence asset onboard the vessel as it entered the port, and they 
would be able to act as a first responder, defeating or at least mitigating any problems 
while any additional actions were taken to defeat the SAW.  Although the capabilities of 
this team were procedurally limited due to the number of team members and the range at 
which they were embarked, they were assessed to be effective. 
 
3.3.7.2 SAW Alternative 1 – Force Group 
Alternative 1 for the SAW scenario used the Sparviero hydrofoil as a 
harbor patrol vessel, in addition to the current Sea Marshals.  The Sea Marshals defensive 
capabilities would be improved through the use of disabling fire from the TDSI vessel, 
which would require a high degree of C2 coordination, with the Sea Marshals playing a 
key role in the designation of the vessel as a SAW ship.  For this alternative, each of four 
Sparviero patrol craft were crewed by the normal 11-man crew and armed with the  
76mm deck gun as well as .50-caliber machine guns.  At all times, two hydrofoils would 
patrol the harbor and would be called in to respond to the SAW attack either within the 
port boundaries, or in close vicinity to the port.  The crew would attempt to stop the SAW 
vessel either through disabling the steering mechanism of the vessel, or through disabling 
the steering or propulsion equipment with the 76mm and .50-caliber machine gun.  
Although this alternative was not effective when used alone, it was effective in 
conjunction with the onboard Sea Marshals. 
 
3.3.7.3 SAW Alternative 2 – Force Group 
Alternative 2 for the SAW scenario consisted of a land-based rapid 
response force team that could be airlifted out to retake the merchant vessel via 
helicopter, in addition to, and in support of, the existing three-man Sea Marshal team 
escorting each HVU into Singapore.  This team would have capabilities similar to  
U.S. Navy SEALs, in that they could conduct a hostile environment boarding while the 
ship was at sea.  A minimum of three teams and three SH-60B helicopters were required 
to meet the 24/7 requirement.  Because of the time required to cold-start a helicopter and 
brief the special operations team, it was infeasible to expect that the reaction force would 
be effective if the SAW attack was not detected until the ship entered the port area.  
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Analysis revealed that this option essentially could only defeat a SAW attack that was 
detected at sea, unless the Sea Marshals onboard that could retake or redirect the SAW 
vessel.  The in-port SAW attack detection used in the SAW scenario left the operators 
with very little time to adequately plan and respond to the SAW attack. 
 
3.3.8 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Scenario 
Force WMD Scenario Alternatives 
• Forward base stations
• Sparviero Patrol Craft 
Transport
• 12-Man Inspection Team
• Singapore base station
• Helicopter transport 
• 12-Man Inspection Team
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
 
Figure 40.  Force Group Alternatives for WMD Scenario 
 
The Force Group developed two alternative solutions to transport the  
Sea Inspection team to COIs for the WMD threat.  There was no “As-Is” 
Transportation System since there was no “As-Is” Sea Inspection System. 
 
3.3.8.1 WMD 2005 “As-Is” System – Force Group 
The “As-Is” Force Group transportation capability for the Sea Inspection 
System in the WMD scenario was nonexistent, due to the fact that an At-Sea Enroute 
Inspection System was not in use. 
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3.3.8.2 WMD Alternative 1 – Force Group 
Alternative 1 for the WMD scenario transported the Sea Inspection team 
via SH-60B helicopter from a base in Singapore to the COI.  Four Singaporean SH-60Bs 
were assumed to be able to carry the 12-man inspection team and their inspection 
equipment to a boarding point at least 250 NM from the Straits of Malacca.  The choice 
of using a helicopter to transport the inspection team out to the vessel was made because 
of their current existence and the ease of implementation.  Most COIs that entered the 
Straits of Malacca would be large merchant vessels that could easily and safely be 
boarded by helicopter teams.  The other positive aspect of this alternative was that the 
inspection teams could be based at a single force concentration site, such as Singapore, 
and could be quickly transported out to the threat vessel at 250 NM in 1½ hours using a 
167-kt cruise speed.  Following their inspection, the boarding team would either ride the 
ship into port or depart the COI by air or by sea.  The number of inspection teams that 
would be required for the active area was determined through analysis by the  
Sea Inspection Group. 
 
3.3.8.3 WMD Alternative 2 – Force Group 
Alternative 2 for the WMD scenario transported the 12-man  
Sea Inspection team via the Sparviero vessel to the COI.  In order to achieve a 1½-hour 
transit time to the COI, this alternative required that the inspection teams be located at 
forward staging areas close to the major shipping lanes where the planned intercept 
would take place.  This would be done by constructing bases on several of the 
surrounding islands in the Pualu Natuna area to the northeast of Singapore, and the 
George Town, Malaysia area to the northwest of the Straits of Malacca.  Outlying bases 
would allow adequate time for the inspection team to equip and intercept the suspect 
vessel using one of six TDSI transport vessels as primary transportation, and to reduce 
delay costs by inspecting the vessel while it was in transit.  This offshore option was able 
to be quickly implemented, and would have the additional security of an armed escort for 
the inspection team while they were conducting the onboard inspection, although the 
forward bases would incur additional costs. 
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3.4.1 Alternatives Generation – Land Inspection Group 
The Land System Group alternatives were developed through a number of 
iterations integrating current shipping procedures, port operations, security measures, and 
technologies, both current and evolving.  The final alternatives were refined through a 
combination of proven procedures with the means to inspect more containers without 
impeding the flow of commerce.  Research and insight from the Port of Oakland,  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection were 
key in finalizing our alternatives.  With the large amount of variables that affect sensor 
performance, those sensors chosen for the alternatives may not give the best performance 
against specific threats in every scenario.  However, they were used for consistency 
throughout the study for analysis and comparison of the alternatives. 
 
3.4.2 Design Space – Land Inspection Group 
The driving factor for inspecting cargo was the volume of containers that ports 
had to process.  There were a considerable number of factors that contributed to a port’s 
ability to process cargo, including overall facilities, local regulations and trade laws, 
amount of cargo, and security plans. 
To best determine alternatives, the problem was bounded to evaluate current 
operations and handling infrastructure.  This restricted the Design Space to comparing the 
best ways to implement inspection capabilities and techniques without introducing new 
techniques for processing cargo, such as conveyors or railroads.  Most ports would not be 
able to support complete reconstruction since it would hamper operations, especially if it 
were to be done in a timely manner to support near future implementation. 
 
3.4.3 Alternatives Generation 
With the amount of cargo that was processed daily, attempting to thoroughly 
inspect everything processed would lead to a substantial increase in delay time, manning, 
required training, and total cost.  Advancements in detection technologies, coupled with 
efficient procedures, could minimize these effects, while increasing the detection 
probabilities of hazardous materials and unauthorized personnel.  A number of 
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technologies existed to detect hazardous WMD materials.  The specific threat, amount, 
atmosphere conditions, and dispersion methods all affected the severity and impact of a 
successful attack.  In generation of alternatives, an assessment of current or developing 
technologies was necessary to determine what was available to address the threats. 
The morphological charts in Figure 41 summarize the variety of material and 
nonmaterial solutions considered and assessed. 
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CONTAINER HISTORY VERIFICATION METHOD NUCLEAR/ RADIATION CHEM/BIO EXPLOSIVES FOREIGN OBJECTS
Origin Human Intelligence Gamma Ray Imager Optical Flash Chromotography X-Ray Machine
Route Surveillance System High Purity Germanium Arrays Vapor Detector Density Imager/sensor
Destination Smart Container Scintillaiton Counter Flame Emission Photometry Molecule Locator Shape recognition
Contents Canine Neutron Generator Photo Ionization X-Ray Anomoly recognition
Manifest Manifest Comparison Laser Infrared Flourescence Infrared Spectrometry Neutron Activation Visual
Shipping Company Robotic / Mobile Inspection Semiconductor Detectors Chemical Sensitive Electronics Canine Acoustic
Human Inspection Thermo Luminescence Surface Acoustic Wave
Tamper Seals LIDAR Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Attached Sensors Flow Cytometry
Unmanned Vehicles







AUTOMATED INTERPRETATION RECEIVE/          TRANSMIT RECORD/ DISPLAY
Sensor Mapping Human Search Infrared Computer Database
Data Analysis Imaging Display Radio (UHF, Walkie Talkie) Voice / Video Recorder
Smart Containers Animal Indication Encoded Laser Monitors







Figure 41.  Land Inspection System Morphological Chart 
 
This chart depicts the variety of material and nonmaterial solutions considered and assessed. 
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3.4.4 Feasibility Screening – Land Inspection Group 
With a number of competing developing and proven technologies, the integration 
of procedures, accountability techniques, and use of sensors gave a wide selection of 
choices at first glance.  To assist with the development of alternatives, there were 
characteristics that select components of the system had to possess. 
The sensor packages had to contain some mobile sensors and some stationary 
sensors.  There needed to be a means to recharge or power them without interrupting 
operations.  With the standardization of containers, and without the option to open and 
inspect every one, the system needed to detect threats through the side of the container.  
The objective to prevent attacks dictated that sensors needed the capability to detect the 
presence of chemical, biological, and explosive threats without the agent being released 
into the air, if possible. 
Tamper proofing, tracking, and securing of containers needed to cover the entire 
supply chain.  The vulnerability of the containers is greatly due to the potential number of 
people and commercial industries that are responsible for the shipment from point of 
packing to final destination.  The worldwide nature of the industry also meant the devices 
used to address the security of containers during transit needed to be affordable, 
maintainable, and usable by the majority of players. 
Finally, the communications had to cover both port operations and support 
external decision makers.  This called for secure, reliable, and real time information 
sharing as well as the ability to store large amounts of information for future use. 
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Table 16.  Land Inspection System QFD 
 
QFD shows whether stakeholder requirements are met by system design 
components or not. 
 
3.4.6 2005 “As-Is” System – Land Inspection Group 
The existing inspection system in Singapore to prevent smuggling of WMDs and 
hazardous materials improved with the implementation of new security measures and 
initiatives.  Singapore’s participation in the current initiatives are detailed in Annex D.  
For physical security, Singapore had a process for their imports that were unloaded and 
headed into their country, and a different regime for transshipment cargo that was 
expected to be loaded on another ship.  There were six Free Trade Zones in Singapore 
that allowed for goods to be exchanged among countries without customs being involved.  
It was unknown what, if any, inspection process existed for that cargo.  For cargo that 
eventually ended up in Singapore, customs officials removed and inspected the cargo as 
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they deemed necessary (approximately 1.4%) and would repack the containers.  Permits 
were required for processing though they might not accompany the cargo. 
For transshipments or exports headed for the United States, U.S. Customs targeted 
roughly 4%-6% of the cargo.  They used canines and x-ray, gamma ray, and radiation 
detectors to inspect the cargo.  Though there were over 20 countries participating in the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Land Inspection Group could not find which 
countries, if any, other than the U.S. had inspectors in foreign ports. 
For the purpose of this study, it was assumed that shipments to Singapore that 
originated in the U.S. or in any other CSI country would be inspected in accordance with 
the existing U.S. inspection protocol.  This allowed for analysis of the existing land 
inspection infrastructure that the U.S. used, both in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and 
abroad, and which could relatively easily be applied to cargo bound for another  
partner country 
 
3.4.6.1 Alternative 1 – Land Inspection Group 
The burden of cargo inspection carried a large cost; not only to inspecting 
countries, but also to the shipping industry.  The time required to actively and manually 
inspect cargo made it impossible to inspect every container, especially in a major hub like 
Singapore.  The first alternative took advantage of passive detection capabilities coupled 
with the normal process of shipping containers as seen in Figure 42. 
 122






























Figure 42.  Land Inspection System Alternative 1 – Port-Centric Inspection System 
 
Port centric alternative focuses heavily on a sensors network inside a port.  It 
depends mostly on passive sensors.  There are active alert teams for further 
investigation in case of positive alarms. 
 
The Port-Centric alternative used the same active sensors for imaging and 
radiation detectors for randomly inspecting 5% of the cargo.  There were also passive 
sensors on the pier cranes and transport vessels that moved containers throughout the 
port.  Since containers were all loaded and unloaded using the same equipment, this 
allowed passive sensors to be in close proximity to containers in case something 
detectable was present. 
The attachment of the sensors to the equipment would also allow for 
flexibility if threats changed or new technologies proved to better address specific threats.  
The ideal architecture would have sensors to address every type of threat.  Due to the 
limited capabilities to detect chemical, biological, and explosives before they were 
released to the atmosphere, few effective sensor options existed. 
The active teams inspected the cargo that was sitting in storage waiting for 
shipments to other destinations.  This took advantage of dead time for staged containers.  
If a passive sensor alerted port operators, an active response team would report and 
investigate further with more accurate means.  The land inspection allowed for containers 
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to be removed from the shipping process for further analysis without delaying an entire 
ship of containers.  It was vital to detect materials before containers were loaded for sea.  
Having the ability to search containers one at a time would always have less commercial 
impact than searching at sea. 
There was no targeting means employed in this alternative other than a 
passive system alarm.  One hundred percent of containers were searched passively and 
5% were randomly searched with an active inspection team.  Any type of intelligence 
would assist in the active inspection selection process, but without the intelligence all 
containers were considered potentially hazardous. 
 
3.4.6.2 Alternative 2 – Land Inspection Group 
Alternative 2 expanded on Alternative 1, shifting more of the 
accountability of container security to the manufacturers, importers, carriers, brokers, and 
other employees throughout the supply chain.  The “trusted agent” classification would 
be obtained in the same manner as the current Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT).  The “trusted agent” certified shipper of goods must adhere to 
guidelines concerning procedural security, physical security, personnel security, 
education and training, access controls, manifest procedures, and conveyance 
procedures.58  Cargo containers arrived at the port and were accessed based on whether 
or not they were from a certified shipper.  There were then three inspection triggers 
warranting an active inspection. 
As containers were stuffed at the warehouse, mechanical tamper seals 
were fastened, and the containers verified and sealed, which is the first trigger.  Upon 
arrival to the terminal, if the lock was damaged, missing, or suspect, an inspection team 
would thoroughly inspect the container until cleared for shipment. 
                                                 
58 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “C-TPAT Fact Sheet and Frequently Asked Questions,” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/fact_sheet.xml, (accessed  
20 May 2005). 
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Figure 43.  Land Inspection System Alternative 2 - Trusted Agent Inspection System 
 
The Trusted Agent architecture reduces the number of possible suspect containers 
before they enter the port by depending on the C-TPAT security certification.  This 
allows the system to identify suspect containers using a targeting process. 
 
A second trigger to determine which containers to inspect would be the 
Automated Targeting System (ATS).  ATS was a proven technology of information 
sharing that looked at a number of administrative, procedural, and anomaly recognition 
factors that might lead to containers being marked as suspect.  There was always a heavy 
reliance on the quality of information that this system provided, but strict adherence to 
procedures and attention to trends could help focus inspection efforts. 
A third inspection trigger was related to manifests.  Though manifests 
were not always accurate, procedures and techniques have been developed, but are not 
yet in place, to screen information provided by them to better select and prioritize 
inspection-worthy containers59.  Examples of additional data the maritime industry 
requires to make manifest data more relevant are: 
                                                 
59 Coalition for Secure Ports. “Improving Port Security,” 
http://www.secureports.org/improving_security/factsheet_screening.html, (accessed 15 May 2005). 
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• More specific and precise cargo descriptions. 
• Name of party that is selling the goods to the importer. 
• Name of party that is purchasing the goods. 
• Point of origin of the goods. 
• Country from which goods are exported. 
• Ultimate consignee (final recipient). 
• Exporter representative. 
• Name of broker. 
• Origin of container shipment. 
• Name and address of business where container was stuffed. 
 
In addition to the three triggers that warranted an inspection, a small 
percentage would also be inspected randomly.  This would attempt to address the threats 
that had been loaded into containers that did not trigger an inspection by the three 
security measures in place. 
The passive network of sensors would exist as in the Port-Centric 
alternative.  The inspection teams would have the burden of responding to triggered 
inspections, random inspections, and investigating alerts by passive sensors.  The more 
sensors in the process, the more false alarms were expected, which could slow inspection 
procedures and later impact commerce.  It was impossible to predict specific detection 
capabilities of sensors without knowing what the threat of interest was, the environment 
the sensor would be working in, how much material was present, the type of storage 
container, and if there was shielding used.  The nature of container shipping and 
procedures practiced by all major ports, as well as the operational concept, allowed 
assumptions to be made to address many of these variables. 
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3.5.1 Alternatives Generation – Sea Inspection Group 
The Sea Inspection Group alternatives were developed by brainstorming and 
researching available technologies to generate ideas.  The brainstorming sessions were 
used to generate very basic methods for the sea inspection problem as well as generating 
outside of the box ideas.  The goal was to develop system alternatives using both existing 
technology and technologies that would be available within five years to ensure that the 
objectives generated during the needs analysis phase would be met.  The Sea Inspection 
Group also made several trips up to Lawrence Livermore Labs in Pleasanton, California, 
to view actual systems that might be used in the alternatives generated. 
 
3.5.2 Design Space – Sea Inspection Group 
The design space given to the Sea Inspection Group was open to incorporating all 
existing and potential technology that could be implemented within the next five years.  
This criterion made some of the options infeasible.  For example, the initial idea for 
searching containers was with the use of robot-mounted sensors.  Although robotic 
technology has made significant progress, limits in battery capacity, mobility, and 
payload capacity (sensor weight) made these types of system alternatives prohibitive.  As 
part of the Sea Inspection Group’s visit to Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, the group 
was shown several sensor technologies that could be used in the alternatives.  Other 
alternatives, such as neutron interrogation for radioactive sources, were found infeasible 
due to concerns regarding how they would work in a maritime environment.  Through 
this process, two alternatives remained that were capable of being implemented in the 
next five years. 
 
3.5.3 Alternatives Generation – Sea Inspection Group 
The Sea Inspection Group used two processes to develop alternatives:  
Brainstorming and the Morphological Box.  The brainstorming sessions took place over 
the span of two class weeks.  The group started with a discussion of the group’s 
objectives, restrictions, and limitations.  Also discussed, was the aspect of ensuring that 
the inspection devices could be used for searching the ship internally, externally,  
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cargo-holds and the inside of containers.  Most importantly, the group discussed the idea 
that all alternatives had to be feasible within the next five years. 
After agreeing to these initial guidelines, the group separated to independently 
brainstorm and research viable technologies.  Sources for these technologies can be found 
in the Modeling and Analysis and Cost Modeling sections of this paper.  During the 
sessions that followed, each member discussed their self-generated list and the 
technologies behind each alternative.  The alternatives were then combined into a master 
list from which the group pulled alternatives for each objective of the system.  Some 
discussions concerning each alternative included feasibility and limitations of the ideas 
and served to remove some of the alternatives from the final list. 
The group evolved the master list into a morphological chart that mapped each 
idea into its appropriate functional column.  The functional columns come directly from 
the objective hierarchy.  The goal of the morphological chart is to ensure that each 
function has options from which to choose for idea selection during alternative 
generation.  Some of the ideas fit into several columns and some of the ideas from the 
master list did not fit into any of the columns because they did not meet the group’s 
objectives or the system’s functions. 
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Figure 44.  Sea Inspection Morphological Chart for Alternatives. 
 
This morphological chart was generated for use in idea generation.  The five 
functions are listed at the top of the chart and then the sub-functions are listed 
below.  During alternatives generation, the group brainstormed and filled in the 
chart with options for different systems.  Initial options came from individual 
research, briefings from national laboratories, web searches or individual 
imaginations.  From there, two alternatives were generated and the options that 
correspond to that alternative are shown by the different colored circles.  Green 
circles indicate the Boarding Team Alternative and pink circles represent the Honor 
System Alternative. 
 
At this point, the group divided the alternatives into two different systems:  The 
Boarding Team Inspection System and the Honor Inspection System. 
Alternative 1:  The Boarding Team Inspection System was defined as the use of 
human inspection teams to board and search suspect vessels for contraband material.  
This was to include cargo-holds and containers as well as the inspection of  
shipping documents. 
Alternative 2:  The Honor Inspection System was defined as the use of  
Smart-container devices installed on each container and in cargo-holds of ships.  The 
sensor mapping capabilities inherent to some of these devices allows location of the 
suspect containers or cargo.  Also, program requirements or standards would be 
established for the shipping companies to meet in order to bypass a boarding team 
inspection.  A human boarding team is also used to search vessels that do not meet the 
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Honor Inspection System requirements or have Smart container devices alarming for 
reasons that cannot be mitigated. 
The two systems contain similar aspects (e.g., the boarding team), but the  
Smart container devices were an added layer of protection and localization to be used by 
the human boarding team.  The separation of the two systems was used to allow the high 
cost of the Smart container devices to be discarded if modeling and analysis showed they 
were not cost effective. 
 
3.5.4 Feasibility Screening – Sea Inspection Group 
Using the system requirements, the Sea Inspection Group produced a feasibility 
matrix (Figure 45) to assess the ability of the alternatives to produce the desired results.  
These requirements are discussed in the needs analysis section of this paper.  The 
“current” system produced none of the desired results, as there was no current system.  
The Boarding Team Inspection System and the Honor Inspection System gave the group 
the ability to detect hazardous materials with current technologies (or in the next  
five years) in a maritime environment.  The group assumed a 25-kg, weapons-grade,  
Uranium-235 source with one-quarter inch of Pb shielding as criteria for the detection of 
radioactive materials.  This source assumption was used because it is large enough to be 
used in the production of the 20-KT nuclear device as given in the WMD scenario.60  The 
one-quarter inch of Pb shielding was used because it was assumed that some amount of 
shielding would be used by terrorist agents to try to hide the nuclear device without large 
cost factors or issues due to the weight of the device. 
 
                                                 
60 Federation of American Scientists, Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Nuclear Weapons Design,” 
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Figure 45.  Feasibility Screening Matrix 
 
Listed the three system alternatives are listed in the first column:  the current 
system, Boarding Team alternative, and the Honor System alternative.  The top row 
of the chart lists the objectives the group wanted to achieve and then went through 
each alternative to see if it would meet those criteria. 
 
3.5.5 QFD – Sea Inspection Group 
The Quality Functional Deployment matrix was a cross-check of customer 
requirements versus the design requirements that the Sea Inspection Group developed  
(Figure 46).  Essentially, the design requirements the group generated for the alternatives 
generation were required to meet all the customer requirements that the group generated 
















































Search Vessel X X X X X X
Se arch Conta iners X X X X X X X
Detect Radiation X X X X
De tect Bio/Chem X  X
Detect Ex plosives X  X
Detect Fore ign Obje cts X X
Provide Automa tic Location X X X X X
Provide Human Interface X X X X X X
Ide ntify Ma terial X X X X X X
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Figure 46.  Sea Inspection System QFD 
 
This figure shows both the design and customer requirements.  The Xs indicate 
where the design requirements meet the customer’s requirements. 
 
3.5.6 2005 “As-Is” System – Sea Inspection Group 
There was no current Sea Inspection System in place at the Port of Singapore 
(Figure 47).  Shipping container security was dependent on the shipping companies’ 
efforts to ensure that no contraband was packed inside the container before being sealed 
and placed onboard a ship.  The locks on current container systems were easily broken or 
defeated, and no emphasis was placed on security after the ships left the loading docks. 
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 CURRENT SYSTEM
Shipping companies are responsible for search and security of containers, cargo, and 
vessels. Anti-tamper devices are optional and when used, are easily rendered useless.
Manifests are used to track cargo.  Any foreign objects or other suspect cargo are 
self-reported by the shipping company or cargo workers.  
 
Figure 47.  Current System 
 
The Current System had no at-sea inspection.  The ports had to rely on the shipping 
companies to report any discrepancies. 
 
3.5.6.1 Alternative 1 – Sea Inspection Group 
Boarding Team System:  In the Boarding Team System (Figure 48 and 
Figure 49), shipping companies were responsible for the security of containers, cargo, 
and vessels.  Hazardous materials (if any) were listed in manifest documentation that was 
used to track cargo.  Any foreign objects, hazardous materials, or suspect cargo were  
self-reported by the shipping company or their cargo workers.  Intelligence agencies used 
an algorithm that uses the vessel/cargo company history, manifest data, course data, and 
other intelligence and anomalies to identify suspect vessels and nominate them for a 
human inspection team.  Human inspection was performed by teams of 12 men.  They 
inspected the ship and shipping documents using portable dosimeter devices for radiation 
sensing and swabs or swipes for explosive sensing.  Chemical/Biological inspections 
were performed with M-8/M-9 and M256 kits for chemical agents and portable  
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Air Particulate Detection Systems (APDS) for biological agents.  An APDS located at 





BOARDING TEAM INSPECTION SYSTEM
• 24-HOUR RULE FOR MANIFEST DATA.







Figure 48.  Boarding Team Inspection System 
 
Shipping companies were responsible for reporting any discrepancies.  If there were 
any discrepancies, ships were then boarded and inspected by boarding teams.  Ships 
could also be randomly selected for an inspection by the boarding teams. 
                                                 
61 Interview with Thomas McGrann, site visit to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories,  




ALTERNATIVE 1:  BOARDING TEAM INSPECTION SYSTEM
• Teams inspect ship for explosives, contraband, and manifest anomalies.  
• Review shipping documents for manifest anomalies.
• Communications maintained with portable radios.
• Portable gamma imager.
• Spectrometer.
• Portable radiation detectors.
• Swabs for explosives.  
• M-8/M-9 paper for chemical agents.
• M256 kit for nerve agents.
• Bio detection device.
 
Figure 49.  Boarding Team Inspection System 
 
Each boarding team consisted of 12 men (selected in the Modeling and Analysis 
section), 10 of which actively inspected the ship with various sensors to detect 
chemical, biological, nuclear, or explosive materials that might be onboard.  
Backpack sensor packages and other handheld devices are designed to fit in small 
spaces between containers so that interior containers can be inspected for 
radiological and other threats. 
 
3.5.6.2 Alternative 2 – Sea Inspection Group 
The Honor System:  This system included the continued use of manifest 
screening, intelligence, and ship history for screening vessels and shipping companies.  It 
also included the installation and use of Smart container devices on all containers and 
cargo holds that incorporated antitampering, intrusion, tracking, radiation detection, 
communications, and reporting elements that gave stakeholders the location and status of 
cargo in real time.  The Smart container devices used would employ a sensor mapping 
function and a central data station to localize any anomaly such as the presence of 
radiation.  The key component of this system was that it was required to be mandatory for 
all shipping companies and vessels, thereby setting a minimum standard for security.  
After establishing a standard of security, and requiring the shipping companies to live up 
to this self-imposed standard, the vessels were allowed immediate access to their 
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destination port.  If the shipping companies did not meet the minimum requirements they 
were automatically selected for a boarding team inspection.  As a part of this system, 
random inspections of vessels would be conducted to ensure Smart container devices, 
installed air sampling devices and other requirements were installed and in good working 
order.  The use of Smart container devices was sent to C2 elements by the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) discussed in the C3I section of this paper.  If a vessel or 
shipping company failed an inspection, their containers/vessels were not allowed 
immediate access to their destination port.  Human inspection teams conducted active 
inspections of non-Honor System-compliant vessels and those that failed to meet the 
minimum standards.  It was assumed that in order to reduce the delay costs incurred by 
having a boarding team inspecting their ship, 95% of shipping companies would begin 
using Smart container devices as soon as possible.  The results of the 95% assumption 
can be seen in the Modeling and Analysis section of this paper.  The inspection teams 
carried backpack sensors, handheld devices, and portable imaging devices for radiation 
detection.  These devices allowed the search of interior containers onboard the vessel.  
The teams also carried explosive detection kits and portable sampling devices for 
chemical and biological hazards.  The active portion of this system started at 







• Shipping companies must meet following guidelines to bypass boarding team 
inspection. 
o Smart container devices working on all containers.
o Accurate/Timely manifest data (24-hour limit).
o No Smart container alarms.
o “Clean” ship history, including crew.
o Port of call accuracy.
 
Figure 50.  Honor Inspection System 
 
Shipping companies still had to report manifests, but all shipping companies were 
responsible for installing Smart container devices on all containers.  If the 
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ALTERNATIVE 2:  HONOR INSPECTION SYSTEM
• Portable Gamma Imager
• Spectrometer
• Portable radiation detectors
• Swabs for explosives
• M-8/M-9 paper chemical
• M256A1 nerve agents
• Bio detection device 
• Smart container devices
• Anomaly Detection
• Threat Localization
• Teams inspect ship for explosives, contraband and manifest anomalies.  
• Review shipping documents for manifest anomalies
• Communications maintained with portable radios
 
Figure 51.  Honor Inspection System Shipboard Search 
 
If a ship was not compliant with shipping standards or was randomly selected, it 
would be searched by a boarding team.  The sensor packages included handheld 
sensors for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and explosives.  Backpack 
sensor packages and other handheld devices are designed to fit in small spaces 





4.0 MODELING AND ANALYSIS STEP 
The Modeling and Analysis step simulated and examined the current and 
proposed alternative solutions developed during the Alternatives Generation step.  
Individual system models were developed to represent different aspects of each system, 
including cost and performance, in order to evaluate the system and the subsystem 
functions.  Overarching system architecture models were also developed to link the 
different system models together for an overall output.  Additional models were created 
to examine system architecture impacts, such as damage costs and delay costs.  Data 
collected from the systems’ Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of 
performance were examined using statistical programs to determine the performance of 
each potential solution.  The Modeling and Analysis process resulted in an understanding 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the various system alternative solutions to  
the problem. 
 
4.1 OVERALL MODELING PLAN 
Approach:  A comprehensive modeling plan managed the compound, 
multifaceted transformation of system parameter inputs from each system group into 
values for the overall architecture MOEs and Metrics.  Since each architecture consisted 
of up to five system components, the number of architecture variables was substantial:  
each of the five system components had either two or three alternatives that would be 
assessed in one or more of three different scenarios.  This resulted in 123 different 
architecture/scenario combinations that were evaluated. 
The SEA-7 Cohort chose a modular approach that combined the results from 
smaller-scale group system models (produced separately by the five different system 
groups) into relatively simple integrated architecture models that produced overarching 
performance results for architectures comprised of different system alternatives.  This 
approach was chosen to avoid a situation in which the architecture performance results 
were dependent on a single model for four reasons: 
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1. The problem was complex enough that a single model would have been an 
enormous undertaking by an unfortunate few model developers. 
2. The grand model would have been a single-point vulnerability. 
3. A single model could have hidden local optimization for the different 
architecture system components. 
4. This approach allowed different modeling tools to be used in order to best 
model the system. 
 
Alternatively, the modular approach precluded any single-point vulnerability, and 
it allowed for more rapid progress, both as a result of parallel model development and 
because the end product was of a relatively smaller scale and less complex.  Additionally, 
more in-depth analysis and a better understanding of system performance was possible 
since the best modeling tool was used for each system, and each system model was 
tweaked and analyzed to see which inputs and assumptions had the biggest effect on its 
local outcome. 
Performance Measures:  Inputs into the integrated architecture models were the 
outputs from the individual system performance and cost models.  These inputs were then 
transformed into the following overarching performance measures: 
 
• MOE 1 – Performance.  The probability that an architecture would defeat 
a single attack, for each scenario. 
• MOE 2 – Risk.  The estimated damage resulting from a single attack, for 
each scenario. 
• Metric 1 – Commercial Impact.  The combined total of commercial 
system procurement cost, ten-year operating and support cost, and 
commercial delay cost. 
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• Metric 2 – Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) System Cost.  The 
combined total of MDP System procurement cost and ten-year operating 




Inputs:  Inputs into the overall modeling effort consisted of the attack scenario 
and an architecture comprised of a single system alternative for each applicable group 
(e.g., a Land Inspection System alternative is not required for Small Boat Attack 
scenario).  Outputs from the individual group system models were combined to represent 
an overall architecture that was assessed for each scenario. 
Description:  A graphical depiction of the MDP Overarching Modeling Plan is 
shown in Figure 52.  The five system groups individually designed performance models 
to represent their respective systems.  Inputs to these smaller performance models and 
system variables within these models were evaluated and adjusted in order to determine 
the best alternatives for each local system.  Similarly, cost models were individually 
designed to represent the MDP System and commercial acquisition, as well as ten-year 













































































































Figure 52.  MDP Overarching Modeling Plan 
 
The MDP Overarching Modeling Plan pictorially showed the process of utilizing 
integrated architecture models to transform inputs from individual system 
performance and cost models into the desired performance measure outputs. 
 
Integrated architecture models were developed which converted outputs from the 
individual group performance and cost models into values for the overarching  
MOEs 1 and 2 (Performance and Risk) and Metrics 1 and 2 (Commercial Impact and 
MDP System Cost).  In order to determine the Performance (MOE 1) and Risk (MOE 2), 
Attack Damage Models were designed which allowed the conversion of the distance at 
which a given attack was defeated into a damage cost (MOE 2) in dollars.  If the defeat 
distance was far enough away, the attack was considered unsuccessful, and it counted 
positively toward the architecture’s performance (MOE 1) or probability of defeat. 
Similarly, a Shipping Delay Cost Model was designed which allowed the 
conversion of the total shipping delay time into a cost that contributed to  
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Commercial Impact (Metric 1).  The system cost models divided the ten-year acquisition, 
operating, and support costs into systems required by industry, which contributed to 
Commercial Impact (Metric 1), and the MDP System itself, which contributed to  
MDP System Cost (Metric 2).  Since costs were viewed as somewhat fungible between 
Commercial Impact (Metric 1) and MDP System Cost (Metric 2), a Total System Cost 
was determined by simply summing these two costs. 
 
4.1.1 Performance Models 
Each system group designed performance models that transformed external inputs 
that were unique to their system into outputs that would be used by a subsequent system 
group or to determine the integrated architecture performance.  The inputs for the system 
performance models were dependent on the threat scenario, and the models were used to 
evaluate the impact of and subsequently select singular values for system variables, or 
factors.  Using this method, each system group was able to optimize their local system 
model and determine the inputs and system variables that had the biggest effects on their 
local performance. 
 
4.1.2 Cost Models 
Cost Modeling was performed through two separate approaches.  Commercial 
Delay Costs were determined from delay times produced from Performance Models.  
These delay times were then input into a Commercial Shipping Delay Cost Model, which 
determined the associated cost.  Alternatively, System Costs were modeled directly, with 
costs broken down into Commercial System Costs associated with the shipping industry, 
and MDP System Costs associated with the MDP System.  Each system group modeled 
both methods, as applicable, and the aggregate of the groups’ individual work produced 
the Commercial Impact (Metric 1) and the MDP System Cost (Metric 2).  All costs were 
adjusted as appropriate to reflect FY05$US. 
 
4.1.3 System Cost (MDP System and Commercial System) 
Each system group designed a cost model that took into account inherent costs 
directly associated with the separate MDP and industry-required propositions for a 
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lifecycle of ten years.  Each group divided costs into the following categories, in 
conformance with DOD 5000: 
 
• Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E). 
• Military Construction (MILCON). 
• Procurement. 
• Operations and Support (O&S). 
 
4.1.4 Commercial Shipping Delay Cost Model 
In addition, the groups developed independent performance and delay cost 
models, as appropriate, to estimate the relevant commercial impact costs incurred 
according to scenario and alternative system architecture.  The results of the performance 
models provided the approximate delay time associated with each alternative and  
threat-based scenario.  These impact costs were then translated into resultant costs 
incurred due to delay.  Integration of these costs provided the quantitative metrics utilized 
for the analysis of all alternatives including the current system architecture. 
A large-scale, high-impact change in port operations to increase security could be 
resisted, resented, and highly detrimental to world trade and consumer prices if cargo 
flow was significantly disrupted in the name of security.  There have not been many 
known attempts, if any, to ship Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in cargo 
containers.  It would be very difficult to convince shippers and consumers that a high cost 
system is worth the investment and the resulting cost due to delay.  It was vital that any 
system implemented was not selected based on performance alone, but also with 
importance placed on minimal impact on the timely flow of containerized goods.  The 
shipping delay cost model was completed to compare alternatives’ impact on the 
shipment of containers based on the time it took to get through the system and the 
associated cost.  The Sea Inspection Group looked at a larger-scale ship delay cost, while 
the Land Inspection Group focused on individual containers. 
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4.1.4.1 Individual Container Delay Cost Model 
Approach:  A container that was pulled out of the cargo movement 
system because of an alarm would clearly not get to its intended destination at the same 
time that it would have if the inspection system was not in place.  For containers that 
contain hidden weapons, this is a desirable outcome.  But for containers that have false 
alarms, a delay of any kind will negatively impact commerce and therefore must be 
considered in the selection of alternatives. 
MOEs:  The more times a false alarm resulted and a container was 
delayed, the more it cost both port security and the shipper, and, in turn, the consumer.  
Therefore, the fewer false alarms resulting (which was tied to sensor performance) and 
the shorter the wait time a false alarm took to be cleared (a function of the number of 
available alert teams to respond to a false alarm), the cheaper the system cost with respect 
to commercial delay. 
Assumptions:  The individual container delay cost model was based on a 
daily turn-around system.  If a container was flagged falsely and pulled out of the system 
for further inspection, it had 24 hours to return to the system before it was assumed to 
have “missed its boat.”  Because of the extreme complexity of transshipments at a large-
scale international hub like Singapore, this 24-hour-turnaround assumption was used to 
baseline the assumed delay cost impact of any given Land Inspection System.  This was 
important to quantify the cost of a container being delayed for any amount of time, from 
5 minutes to 24 hours.  The individual container delay cost is based on the  
following equation:   
 
Container Delay Cost = (FA Flat Cost) + (Delay Cost per Hour)*(# Hours Delayed),         Equation 1 
For hours < 24 
 
Container Delay Cost = (FA Flat Cost) + (Delay Cost per Hour)*(# Hours Delayed),         Equation 2 
      + (Container Value) 





There was a flat cost charged to the system every time a false alarm happened.  
This was based on the negative impact cost the false alarm will have on the smooth flow 
of containers through the existing port infrastructure.  Then, with every minute that 
passes, an additional cost was levied to quantify the negative effects of a long wait in an 
alarm verification queue.  Finally, if at the end of a 24-hour period a container is still 
awaiting alarm verification, an additional “miss the boat” cost is levied.  This “missed 
intended shipment” cost was a large driver to overall commercial impact/delay cost 
because of the high jump in cost from a container that was just shortly delayed in the 
system to a container that was delayed for more than 24 hours, as shown in Figure 53. 
 

























Returned to system- but at cost
 
Figure 53.  Commercial Impact Cost vs. Time Delay per Container 
 
As the system causes a delay because a container is suspect, targeted, and inspected 
by active teams, commercial cost increases as delay time increases.  If the process 




Inputs:  The delay cost model was based on the average value 
($25,397.50) of a U.S. Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit (TEU) container in 1998.62  The flat 
cost of a false alarm was a composite estimate as a function of time, based on the extra 
equipment, manpower, and tracking costs incurred for that pulling a container from the 
system for alarm verification. 
Description:  The individual container delay cost model shown in  
Figure 53 was integrated into the dynamic process architecture model for Alternatives 1 
and 2 through a Microsoft Excel worksheet used as a model output analyzer. 
Results:  The results of the based on the individual container delay cost 
model are aggregated into the results of the overall performance model discussed in the  
“Land Inspection- Performance Model” section (4.4.1) of this report. 
 
4.1.4.2 Merchant Ship Delay Cost Model 
Approach:  The model the Sea Inspection Group used for the 
performance was also used to calculate the delay time caused by the inspection system(s).  
The parameters of the model needed to be changed to provide the model with the 
required assumptions. 
MOEs:  The MOEs for this model were the average delay for the ships 
and the delay cost incurred from that delay.  In order to obtain a delay cost, the average 
delay for each ship was calculated by timing each ship in the system, adding up those 
times and dividing the total delay by the total number of ships arriving at the  





n∑= 1 ,            Equation 3 
 
t  is the average delay for each ship 
t is the delay for each ship. 
 
                                                 
62 http://www.pmanet.org/pubs/pmaupdates/v11_iss11_update_11_1999.pdf, (accessed 30 May 2005). 
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If no delay could occur, all containers would enter Singapore, creating a 














c is the average container value imported/exported to/from U.S.63 
N is the total number of containers per year into Singapore64 
 
Any delay was considered to cause some fraction of the whole container 






















b is average number of containers per ship 
c is total number of container ships entering port of Singapore.65 
                                                 
63 PMA Research, “Import Containers Surge on West, East, Gulf Coasts,” PMA Update, Vol. 11, No. 11, 
(November 1999):  pp. 1-4,  http://www.pmanet.org/pubs/pmaupdates/v11_iss11_update_11_1999.pdf, (accessed 
February 2005). 
64 Singapore Maritime Port Authority, “Information Center
,
” Container Throughput PDF files, 
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/infocentre/pdfs/container-throughput.pdf, (accessed April 2005). 
65 Singapore Maritime Port Authority, “Information Center,” Vessel Arrival PDF files, 
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/infocentre/pdfs/vessel-arrivals.pdf, (accessed April 2005). 
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DC represents a total annual delay cost for an average of one-hour delay 
caused by the system.  In order to get the actual delay cost, the model output was simply 
multiplied by DC. 
Assumptions:  Some basic assumptions for delay cost were made prior to 
modeling.  The output of the model was the average delay in “hours per ship.”  This 
number needed to be converted into “dollars per year.”  In order to do this conversion, the 
monetary value of each container imported and exported from the U.S. was used since the 
Port of Singapore did not keep these statistics.  The total number of ships per year 
arriving at the Port of Singapore and the average number of containers in a ship were 
used to calculate the monetary value of an average of one hour of delay. 
Inputs:  The inputs (Table 17) that went into this model were the same as 
the inputs for the performance model, again with slight differences for Alternative 2.  
Both models had a Mean Time Between Arrival (MTBA) and a Ship Size Per Team 
(SSPT) input.  Each also included whether or not hazardous materials were onboard 
(Boolean), the inspection time and the number of teams.  The only differences were with 
the probabilities of detection.  Alternative 2, incorporated the probability of detection by 
the boarding team, but added in the probability of detection and false alarm by the  







1%, 2,5%, 5% , 7.5%, 10%
0.155, 0.198, 0.241, 0.284









Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Boarding Team 0.248949237 0.006595327 0.241811536 0.004121632
Smart Container N/A N/A 0.664141855 0.004725326
0.2143 hr/ship 0.0255 hr/ship 0.5315hr/ship 0.0483 hr/ship
0 0 12,680 B$ 5,551 B$














































Commercial Delay Time (queue + false alarm)
P(detect)
 
Table 17.  Treatments and Evaluated Results for Model Runs 
 
This table provides a summary of the treatments and values tested for the 
alternatives and the values chosen to be optimum.  The bottom portion summarizes 
the output of the alternatives using the treatment values chosen above. 
 
Analysis:  The end result of the delay cost model is contained in  
Figure 54.  More detailed analysis of each alternative’s overall cost and delay cost 
incurred as a result of that system’s performance is contained in the “Sea Inspection-
Performance Model” section (4.5.1) of this report. 
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Delay Time vs. Delay Cost






0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3












Figure 54.  Delay Cost vs. Average Delay Time 
 
This graph shows the relationship between the time each ship is delayed and the 
delay cost incurred by delaying the ship from entering port. 
 
4.1.5 Modeling and Analysis – Sensors Group 
4.1.5.1 Performance Model – Sensors Group 
Modeling Approach:  The performance of any Sensor System was 
dependent on two main factors:  (1) Sensor Physics and (2) Sensor Integration and 
Deployment.  Sensor physics could be captured by three groups of parameters, which, in 
most cases, were not completely independent from each other: 
 
• Sensor-target interactions (sensor capabilities versus target signatures or 
observables, sensor-target geometry, etc.). 
• Sensor-environment interactions (particularly weather effects on the 
propagation path of either emitted or reflected energy from the target). 
• Sensor-specific parameters (wavelength, radiated power, sensitivity,  
field of view, etc.). 
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While sensor physics pertained to the specific system considered and the 
resulting “observables” or signatures for targets, sensor integration looked at the 
aggregate level, which is totally scenario-dependent. 
The Sensors Group specifically looked at: 
 
• Sensor-sensor interactions (cumulative probability of detection, coverage 
overlap, etc.). 
• Sensor-location interaction (emplacement considerations as they relate to 
sensor line of sight, for example). 
 
These main factors were taken into consideration and were specifically 
dealt with by separate—though interrelated—modeling “levels” as shown in Figure 55. 
 
 
Figure 55.  Sensor Modeling Approach 
 
The diagram shows a conceptual representation of the two-tier approach to 
modeling implemented.  The first low-level tier was concerned with the  
physics-based, individual radar and EO/IR sensor specific parameters, while the 
high-level tier focused on aggregate performance. 
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The first level of modeling, represented in the diagram by the radar and 
EO/IR ovals, was conducted by two separate TDSI Groups, which were specifically 
concerned with the physics-based modeling task.  This modeling effort was conducted 
using two existing modeling tools:  Advanced Refractive Effects Propagation System 
(AREPS) and Target and Acquisition Weapons Software (TAWS).  AREPS was used for 
radar and TAWS for EO/IR. Application inputs included: 
 
• Sensor-specific parameters (wavelength, scan rate, field of view,  
pulse length, antenna height, minimum resolvable temperature, etc.) 
• Target-specific parameters (type, dimensions, radar cross-section, 
temperature, etc.). 
• Environment-specific parameters (sea surface temperature, humidity, 
visibility, aerosols, clutter, wind speed, etc.). 
The output results varied for each application, but both AREPS and 
TAWS provided the required information—in some cases through some manipulation of 
the output data—that basically consisted of a spatial distribution of probabilities of 
detection (Pdet) as a function of range from the sensor. 
These individual sensor probabilities of detection and ranges were 
subsequently used as inputs into the second tier, or aggregate level, of modeling.  This 
second stage was conducted using mostly graphical tools and also some Microsoft® Excel 
spreadsheet models designed to automate repetitive calculations like sensor line of sight,  
coverage overlap, and sweep rate.  Both paper and electronic maps were used extensively 
to plot and analyze coverage areas, number and type of sensors, emplacement and 
platforms selection, and trade-offs among these factors. 
An analysis of reliability, availability, and maintainability for the different 
sensors used in the Sensor Group alternatives is shown in Appendix J. 
MOPs and MOEs:  At the aggregate level, a single MOP captured the 
overall performance of the sensor deployment alternatives selected for modeling: sensor 
coverage.  This is functionally equivalent to range, and given our basic “cookie cutter” 
detection model assumption, it was defined to be the maximum range for which Pdet is 
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unity.  Range was considered to be dependent on three main factors:  (1) target critical 
dimensions for the observable signature; (2) environment (weather/sea state); and, (3) for 
line of sight sensors, platform height. 
Two other specific MOEs were selected for modeling purposes:   
(1) Time-to-Detection (TDet) and Time-to-Classification/ID (TClass/ID) as seen on 
Figure 56.  These two MOEs basically captured aggregate effectiveness for the  
Sensor System.  Given the “cookie-cutter” assumption made for the detection function, 
TDet was very straightforward to calculate because the delay was basically 0 from the 
moment that a contact was within the field of view of the detection/tracking sensor.  
Conversely, the TClass/ID had to take into account that if the target was not within the 
field of view of the sensor at time 0, consideration had to be given to the time required 
for a classification/ID-capable platform/sensor to be moved to the target area.  Figure 56 




Figure 56.  Time-to-Detection and Time-to-Classification/ID 
 
Time-to-Classification/ID became the critical metric for the performance at the 
aggregate level.  It included computation of the time required to position a 
classifying/ID-capable asset within “line-of-sight” distance to the contact of interest. 
 
Finally, Time-to-Go One (TTG1) was an overall system-level MOE which 
was designed to capture the end result contribution of the sensor subsystem to the larger 
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MDP Integrated System.  It was measured as the time remaining from the moment when 
a contact was detected and identified until it was—at least theoretically—in a position 
where it could execute its intended damage-producing effect (e.g., for the SAW scenario 
this would be ramming the pier of the Port of Singapore).  The relationship between this 
metric and the MOEs TDet and TClass/ID is direct—distance divided by vessel speed—
once the distance to the contact is determined, which was scenario driven (assuming a 
fixed given vessel speed). 
TTG1 was computed for the different alternatives (and “As-Is” System) 
through worst-case assumptions regarding location.  For instance, for Alternative 1 this 
was done basing the computations on distances and ranges from the most easterly radar 
station (coastal, tower-based, 300-foot tower) located in Tanjung Piang, Bintan, 
Indonesia and a potential “ship-as-a-weapon” vessel coming from the South China Sea.  
For Alternative 2, the same computations were performed using ranges and distances 
based on the use of the most easterly radar aerostat station (tethered at 15,000 feet above 
sea level (ASL)) located in Pulau Jemaja, Indonesia and also a potential  
“ship-as-a-weapon” vessel coming from the South China Sea.  The classification/ID task 
was assumed to be executed by either AIS alone for Alternative 1, or AIS plus maritime 
patrol aircraft (MPA) for Alternative 2.  In both cases, AIS base stations were considered 
to be collocated with the radar station (coastal aerostat mounted).  The results from this 
modeling approach are shown in the “Results (Treatment and MOE Values)” section. 
Assumptions:  Some simplifying assumptions were made in order to 
make the problem more manageable within the scope and time limitations of the project.  
These are basically related to the detection probabilities, overlapping coverages, and 
classification and identification capabilities. 
 
• Detection Probability:  The cookie-cutter detection approach was 
adopted.  A “cookie-cutter” sensor sees everything that is within its range 
R; that is, if the target is within the distance R to the sensor, then the 
probability of the sensor detecting it is unity (and conversely, the 
probability of false alarm Pfa is 0).  This range R, therefore, became a 
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technology-driven design parameter, used to derive coverages for the 
different sensors considered. 
Although initially this may have appeared to be an extremely relaxed 
assumption, the contrary could also be argued.  The output from the 
modeling tool used for radar (AREPS) gave single scan Pdet versus range.  
Assuming a typical scan rate of 30 rpm, this would place the target in the 
field of view of the sensor every two seconds, and given the relative slow 
speed of the target, the cumulative probability of detection should rapidly 
converge to unity for all large ships. 
• Coverage and Space-Based Aggregate Probability of Detection:  
Wherever there was overlap in coverages, the assumption was made that 
there was no gain in Pdet due to more than one sensor looking at it 
simultaneously.  This assumption was also worst-case and hence 
conservative (the resulting system would not be designed with shorter than 
minimum ranges for worst case conditions).  The basic consideration was 
that two neighboring stations would likely be looking at the same basic  
weather-related propagation effects and sensor-target geometries, and then 
if one sensor did not see the target, the neighboring sensor station would 
not see it either. 
• Classification/ID:  All large ships—above 300 GRT—were assumed to 
have operational AIS transponders installed, hence they would be within 
the field of view (when within range) of this Classification/ID Sensor 
System at all times.  If, for whatever reason, AIS was not operational for 
these vessels, then that constituted an anomaly indication. 
 
Description:  For consistency, only the aggregate-level modeling results 
will be presented in this chapter.  The detailed results from the low-level (physics) 
modeling effort are attached as separate appendices at the end of this report. 
The results from the low-level “tier” were taken as inputs for the 
subsequent modeling stages; accordingly, the planning and design ranges for Pdet=1 for 
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each type of sensor were selected based on sensor, target, and environmental 
considerations that resulted from this first “tier” of modeling.  Additionally, all through 
the modeling phase some of the intermediate results being produced were iteratively used 
to enhance the alternative development and refinement process. 
The “As-Is” System data was used in the first run of the model with 
basically two main purposes:  (1) to evaluate the adequacy of the modeling approach and 
tools used; and (2) to assess and document the capabilities of the existing system.  
Successive iterations of the model at the aggregate level were later generated for the 
complete set of alternatives. 
Results (Treatment and MOE Values):  The basic treatments applied 
were totally dependent on the modeling tier considered.  For the low-level models, these 
consisted of:  (1) sensor-specific parameters, (2) sensor location and height, (3) target 
dimensions, and (4) weather.  For the upper-tier (aggregate) modeling level, those 
treatments were basically combined and presented as sensor footprints or coverages. 
While the low-level modeling and simulation tools used were mostly 
analytical (computer-based), the basic tool used to generate the aggregate level model 
was—as previously stated—graphical.  Physics-based (from low-level modeling) 
coverages were derived and analyzed for each alternative.  As previously stated, the  
low-level modeling results are attached in the corresponding appendices and only the 
aggregate modeling results will be shown here. 
Aggregate-Level Performance Results:  Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
(DTED) maps provided by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) were 
used to depict and evaluate the radar coverage for both the “As-Is” Systems and selected 
alternatives.  DTED level 0 was available in an unclassified format and deemed suitable. 
As previously stated, the aggregate model itself consisted of the 
representation of the physics-derived (from the low-level modeling tier) radar coverages 
over the DTED maps.  These maps were used to determine the minimum number of 
systems required and the general location for the radar installations (a final selection of 
sites should be made after conducting more detailed field studies).  “Calibrated” range 
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circles (drawn to scale) were developed for overlay onto the DTED maps, using the range 
data from the low-level models (particularly, AREPS for radar coverages). 
In all cases, the calibrated radar range circles were computed for a 
probability of detection of 0.9 (Pdet=0.9), a probability of false alarm of 10-8 (Pfa=10-8), 
and an estimated target cross-section (RCS) of 800 m2, approximately the size of an 
ocean-going freighter of 300 GRT or more, as required for the SAW scenario. 
 
• (“As-Is” System) 
o Detection and Tracking (Radar):  See “As-Is Radar System” 
coverage in Figure 57. 
o Classification/ID (AIS and EO/IR):  Based on a survey of the 
existing system, AIS coverage was assumed to be equivalent to the 






Figure 57.  “As-Is” Radar System Coverage 
 
It can be seen that the “As-Is” Radar System covers only a very limited 
portion of the “critical area.”  The radar stations are assumed to be 
mounted on 90-foot towers, resulting in calibrated range circles of 12 NM.  
The smaller range circles inside the Singapore Straits are 6 NM due to 
reduced antenna height. 
 
• Alternative 1 
o Detection and Tracking (Radar):  See “Coastal Radar  
Surveillance-Microwave” coverage in Figure 58 and “HFSWR” 
coverage in Figure 59. 
o Classification/ID (AIS and EO/IR):  AIS base stations were 
assumed to be collocated with coastal radar stations; therefore, due 
to the increased antenna heights, extended ranges were obtained.  
EO/IR assets were assumed to be mounted on MPA and fixed sites 
at selected critical points (performance was not modeled at the 
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aggregate level).  See “Coastal Radar Surveillance-Microwave” 
and “HFSWR” coverage. 
 
 
Figure 58.  Coastal Microwave Radar Coverage 
 
Alternative 1 includes a network of coastal microwave radar stations.  Each radar 





Figure 59.  High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) Coverage 
 
Alternatives 1 and 2 also include a network of coastal High Frequency Surface 
Wave Radar (HFSWR) stations.  With current antenna array technology, each 
station covers a circular sector of 200 NM in a 120° arc.  Sector overlap is desirable 
to increase Pdet. 
 
• Alternative 2 
o Detection and Tracking (Radar):  See “MAEAR” coverage, 
“HFSWR”, and “MPA.” 
o Classification/ID (AIS and EO/IR):  AIS base stations were 
assumed to be collocated with deployed aerostats, therefore due to 
the increased antenna heights extended ranges were obtained.  
EO/IR assets mounted on MPA and fixed sites at selected critical 
points (performance not modeled at the aggregate level). 
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Figure 60.  Medium Altitude and Endurance Aerostat Radar (MAEAR) Coverage 
 
Alternative 2 includes a network of six 5,000-foot tethered aerostats along the straits 
and one 15,000-foot station in the South China Sea.  The corresponding calibrated 
range circles are 90 NM and 150 NM, respectively.  Detailed wind profiles were also 
used to calculate estimated uptime versus downtime ratios. 
 162
 
Figure 61.  Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Radar Coverage 
 
Alternative 2 also includes the use of MPA to cover the aerostat downtime periods.  
Three “search boxes” were defined, two are 300 NM by 100 NM in two “legs,” and 
one (in the critical narrow area of the Strait) is 150 NM by 100 NM. 
 
Using the results provided by the different models with regards to sensor 
deployment, performance, and coverages, the following estimations for the values of 
TTG1 were obtained for the different alternatives (see Table 18): 
 
Architecture 95% C.I. “As-Is” Alt 1 Alt 2 
High 1.80 4.00 16.50 
Expected 1.80 4.00 16.10 
TTG1 (hrs) 
Low 1.80 4.00 15.70 
Table 18.  Sensor Performance Modeling Output 
 
The sensor performance model output is a “Time to Go” parameter indicating the 
time available to make decisions and complete response prior to attack success. 
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As it was previously explained, these values correspond to worst-case 
scenario computations based on the assumption of constant vessel speed (20 kts) and the  
SAW scenario, where a hostile vessel would be targeting the Port of Singapore.  The 
resulting times reflect the different coverages (ranges) for detection and classification/ID.  
For Alternative 2 (aerostat-based) there is some variation, which is because MPA will 
have to be operational for the aerostat downtime (assumed to be 25%) and, in that case, 
the resulting “search boxes” (given typical P-3 “Orion” parameters) will produce 
optimistic and pessimistic values for TDet and TClass/ID. 
Although these values of TTG1 allow a relative performance comparison 
among the alternatives, it is very important to note that they have little value if considered 
in isolation from the rest of the model.  As will be seen further into the report, they were 
subsequently used as input parameters into the overall system-level MDP model, where 
they were basically analyzed in relation to the response force reaction times to derive 
valid conclusions. 
The following graph (Figure 62) shows a performance (TTG1) versus cost 
representation for the “As-Is” and Alternatives 1 and 2.  Costs are calculated for a  



















As-Is: limited performance 1.4 hrs 
Alt 2: best performance 16.1 hrs 
Alt 1: better performance 4.0 hrs 
 
Figure 62.  Sensors Systems Performance (TTG1) vs. Cost 
 
The measures TTG1 for the “As-Is” and the two Alternative Sensor Systems 
selected indicate a moderate increase in performance with reduced cost and a 
significant increase over current capability at exceptional costs. 
 
4.1.5.2 System Cost Model – Sensors Group 
Sensor System Cost Estimation:  In recent years, the communities 
surrounding the area of regard, as well as USPACOM, had improved the overall 
situational awareness capability within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.  The 
primary investment was the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Reporting System 
(STRAITREP).  The STRAITREP System was a joint mandatory ship reporting system 
in the Straits using shore-based radar installations, Vessel Tracking Service (VTS)/AIS 
base stations, and Very High Frequency (VHF) communications to provide sensor 
coverage and facilitate communication.  Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia had all 
committed resources and assets to the project, with the most substantial progress made by 
Singapore and Malaysia.  Singapore improved the existing situational awareness 
capability with new and improved assets, while Malaysia undertook significant new 
construction and infrastructure installation. 
Data Sources and Verification:  An extensive investigation for existing 
sensor systems, including cost, was conducted, but limited to open and unclassified 
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sources.  The primary source for existing and proposed national and civil defense assets 
was Jane’s Information Group in both published and online (http://online.janes.com/) 
subscription service form.  Collaborating material was sought generally when an 
ambiguity, lack of information, or potential conflict was revealed.  Secondary sources 
included, but were not limited to, the public Singapore Government Website 
(http://www.gov.sg/), the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/), and 
GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/).  Where applicable and available, 
support costs were derived from http://www.navyvamosc.com/. 
Some cost data was available from the abovementioned sources, but the 
analogous systems and their operating cost were gained primarily from U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) sources including: 
 
• DOD procurement documentation:  Department of Defense Justification of 
Estimates, February 1998. 
• P-3 System PBL Normalized Cost Opportunity Index, Department of the 
Navy, 1999. 
 
Extensive efforts went into establishing collaborative relations or, at the 
very least, communication channels with operators, potential designers, and 
manufacturers of applicable equipments. 
The TDSI component of the MPD Group added invaluable depth and 
technical expertise to the sensors costing effort.  Collaboration meetings defined and 
detailed the operational norms including assets, utilization, port approach control, and 
interagency/interservice cooperation. 
Current System Investigation:  Based on the noted research, fixed radar 
stations have been installed at 12 designated locations in Malaysian and Singaporean 
waters and seven new VTS base stations have been constructed on the Malaysian side of 
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the Malacca Straits.  Moreover, only VHF equipment is used to establish communication 
between the VTS authorities and the vessels using designated frequency channels.66 
System Cost Assumptions:  The Sensors Group approached the cost 
estimation using the following assumptions: 
 
• STRAITREP assets were the only assets with 100% dedication and cost 
burden to the MDP mission. 
• STRAITREP System costs included operation and sustaining costs only, 
including operator/technicians. 
• National and civil defense assets specifically designated “maritime”  
(e.g., Navy Coastal Patrol Craft, Air Force Maritime Patrol Aircraft, etc.) 
were utilized at 20% for the MDP mission. 
• Existing platforms (patrol vessels/aircraft, lighthouses, towers, etc.) and 
associated operating costs were not used in the overall models. 
• New Point-to-Point (Sensor-to-C2) Communication System costs were  
not included. 
• New sensor equipment (even for old platforms) and new construction 
costs, including Operations and Support (O&S), were used in  
overall models. 
• Annual operation, maintenance, and support costs were estimated using 
5%, 7%, or 10% of actual equipment costs. 
• Personnel costs were estimated at $75K per person per year, with one 
person per new system unless otherwise noted. 
• All costs were adjusted to FY05$US unless otherwise noted. 
• The proposed systems were loosely analogous to the four primary systems 
described below for which accurate cost data was available, unless 
otherwise noted: 
o Fixed (coastal-based) Surface Search Radar:  Scanter 2001 System. 
                                                 
66 International Maritime Organization, Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems, Resolution MSC.73(69), 
Annex 10, adopted May 1998. 
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o Fixed Wing/Rotary Wing Aircraft Radar:  AN/APS-134. 
o Tethered Airborne/Aerostat Radar:  AN/APS-143. 
o EO/IR System:  Thermal and Imaging Sensor System (TISS); 
Boeing). 
 
Sensor System “As-Is” Cost Estimate:  The Current “As-Is” Sensor 
System included: 
 
• Twelve medium to short range microwave radar stations located at 
Malaysian and Singaporean Ports and waterways. 
• Three VTS authorities (Kelang, Johor, and Singapore). 
• Seven AIS base stations in Malaysia, covering 180 miles from Kelang to 
Tanjung Piai. 
• Two AIS base stations in the Singapore Straits. 
• Various surface patrol and maritime patrol aircraft. 
 
Singapore was operating 17 to 23 surface craft, and 10 rotary wing and  
5 fixed wing aircraft capable of sensor platform hosting.  Malaysia was estimated to be 
operating 7 to 18 surface craft, 12 rotary-wing and 10 fixed-wing aircraft.  Indonesia was 
estimated at 0 MDP dedicated assets.  Altogether, there are approximately  
34 individual systems identified and in use in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.  
System costs were approximated using comparable systems within the U.S. inventories. 
For a conservative estimate, the Sensors Group used the reported 




Life Cycle Categories As-Is Costs (FY05$M) 
     Min Mean Max 
Program Acquisition Cost  $                 -  $                 -  $                -  
 Procurement Cost  $                 -  $                 -  $                 - 
  Prime Mission Equipment  $                 -  $                 -  $                 - 
 MILCON    $                 -  $                 -  $                 - 
           
Operation and Support  $    5,939,757   $    8,863,785   $  13,567,970 
 Ops and Maint   $    4,109,757   $    7,033,785   $  11,737,970 
 Personnel   $    1,830,000   $    1,830,000   $    1,830,000 
           
        
One Year O&S Totals  $    5,939,757   $    8,863,785   $  13,567,970 
        
Ten Year O&S Total (FY05$M)  $    59.40   $    88.60   $  135.70  
  
Figure 63.  “As-Is” System Cost Estimate 
 
The “As-Is” System cost estimates are based on current inventory, operation, and 
support requirements, and utilization rates established by AOR operators. 
 
Sensor System Alternative 1 Cost Estimate:  Alternative 1 included: 
 
• Eight HFSWRs for long-range detection and tracking. 
• Fourteen new tower-mounted microwave surface search radars for 
medium and short range and small craft detection and tracking. 
• Fourteen AIS base stations (collocated with tower-mounted radars). 
• Nine Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) fitted with new EO/IR equipment 
for identification and classification only.  Note:  Existing platform 
operating costs were not used in the overall models (i.e., “0 cost delta”), 
but new equipment (even for old platforms) and new construction costs, 
including O&S, were used. 
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Life Cycle Categories Alt 1 Costs (FY05$M) 
     Min Mean Max 
Program Acquisition Cost  $      35,416,400   $      35,416,400   $      35,416,400  
 Procurement Cost  $      21,016,400   $      21,016,400   $      21,016,400  
  Prime Mission Equipment  $      21,016,400   $      21,016,400   $      21,016,400  
 MILCON    $      14,400,000   $      14,400,000   $      14,400,000  
           
Operation and Support  $        4,095,820   $        4,804,148   $        5,866,640  
 Ops and Maint   $        1,770,820   $        2,479,148   $        3,541,640  
 Personnel    $        2,325,000   $        2,325,000   $        2,325,000  
           
        
   First Year Totals  $      39,512,220   $      40,220,548   $      41,283,040  
   Nine Year O&S Totals  $      36,862,380   $      43,237,332   $      52,799,760  
        
Ten Year Acquisition and O&S 
Total (FY05$M)  $           76.40   $          83.50   $           94.10 
  
Figure 64.  Alternative 1 Cost Estimate 
 
The Alternative 1 System cost estimates are based on estimated inventory 
acquisition, O&S requirements, and utilization rates established by AOR operators. 
 
Sensor System Alternative 2 Cost Estimate:  Alternative 2 included: 
 
• Six HFSWRs for long-range detection and tracking. 
• Six MAEARs (at 5,000 feet) for medium- and short-range and small craft 
detection and tracking. 
• One MAEAR (at 15,000 feet). 
• Seven aerostat-mounted AIS/VTS transponder/interrogators base stations 
(collocated with radar systems). 
• Nine MPAs fitted with new EO/IR, airborne surface long-range 
microwave radar, and AIS transponder/interrogator equipment for foul 
weather search, detection, track, identification and classification.  Note:  
Existing platform operating costs were not used in the overall models  
(i.e., “0 cost delta”), but new equipment (even for old platforms) and new 
construction costs including O&S were used. 
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Life Cycle Categories Alt 2 Costs (FY05$M) 
     Min Mean Max 
Program Acquisition Cost  $ 165,462,733  $ 165,462,733   $ 165,462,733  
 Procurement Cost   $  16,062,733   $  16,062,733   $  16,062,733  
  Prime Mission Equipment  $  16,062,733   $  16,062,733   $  16,062,733  
 MILCON    $ 149,400,000  $ 149,400,000   $ 149,400,000  
           
Operation and Support   $  10,172,933   $  13,582,106   $  18,695,865  
 Ops and Maint   $    8,522,933   $  11,932,106   $  17,045,865  
 Personnel   $    1,650,000   $    1,650,000   $    1,650,000  
           
        
    First Year Totals  $ 175,635,666  $ 179,044,839   $ 184,158,598  
   Nine Year O&S Total  $  91,556,394   $ 122,238,951   $ 168,262,787  
        
Ten Year Acquisition and O&S 
Total (FY05$M)  $     267.20  $     301.30   $     352.40  
  
Figure 65.  Alternative 2 Cost Estimate 
 
The Alternative 2 System cost estimates are based on estimated inventory 
acquisition, O&S requirements, and utilization rates established by AOR operators. 
 
4.1.6 Modeling and Analysis – C3I Group 
The development of the C3I model was based on a desire to incorporate both the 
theory and practice of C2 into a single model.  The intent of the model was to provide 
insight into what C2 architectures and strategies produce the best performance. 
The main question the C3I Group wanted to answer was “can the MDP System 
make a good and timely decision?”  The best way to model a timely and informed 
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Figure 66.  C3I Performance Model Overview 
 
The intent was to model the presence of intelligence on which the decision maker 
could base an informed and timely decision, so two distinct models were used. 
 
The group defined an “informed” decision as one based on the aggregation of 
verified information received from electronic intelligence (e.g., sensors such as radar), 
Sea Inspection, Land Inspection, or HUMINT.  “Timeliness” meant analysis performed 
and a decision made with time to react through inspection or target engagement.  The 
inputs to the “Timeliness Model” were varied and the outputs were used to compare 
Alternatives 1 and 2 to the “As-Is” System.  The “Informed Model” inputs were held 
constant, as they were the outputs from Sensors, Sea Inspection, and Land Inspection 
Groups’ models.  This “aggregation” of information from multiple sources exemplified 
the data fusion process in a C3I System. 
 
4.1.6.1 C3I Performance Models 
Informed Model 
Approach:  The intent of the informed model was to determine the 
percentage of correct and incorrect decisions based on the presence or quality of 
information received from lateral systems of the overall MDP System, such as external 
intelligence, AIS information from sensors, or results of sea inspections.  An information-
scoring scheme was developed to analyze model outputs. 
The flowchart in Figure 67 depicts the process of the informed model. 
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Figure 67.  Informed Model Flowchart 
 
This flowchart shows how an information packet travels through the model, 
collecting AIS, Sea Inspection, and External Intelligence to derive an  
information score. 
 
Information from the lateral subsystems in the MDP System received a 
three-digit integer score, as summarized in Table 19.  The first digit (the hundred’s place) 
designated the quality of AIS information, the ten’s place digit qualified Sea Inspection 
Information, and the last digit (the one’s place) qualified External Intelligence (fed by the  
Land Inspection System alternative results). 
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 No Information Good Information Bad Information 
AIS 100 200 300 
Sea Inspection 10 20 30 
External Intelligence 1 2 3 
Table 19.  Informed Model Information Scoring Scheme 
 
This matrix represents the scoring method given the three different sources of 
information tags:  No Information, Good Information, and Bad Information, each 
associated with a specific score.  Having No Information on a ship rendered a score 
of 1*10n, where n = [0,1,2].  Having Good Information on a ship rendered a score of 
2*10n, where n = [0,1,2].  Having Bad Information on a ship rendered a score of 
3*10n, where n = [0,1,2].  The total score provided a means of analyzing the model 
outputs, i.e., decisions whether to inspect/engage or let the vessel pass. 
 
The total score determined the selected decision relative to the scenario; 
SAW was to engage or not, WMD was to sea inspect or let pass.  The final three-digit 
score was compared to a decision table to determine if the decision was to inspect/engage  
or pass. 
 
Decision Score Decision Decision Score Decision Decision Score Decision 
111 Inspect 222 Pass 333 Inspect 
121 Inspect 212 Pass 312 Inspect 
112 Inspect 221 Pass 321 Inspect 
131 Inspect 211 Pass 322 Inspect 
113 Inspect 233 Inspect 331 Inspect 
133 Inspect 232 Inspect 313 Inspect 
122 Pass 223 Inspect 323 Inspect 
123 Inspect 213 Inspect 332 Inspect 
132 Inspect 231 Inspect 311 Inspect 
Table 20.  Informed Model Decision Table 
 
Table 19 determined the decision based on the three-digit score.  For example, a 
ship is generated and passes through the system, receiving a score of 100 for AIS,  
20 for Land Inspection, and 2 for External Intelligence.  The final score of 122 
means there is no AIS information, but the cargo was inspected and passed by a 
Land Inspection port, and the External Intelligence is good (e.g., there are no 
reports of illegal cargo).  This would result in a decision to allow the ship to pass 
with no Sea Inspection. 
 
Out of 27 possible combinations, only 5 scores represented a decision to 
not engage or not inspect.  The determination of the decision was based on knowledge of 
the operations at the Coast Guard’s Pacific Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center  
(MIFC PAC) in Alameda, California.  The model also represented decisions that were 
risk-averse, i.e., “it’s better to be safe than sorry.” 
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Each combination of inputs (see Table 21 for input combinations) was run  
30 times.  The assumption for the WMD scenario was that a WMD was present on each 
of 10,000 ships generated in the model.  The SAW scenarios assumed a certain 
percentage of the 10,000 ships had some anomalous behavior.  Running only anomalous 
ships through the model was done to evaluate the performance of the C3I System, given 
that an attack was occurring. 
Assumptions:  The following assumptions underlined the informed 
model: 
 
• Physical delays associated with gathering information were not modeled. 
• AIS transponders were located on all ships transiting in the AOR. 
• All ships with anomalies had parties onboard that intended to use the 
vessel as a weapon. 
• Only one decision was made per ship (10,000 decisions). 
 
Inputs:  The C3I Informed Model inputs were the outputs from the 
Sensors, Sea Inspection, and Land Inspection Groups’ models (see Table 21), with the 
exception of the anomaly input.  The model throughputs were individual ships processed 
through the MDP System (10,000 per run) and the model was determined to be scenario-
dependent—input values changed based on the specific scenario being considered. 
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 “As-Is” Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Inputs WMD SAW WMD SAW WMD SAW 
AIS (Y/N) 0.75 0.75 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999 
AIS G/B) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Sea Inspect (Y/N) 0.001 0.001 0.2489492 0.24895 0.6641419 0.66414 
Sea Inspect G/B) 0 0 0.107 0.107 0.073 0.073 
External Intel (Y/N) 0.02 0.02 0.47 0.47 0.94 0.94 
External Intel (G/B) 0.99 0.99 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.94 
Anomaly 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 
(1-Inspection Error) 0.9999 0.999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
(1-Pass Error) 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Table 21.  Input Values for C3I Informed Model 
 
These inputs values for the C3I Informed Model are outputs from the models for the 
subsystems lateral to the C3I System:  Sensors (AIS information), Sea Inspection 
and External Intelligence (fed by Land Inspection).  This exemplifies the purpose of 
C3I:  to enhance situational awareness by providing a common operating picture by 
aggregating information from multiple intelligence sources.  See the respective 
group sections for a detailed explanation of the numbers above. 
 
AIS, provided by the Sensors Group, represented vessel information that 
included Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), vessel call sign and name, vessel 
type, vector information, and manifest. External Intelligence was fed by the  
Land Inspection System alternative results.  The anomaly input was only used for the  
SAW scenario.  The C3I Group determined only 1% of the ships would display 
anomalous behavior.  The inspection error and pass error inputs (last two rows in  
Table 21) represented the probabilities of making a Type I and Type II error.  For this 
model, a Type I error occurred when the decision to let a ship pass was made, but it 
should have been inspected.  A Type II error occurred when the decision to inspect a ship 
was made, but it should have been allowed to pass.  Based on the numbers in Table 21, a 
Type I error occurred in 0.01% of ships inspected and a Type II error occurred in 0.5% of 
ships allowed to pass.  These numbers represented a conservative view of the capabilities 
of the system.  A Type II error had less risk associated with it, but such an error could 
increase costs and have a negative impact on commerce.  A Type I error had more risk 
associated with it, and should be avoided.67 
                                                 
67 These percentages were determined by the C3I Group based on conversations with analysts from the 
 
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area, MIFC. 
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Outputs:  The initial model outputs were the tallied count of decisions 
scored to: 
 
• inspect/engage given the information warranted inspection or engagement; 
• inspection and engagement decisions made in error; 
• pass vessel without inspection or engagement; and 
• pass vessel decisions made in error. 
 
The probability calculations were based on 30 runs of 10,000 “vessels” 
each.  Each vessel represented one decision, but multiple decisions could not be made on 
one vessel.  For the WMD scenario, the probability of making the decision to send an 
inspection team was calculated by: 
 
[     ]
   
Inspected Inspected in Error
Total number of ships
+ . 
For the SAW scenario, probability of sending an engagement force to 
intercept the ship displaying anomalous activity was given by: 
 
[     ]
     
Engaged Engaged in Error
Total number of ships with anomalies
+ . 
 
MOEs:  The MOE provided by the informed model was the probability of 
deciding to send inspection team in response to the WMD scenario, or engagement forces 
to a suspect vessel with respect to the SAW scenario.  The C3I’s intelligence source for 
the SAW scenario was an anomaly.  The group defined an anomaly as information from a 
highly reliable source that a vessel had deviated from a “norm,” i.e., suddenly changed 
course, refused to obey International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, did not 
follow its float plan, did not follow the traffic separation scheme, did not board the harbor 
pilot at the appropriate rendezvous point, or refused to obey posted speed restrictions. 
Description:  The Informed Model was a queuing model using Extend™ 
v.6.  The inputs were read into Extend from a Microsoft Excel™ file.  The Extend™ 
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outputs were read back into an Excel™ file where they were sorted and tallied.  Figure 68 
is a screen capture of the Informed Model in Extend™. 
 
 
Figure 68.  EXTEND™ Screen Shot of “Informed Model” 
 
The above screen shot of the “Informed Model” shows the fow of ships as AIS,  
Sea Inspection, and External Intelligence (Land Inspection) information on the ship 





Approach:  Another measure of performance was data fusion process 
time.  This was the time it took to aggregate and analyze information from the lateral 
systems.  After discussing the various relationships between each subgroup within MDP, 
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it was decided that “Time To Go” (TTG) would be the overall metric for C3I analysis 
time.  TTG was defined as the time it took each group to do their job represented as a 
“chunk of time” out of the total time given to respond to a particular scenario.  Thus, the 
timeliness output was a “most likely” time to accomplish data fusion. 
The flowchart in Figure 69 depicts the process of the timeliness model. 
 
 
Figure 69.  Swim-Lane Flowchart of “As-Is” System in the “Timeliness” Model 
 
This swim-lane flowchart outlines the main processes that occur in the  
“As-Is” Model.  Note that the swim-lane highlights the particular area of the model 





Figure 70.  Screen Capture of the “As-Is” System in the Timeliness Model 
 
The model represents the flow of maritime information from sensors and 
information sources to the Data Fusion Center and C2 Center.  This model was built 
to replicate the process performed at the USCG MIFCPAC in Alameda, California. 
 
• General Description: 
o The model’s intent was to represent the decision making process of 
a maritime C2 Center and to quantify that process by determining 
the time to make a decision on a certain piece or group of 
information (MOE). 
• Description of the information passing through the system: 
o The items passing through the model represented pieces of 
information originating from two sources:  Sensors and 
Intelligence Collection.  Each piece of information was randomly 
assigned a track number (which was dependent on the traffic 
density, the entire area of regard, and the individual sensor areas of 
regard).  The pieces of sensor information were also randomly 
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assigned a CEP that was based on a distribution provided by the 
Sensors Group.  Once all sources were combined, each piece of 
information was randomly assigned a priority between 1 (lowest) 
and 5 (highest).  Comparisons were made based on continuous 
addition of pieces of information to the track row and type of 
information column. 
 
Considering the overall MOE of time, the Modeling Group applied the 
need to model information flow from the viewpoint of the commander in charge of the  
C2 Center.  As though presented on a large map display screen, information about 
contacts and ships came into the model Data Fusion Center from various sources.  The 
sources, or object generators, were designed to encompass all of the possible inputs of 
information that might be collected by a Data Fusion Center.  At Alameda, for example, 
contact information could be updated by checking computer databases, receiving reports 
from analysts in the field, or by reviewing electronic intelligence databases. 
The overarching assumption for this model was that as data came into the  
Data Fusion Center, an analyst or watch stander accumulated the various pieces until a 
sufficient amount of data was available to warrant making a decision or completing an 




Figure 71.  Functional Flow Diagram of a Data Fusion Center 
 
This closely approximates the process used at USCG MIFCPAC Alameda.  Note 
that both communications and analysts play a key role in this process. 
 
Given the variety of sources in this category, the C3I Group created a 
generic generation block called “external intelligence.”  The other sources of data were 
from “sensors” (i.e., radar and AIS), and MDP “Land Inspection” Systems.  The 
interarrival times of each source of information were chosen to be as accurate a reflection 
of reality as possible.  Therefore, sensor data should arrive with 10 to 100 times the 
frequency of a report from an agent in the field.68 
With this concept of data generation in mind, it was important to note that 
each object generated in the model represented a piece of data concerning a ship.  
Therefore, each data “ball” was given a randomly assigned number between one and the 
total number of ships expected to be tracked on a given day based on a ship density input. 
This decision, or analysis, could be a call for action, or merely the belief 
that this ship was of no concern.  Either way, sufficient knowledge of the ship was 
available to render some conclusion about what should be done regarding a particular 
contact.  Thus, as data accumulated in the model, the number of pieces of information 
                                                 
68 Interview with LT James Holt, stakeholders’ questionnaire, Alameda, California, (12 March 2005). 
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about a ship increased until a sufficient level was reached.  Because the number of the 
ships was randomly assigned to the data balls, the time that it took for a sufficient amount 
of information to build up accurately reflected the systematic arrival of information in the 
real world.  Thus, once “three” pieces of information were received about a ship, the time 
was “stamped,” or recorded, providing the overall metric of time to analyze. 
The other real world process that was replicated in the C2 model  
(see Figure 72) dealt with the prioritization of information for “high interest vessels” 
(HIVs).  During the visit to MIFCPAC Alameda, the watch officers noted that if there 
was a situation that required immediate action, the appropriate information was walked 
directly from the Data Fusion Center to the admiral in charge of the C2 Center.  The 
prioritization of information was replicated in the model through use of a priority score 
randomly assigned to a certain percentage of data balls.  Once a ball was given the 




Figure 72.  Screen Capture of the Data Fusion Center Block in the “Timeliness” Model 
 
Note that as information arrives, it is given a priority by an analyst, which is 
represented by the delay.  The priority data is then separated from normal data and 
sent to the fast track queue. 
 
Microsoft Excel™ was used to compile the output data from the model  
(see Figure 73). 
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 Sensor Data Ext Intel Anomaly Land Inspect Sum Data Arrival Time Decision Time
1 5 2   7 8.58 11.98 
2 3    3 5.78 5.56 
3 3    3  3.39 
4 3    3 2.28 3.67 
5 3    3  3.07 
Figure 73.  Screen Capture of Output Excel Spreadsheet Used to Record Decision Time 
 
The row number indicates ship number.  The first column is where all sensor data is 
placed.  The next three columns contain external intelligence, anomaly, and land 
inspection data.  The next column is the sum of all data columns for a particular 
row.  “Data Arrival Time” is the time when the decision was made.  The last column 
is the time when the last piece of information arrived before the decision was made. 
 
For example, in row one, five pieces of data regarding ship number 1 was 
accumulated from sensors and two pieces of information from an external intelligence 
source.  Within each spreadsheet was an imbedded formula that prevented more than  
three data balls arriving per ship.  Since the ability to record the decision time and keep 
track of the number of pieces of information on each ship was independent of the 
modeling program, but still linked to the model, future models that were built to explore 
various C2 architectures, or alternatives, could still reference the same spreadsheet as 
though accessing a database.  In the real world, the process of connecting “sensors and 
decision makers to achieve shared awareness” is called network-centric warfare.69  By 
corollary, the C3I Modeling Group was able to generate network-centric alternatives 
because they possessed these characteristics.  For example, the architecture for 
Alternative 2 called for four C2 Centers and nine Data Fusion Centers linked in a 
network-centric manner.  This was accomplished by simply replicating the architecture 
for the “As Is” model four times and having each C2 Center reference the same decision 
spreadsheet.  Thus, four times the amount of data could be analyzed at the same time, 
theoretically generating faster decision times. 
                                                 
69 Ralph S. Klingbeil and Keith M. Sullivan, “A Proposed Framework for Network-Centric Maritime Warfare 









• Track duplication had been resolved. 
• Given “position” was accurate. 
• Information assurance problem systems are in place as information was 
assumed correct and reliable. 
• Track duplication was resolved. 
• A decision on all tracks was made. 
• The area of regard was divided evenly amongst the specified number  
of sensors. 
• Full sensor coverage, which may have included AIS, VTS, VMS, but not 
necessarily land-based sensor assets. 
• Items in the model were “data packets” with information in specific ships. 
• Data fusion process included track assignment, priority assignment, and 
prioritization of data packets. 
• Data fusion and command and control centers were collocated. 
• Priority Assignments: 
o 1-4:  Low to High some action required within… (hours, days…). 




• From Sensors Group: 
o Track Quality:  Ptrack. 
o Track Quality:  Pfa. 
o Position Error:  CEP mean. 
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o Position Error:  CEP variance. 
o Traffic Density. 
• Anomaly Probability (determined by the C3I Group). 
• External Intelligence (may be HUMINT, Electronic Intelligence, or other 
types). 
• Internal Intelligence:  Land Inspection information. 
• Internal Intelligence:  Sea Inspection information. 
 
4.2 SYSTEM COST MODEL – C3I GROUP 
Approach:  In order to evaluate “system value” using quantitative performance 
and cost measurements, a systems cost analysis was performed on each of the three 
individual C3I design alternatives.  In order to predict the future cost of the C3I Systems, 
actual data was used when possible, but the predominant technique used analogies of 
similar technology components and operational personnel staffs.  A triangular 
distribution was developed through the estimation of low, mean, and high aggregate 
estimation for each component of the C3I System (e.g., facilities, personnel, equipment). 
Translating the C3I Group functional requirements into budget requirements 
allowed for traceability and ensured direct comparison of each functional requirement, 
which allowed trade studies to occur. 
MOEs: 
 
• Total Ownership Cost for the ten-year system R&D, Procurement, O&S, 
and Disposal costs 
 
Inputs:  The Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs 
were estimated as a function of total system procurement cost, with RDT&E for 
stratellites and UAVs provided from analogies from programs of record.  The military 
construction (MILCON) cost of the C2 Center and Intelligence collection nodes were 
scaled from military and commercial building cost per square foot.  The USCG MIFIC 
Alameda was used as a basis for required space for a C2 Center, multiplied by a factor of 
1.25 for security, video-teleconferencing capability, and survivable construction.  The 
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number of personnel used to staff a C2 Center was directly representative of existing 
operational staffs currently used at the USCG MIFIC Alameda.  A 5:1 personnel-to-
position staffing ratio was used, similar to the operating capability at Alameda.  The 
personnel salary was an input variable that was burdened for lights, space, training, and 
benefits.  This input variable could be modified for implementing U.S. Navy personnel or 
local (Singaporean/Malaysian/Indonesian) personnel to staff the C3I Systems. 
In the development of the personnel cost estimation, given the wide spectra of 
designators for military personnel, it was assumed that the staff would be 
multidisciplined and highly skilled analysts.  The following are the position titles 
envisioned for this system: 
 
• Commander (Officer) 
• Command And Control Watch Standers 
• ELINT–Sensor Tracking Engineer 
• Intelligence (Officer) 
• Intelligence Watch Standers 
• Communications Specialist 
• Communications Operator 
• Information Assurance Supervisor 
• Information Assurance Specialist 
• Support/Logistics/Maintenance 
• Intelligence (Data Fusion Specialist) 
• Intelligence (Support Analysts) 
• Intelligence (HUMINT Specialist) 
• Intelligence (Support Analyst) 
 
Description:  In order to get the better cost estimation, given the different 
subsystems, the components’ costs were statistically summed to derive the total system 
cost, instead of adding the best “guesses” for each component.  Each of the components 
were quantified in terms of their statistical properties (mean, standard deviation, range, 
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most likely, highest, lowest, etc.), and a Monte Carlo simulation was performed, varying 
each element in accordance with its statistical properties.  A probability distribution was 
built for the cost of each of the components. 
The Regional Systems Architecture (RSA) Alternative (Alternative 1) 
consisted of two mirrored systems connected by a communication network grid.  Each 
C2/Data Fusion Center had a fixed staffing level supporting 24/7 “around the clock” 
operations with a mission critical ratio of 5:1.  This alternative relied heavily on ELINT 
collection via sensor data and maintained a large area of regard (AOR), using sequential 
processing and queuing.  This was chosen as a rapidly implementable alternative, which 
was feasible within the political constraints of the region.  This alternative supported each 
of the three SBA, SAW, and WMD scenarios. 
The Network Centric Warfare Systems Architecture (NCW) Alternative 
(Alternative 2) exploited the preprocessing and data fusion concept.  This design 
contributed to a common operating picture (COP), and all were organized in a  
self-synchronizing structure with distributed authority.  The HUMINT network focused 
on social networks and all-source collection.  The Communications System was a 
layered, gracefully-degrading system using a fiber-optic backbone, networked maritime 
wireless communication buoy stations, stratellites and fixed-wing UAVs.  This 
alternative invested heavily in technology and had a greater number of connected nodes, 
which provided for enhanced capability, with the sum of the parts being greater than their 
individual contribution. 
 
4.2.1 System Cost – C3I Group 
The existing Singapore Primary Maritime Domain C2/Intelligence Center relied 
on independent operations and defined territorial responsibility.  The Singapore sensor 
network gave limited correlation sensor data and relied heavily on ELINT collection.  




As expected, C3I Alternative 1 showed a marked improvement in both the SAW 
and WMD scenarios, but was noneffective for the SBA scenario, where there was too 
little reaction time.  Figure 74 shows the total system cost for each alternative. 
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Figure 74.  C3I Alternative Systems Total Ownership Cost Comparison 
 
For each of the three C3I design architectures, operating personnel account for the 
largest contribution to system cost.  Although these mission-critical personnel are 
77% to 99% of system cost, if was determined that the greatest performance benefit 
could only be realized through the use of cognitive humans (“Eyeballs  
and Intellect”). 
 
Overall:  Figure 75 compares the percentage of “correct” decisions of each 
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NCW + Data Fusion Cells Further Increases Performance 
 
Figure 75.  P(Decide Act | Trigger Event) vs. Cost 
 
Only 20% of the “As-Is” System decisions were correct.  The presence of a COP in 
Alternative 1 increased the percentage of correct decisions to 35%.  The largest gain 
came from adding data fusion cells in Alternative 2, but at a cost of $2.9B. 
 
A correct decision was defined as a decision to inspect given there was a WMD 
onboard, or the decision to engage if the ship displayed anomalous activity of a SAW.  
The probability of false alarm, i.e., an incorrect decision, for the C3I System was defined 
as the decision to act in the absence of a trigger event.  Figure 76 compares the 
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Figure 76.  P(Decide Act | No Trigger Event) vs. Cost 
 
The probability of deciding to act given there was no trigger event represents a  
C3I “false alarm.”  Relative to an annual traffic density of approximately  
59,000 cargo vessels, the “As-Is” System incorrectly identifies 290 SAWs and over 
230 vessels carrying WMDs.  Alternative 2 reduces this to only 118 SAWs and  
95 WMDs, but at a substantial cost. 
 
Figure 77 shows the outputs of the Timeliness Model compared to the  
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Figure 77.  C3I Timeliness Model Performance vs. Cost 
 
This graph shows that the cost of C3I alternatives increases as the performance of 
the alternatives in the timeliness model improves. 
 
4.2.2 Analysis – C3I Group 
The box plots in Figure 78 and Figure 79 display the data from model runs using 
Minitab 14™, a statistical software application.  It indicates Alternative 2 provided the 
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Figure 78.  Box plot of Informed Model Outputs for WMD Scenario 
 
As can be seen from the box plot and interval plot for the probability of deciding to 
inspect, the aggregation of the lateral feed system using Alternative 2 results in the 
highest probability for deciding to inspect a vessel given WMD is onboard.  
Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference between the performance 
of the “As-Is” System and Alternative 2. 
 
Small standard deviation values result in no overlap between the “As-Is” System 
and the two alternatives.  The three systems are statistically significant given a  
95% Confidence Interval (there is a significant difference between the performance 
values of each system). 
SAW Scenario:  The box plot in Figure 79 is an analysis of data from Informed 
Model runs using Minitab 14™.  It indicates Alternative 2 provided the highest 
probability of making the decision to send a reaction force, given that a ship was going to 
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Figure 79.  Box plot of Informed Model Outputs for SAW Scenario 
 
As can be seen from the box plot and interval plot for the probability of deciding to 
send an engagement force, the aggregation of the Lateral feed System using 
Alternative 2 results in the highest probability for deciding to engage a SAW.  
Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference between the performance 
of the “As-Is” System and Alternative 2. 
 
Timeliness Model:  The effect a COP has on analysis time is shown in Figure 80. 
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Figure 80.  Box Plot of COP Effect on Analysis Time 
 
This plot shows the C3I modeling results, by comparing the analysis times for the 
different architectures.  The COP resulted from the NCW characteristics of the 




The analysis time of 56.5 in Figure 80 represents Alternative 1 minus a network 
centric communications architecture and the resultant COP.  Simply dividing the AOR 
into two regions and providing a COP did not reduce analysis time.  Alternative 
Architecture 1, which called for a Communications System that provides a COP, cut 
analysis time in half to 28.7.  The addition of data fusion cells in Alternative 2, which 
represented dividing the area into more manageable areas for analysis, significantly 
reduced analysis time. 
When the output spreadsheet was examined more closely (see Figure 81), about 
1% of all decisions exhibited a phenomenon that was termed “confusion.”  Confusion 
occurred when both C2 Centers in the model attempted to access the spreadsheet at the 
same time for the same contact.  For example, C2 Center #1 read a value of “2” and 
added “1,” and C2 Center #2 also read the value of “2,” and added “3.”  In this case, 
since the operations occurred at the same time, the sum immediately exceeds the logic 
checks built into the model and the condition for a decision to be reached (the sum of 3-
5) never occurs.  While an anomaly, this process could indeed occur in the real world in a 
scenario in which the update rate for the Network Centric System caused two or more C2 
Centers to be slightly out of sync. 
 
 
Figure 81.  Excel™ Spreadsheet Screen Shot of C3I “Timeliness” Model Output Data 
 
An example of the spreadsheet output for information “confusion.”  Cell 91 shows a 
sum of 13, indicating that data for cell 91 was referenced by two C2 Centers 
simultaneously. 
 
4.3 MODELING AND ANALYSIS – FORCE GROUP 
4.3.1 Performance Model – Force Group 
Approach:  The Force Group’s modeling effort was conducted using a split 
approach.  Each of the scenarios was modeled independently, using the modeling 
software that best fit the scenario.  The modeling was undertaken using two primary 
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groups.  The first group consisted of two TDSI Operations Research (OR) students who 
focused on using Map Aware Non-Automata (MANA) software to model the  
SBA scenario.  The main Force Group modeled the SAW scenario with EXTENDTM 
software and the WMD scenario using Microsoft EXCELTM. 
One of the major drivers for the model construction plan was the fact that the 
results from the other groups (C2 and Sensors) would not be available until the end of the 
modeling period.  Because of this, the Force Group designed models to run with a wide 
variety of inputs that would be determined from the outputs of these other group 
modeling efforts.  The Force Group conducted numerous model runs using representative 
ranges of these inputs, and, when available following individual group modeling, the 
Force Group selected the modeling runs that corresponded to the outputs from the other 
MDP Group models. 
The OR students evaluated the Force System alternatives against the SBA 
scenario, using a graduated engagement range scale.  Because all of the MDP Group 
models would need to be integrated, the initial runs were conducted using a graduated 
scale of engagement ranges, to determine their associated engagement success probability 
distributions.  This translated into a probability of success for an engagement given a set 
range (or amount of time) for the engagement. 
The main Force Group and professionals at TRAC Monterey helped the MANA 
Group, introducing the MANA software and coordinating the use of the software with the 
New Zealand Defense Technology Agency proprietors.  MANA was designed, in 
conjunction with Project Albert, to be a Complex Adaptive System model that was an 
improvement over the existing ISAAC/EINSTein model.  It was designed with additional 
capabilities that allowed better distinctions in force-on-force interactions.70 
The Force Group modeled the SAW scenario with EXTEND software, to 
determine the probability of each alternative in successfully neutralizing the SAW threat 
before it could reach its intended target.  This model output was in the probability of 
                                                 
70 MANA 3 Beta Version, New Zealand Defense Technology Agency, http://nzdf.mil.nz/_mana,  
15 May 2005. 
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defeat of a SAW attack versus engagement time, which was converted into range.  This 
model was run to show both the value of the response force, as well as the importance of 
the time allowed by C2 for the engagement. 
The Force Group modeled the WMD scenario with Micosoft Excel, to determine 
the time-speed-distance required to deliver an inspection team to a contact of interest 
(COI) at least 250 NM from the critical area.  The model output was simply the time to 
transport the inspection team from a given base location to a COI. 
MOEs:  The MOEs that were used by the Force Group were derived from the 
Force System Objective Hierarchy (see Appendix C).  The primary MOEs that were to be 
estimated by the Force models for the SBA and SAW scenarios were the probability of 
defeat (Pdef) and range of defeat for each Force System alternative.  For the  
WMD scenario, the MOE was transport time, the time to transport the sea inspection 
team from a base station to a COI. 
Assumptions:  One of the first assumptions made by the modeling groups was 
that of perfect intelligence.  It was assumed that the C3I Group would not vector the 
reaction force onto an inadvertent target, and therefore all tasking was against valid 
targets.  This allowed the Force Group to focus on evaluating the capabilities of 
alternatives, rather than the probability of false targets being destroyed.  Another major 
assumption was made concerning the sensors associated with the reaction force.  It was 
assumed that if the target was within the range of the onboard sensors, the target would 
be seen and recognized.  This assumption was justified by the fact that the targets in 
question were often within visual range, and the sensors were mature,  
reliable technology. 
There were several assumptions that were unique to the SBA scenario MANA 
model.  MANA entity characteristics were assigned and maintained as constants 
throughout all SBA scenario model runs.  This allowed the model to display operational 
performance rather than decision making patterns of the system.  Another assumption 
was that for SBA Alternative 1 (Sparviero Patrol/Escort) the use of Over-The-Horizon 
Missile Systems would be permitted.  While it was recognized that this would not be 
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tactically sound with current weapon technology, this assumption was made to show the 
value of extending the engagement envelope beyond traditional line of sight.  A third 
assumption that was made was that the Sea Marshals in the SBA Alternative 2  
(Sea Marshal Escort) would be in place prior to the HVU being attacked.  This was a 
realistic assumption because CONOPS have them being loaded onboard the HVU prior to 
its entry into the critical area.  All of the assumptions that were made for the MANA 
model were maintained throughout all of the modeling runs, and were constant for all of 
the individual alternatives.   
Several of the assumptions for the SAW scenario EXTEND model were the same 
as those made for the SBA MANA model.  The probability of false alarm (Pfa) was 
precluded, allowing the Force Group to focus on the force interactions rather than the 
decision-making process.  The targets assigned were assumed to be within sensor range.  
This was a valid assumption because of the close engagement ranges that were being 
modeled for this scenario.  Another assumption was made that the operational availability 
of the forces would remain constant at 0.9 throughout all model runs.  This was done to 
show the standard performance of the equipment, not a time-scaled degradation of the 
alternative’s performance that required good service practices to maintain the equipment 
in normal operating mode.  Another assumption was made that the engagement 
boundaries would be set by the geography of the port.  This assumption was determined 
from the specifics of the scenario, and artificially limited the engagement time remaining 
after detection of hostile intent.  Because the SAW attack was not detected until it was 
already in the Singapore port area, the engagement would not be conducted outside  
five NM. 
Assumptions for the WMD scenario EXTEND model included a constant 
transportation speed, a calm sea state and good weather, and a compliant boarding. 
Inputs:  The modeling inputs were also broken out by the model scenario.  The 
three models each had independent inputs, which were derived either from documented 
sources, like Jane’s Fighting Ships,71 or through interviews with operators.  A range of 
                                                 
71 Jane’s Fighting Ships, Jane’s Publishing Inc., 4th floor, 115 5th Avenue, New York, NY. 
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input factors were evaluated in each Force model, which led to the selection of the most 
advantageous factor values to represent the scenario-specific performance of each  
Force System alternative.  A summary of the input factors and the values selected for 
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Figure 82.  Force System Modeling Input Factor Variables 
 
This figure shows the variable inputs to the Force System models, along with the 
values that were selected for each Alternative. 
 
The SBA scenario MANA model was capable of assigning attributes to the 
individual entities in the model.  The blue force and red force entities were the only ones 
that were modified from the default neutral settings.  Constant inputs included the blue 
force operational availability, red force characteristics, blue force combat capabilities, 
and blue force location.  The blue force entities were given the capabilities associated 
with the alternative, and then were run against highly hostile red forces that were 
determined to engage the HVUs.  The two major variable factors that were addressed in 
the SAW model were the probability of kill single engagement (PKSE) and the range of 
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engagement.  The Force modeling factors and the range of values evaluated are shown in 
Figure 82. 
The SAW EXTEND model was constructed to simulate the determination of 
hostile intent at any distance, and was run at discovery distances from 5 to ½ NM from 
the port facilities.  The primary inputs that were controlled for this model were the 
combat capabilities of the Sea Marshals (“As-Is” System), of the TDSI transport vessel 
(Alternative 1), and the Rapid Response Force (Alternative 2).  The remainder of the 
inputs to the model, such as target ship speed, number of terrorists onboard, and location 
of response vessel, were determined through random number generators based on normal 
distributions.  The treatments that were considered for the SAW model were the force 
exchange ratio (FER) of the Sea Marshals (number of enemy killed per Sea Marshal), the 
engagement range, and the single engagement probability of kill (PKSE) for the TDSI 
transport vessel engagements and the Rapid Response Force engagements, as shown in 
Figure 83. 
The WMD EXCEL model simply used the maximum cruise speed for each 
alternative mode of transportation.  The SH-60B helicopter used in WMD Alternative 1 
was assumed to travel at 150 kts, while the Sparviero hydrofoil used in  
WMD Alternative 2 was assumed to travel at 46 kts. 
Flowchart:  The SBA and SAW Force models used a similar operational flow 
path.  Because both the SBA and SAW scenarios were essentially force engagements, 
they could be considered similar problems.  The flowcharts assumed that the decision to 
engage had already been made before the target entered the Force Modeling System.  The 
target was then evaluated, primarily to see if the response forces were available and in 
range, and then acted on.  The results of the action could be a missed target, a deterred 
target or a defeated target. 




Figure 83.  Operational Probability Flowchart for Force Models 
 
This flowchart shows the operational flow through either the SBA or SAW models 
used by the Force Group.  It shows both successful and unsuccessful interceptions, 
and the necessary steps that must be completed to get to the next stage. 
 
Description:  The models used by the Force Group were validated through an  
in-depth review of the model structure as well as a review of the model results by both 
the faculty and staff of the NPS and off-campus Special Operations personnel.  While the 
models did not depict the environment and all interactions perfectly, they were a valuable 
tool for gaining insights into the maritime domain protection problem. 
The SBA scenario MANA modeling suite was used to try to capture the behaviors 
of surface combatants in an engagement; specifically, the actions in a small boat attack   
As a Complex Adaptive System, MANA was designed to simulate human interactions on 
the battlefield.  The MANA model was designed to look for emerging patterns in 
engagements and any trends in performance that were differentiated by alternatives.  
MANA was run 25,000 times for each alternative to determine if there were any 
underlying patterns that would emerge through statistical analysis. 
The MANA model was used to evaluate both the Sea Marshal alternative 
(Alternative 2) and the Sparviero patrolling alternative (Alternative 1) for the SBA 
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scenario.  Model runs were performed while varying the single engagement probability of 
kill (PKSE) and the engagement range to determine the most favorable combination of 
the two.  The MANA model was manipulated to reflect a one, two, and three patrol craft 
escort pattern.  The recorded output for each run included:  1) whether or not the target 
was neutralized or deterred; 2) the range of neutralization; and 3) the time it took to 
neutralize the target.  This was then used to calculate the average neutralization range for 
each alternative. 
The SAW scenario EXTEND model was used to help identify key performance 
parameters and applications of the SAW scenario alternatives.  The model was 
constructed to be capable of depicting the two alternatives and the “As-Is” System with 
only minor modifications.  Initially, Sea Marshal performance was run against variable 
numbers of terrorists and variable amounts of time to retake the ship.  The next set of 
runs was for Alternative 2, which incorporated the use of a helicopter delivered  
Rapid Response Force team to retake the vessel.  The final set of runs evaluated the 
Sparviero patrol craft operating as a harbor patrol boat (Alternative 1).  In all SAW model 
runs, the ship speed was determined by a uniform random number between 7 kts and  
20 kts.  This resulted in an average of 13½ kts, giving a mean time of 22 minutes between 
the detection of hostile intent and pier impact. 
These runs allowed the Force Group to explore not only the force exchange ratio 
(FER) of the Sea Marshals, but also the PKSE of the patrol craft and the Rapid Response 
Force team.  This data was then compiled and used to determine the Force  
alternative capabilities. 
The WMD scenario EXCEL model was a very simple time-speed-distance 
calculation.  The distance was determined to a COI located 250 NM from the critical 
area.  Speed was a result of the transport vehicle, either helicopter or Sparviero hydrofoil. 
 
4.3.1.1 Results 
Small Boat Attack (SBA) Scenario:  Figure 84 graphically depicts the 
performance (measured as probability of defeat) of the different Force alternatives 
against the SBA scenario. 
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Force Performance Model Results for 
































Figure 84.  Force Performance Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for SBA Scenario 
 
The Force Group model results for the SBA scenario show that the Sea Marshal 
Escort team was the most effective alternative, followed closely by the  
Sparviero patrol craft used as a convoy escort. 
 
2005 “As-Is” Capability - None.  There was no “As-Is” Force System for 
the SBA scenario, thus it was assessed that attacks of these types would not be defeated 
by the MDP System. 
Alternative 1 – Sparviero Patrol Craft.  The MANA model results 
showed that six Sparvieros in a patrolling role, which included the ROE to engage at  
50 NM, generated only a 60% success rate against the SBA.  The six Sparvieros were 
divided into two three-ship patrols, each responsible for one-half of the critical area of the 
Straits. 
Alternative 2 – Sea Marshal Team.  The MANA model showed 
excellent performance of the Sea Marshal Escort team at ranges outside of 100m  
(see Figure 85).  If the ROE was in place for the Sea Marshals to engage the SBA at 
150m, there was a 92.5% defeat rate outside of the 65-meter minimal damage range, and 
a 95% defeat rate outside of the 35-meter hull breach range.  This capability was based 




Figure 85.  Force Model Results for Sea Marshal Escort in SBA Scenario 
 
This figure shows the overall probability of kill that modeling determined for 
various engagement ranges and single engagement probabilities of kill (PKSE).  
This information was used to determine the required engagement range for a given 
PKSE and a desired overall probability of kill. 
 
4.3.1.2 Ship As a Weapon Scenario 
Figure 86 graphically depicts the performance (measured as probability of 
defeat) of the different Force alternatives against the SAW scenario. 
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Force Performance Model Results for 



































Figure 86.  Force Performance Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for SAW Scenario 
 
The Force Group model results for the SAW scenario show that the “As-Is”  
Sea Marshal team was the most effective, and could be improved by adding the 
Sparviero patrol craft.  The Rapid Response Force showed no improvement over 
the existing system due to the limited response time to respond available in the SAW 
scenario description. 
 
2005 “As-Is” Capability – Sea Marshals.  Model results for the “As-Is” 
Force alternative showed that Sea Marshals on all HVUs entering Singaporean ports 
accounted for an 83% probability of defeat.  This was under the assumption that the Sea 
Marshals would be loaded onboard the vessel at five NM with the harbor pilot, and each 
Sea Marshal was capable of a 2.2 Force Engagement Ratio (FER) (each Sea Marshal was 
capable of successfully defeating 2.2 terrorists). 
Alternative 1 – Patrol Craft.  With the addition of Sparviero patrol craft 
to counter the SAW threat by launching disabling fire at the incoming SAW vessel’s 
propulsion and steering if the Sea Marshals were unsuccessful, the probability of defeat 
increased to 92%.  The onboard Sea Marshals maintained their 2.2 FER proficiency. 
Alternative 2 – Rapid Response Force.  The addition of a  
helicopter-lifted assault team to aid the Sea Marshals in retaking the SAW vessel did not 
improve the probability of defeat.  There were no successful helicopter interventions for 
the SAW model runs, but only because of the scenario limitations, which gave an average 
 205
of 22 minutes between the detection of hostile intent and pier impact.  The scenario did 
not allow sufficient time, approximately one hour, to engage the helicopter and equip, 
brief, and transport the assault team to the SAW vessel.  There were no successful 
helicopter interventions until the SAW vessel was identified outside of seven NM from 
Singapore. 
 
4.3.1.3 WMD Scenario 
2005 “As-Is” Capability - None.  There were no “As-Is” Force transport 
capabilities since there was no “As-Is” Sea Inspection capability for the WMD scenario 
(see Figure 87). 
Alternative 1 – Helicopter Transport.  The use of SH-60B helicopters to 
lift the 12-man inspection teams allowed for not only a relatively short intervention time  
(just over 1½ hours), but also the staging of forces in a centralized location. This allowed 
for easier team rotation plans, as well as ease of repair for equipment needed by the 
inspection teams. 
Alternative 2 – Patrol Craft Transport.  Using the Sparviero hydrofoil 
as a high speed transport vessel, inspection teams could be ferried to COIs in 1½ hours  
(see Figure 87).  In order to make this transport time, forward-located base stations  
were required. 
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Force Performance Model Results for 
































Figure 87.  Force Performance Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for WMD Scenario 
 
The Force Group model results for the WMD scenario show that, in order to 
transport the Sea Inspection team to a contact of interest at 250 NM from the 
critical area, helicopters and patrol craft alternatives were equally effective. 
 
4.3.2 System Cost Model – Force Group 
Approach:  In order to translate the Force Group functional requirements into 
budget requirements, economic analysis used current data when possible, but primarily 
relied on historical data.  Individual costs estimates were determined for each of the 
largest components of the Force System alternatives, which were combined to give a 
realistic view of the likely system cost. 
The analogy methodology was used to find the O&S cost for the HSV-X1 and the 
Sparviero ships, quantifying relevant cost that should be incurred by those ships 
(subsystems) under the O&S conditions specified for the system (if assumptions 
regarding operating conditions changed, the cost reflected those changes).  Extrapolation 
from actual was used to determine the O&S cost for the SH-60B helicopter and the 
annual cost of the Interdiction/Inspection teams. 
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MOEs:  The MOE for all scenario alternatives was the MDP System Cost:  the 
ten-year Procurement and O&S cost of the MDP System.  There were no  
Commercial System or Delay costs associated with the Force System. 
Assumptions:  O&S for the HSV-X1 was found using the analogy method, using 
the O&S cost data for the MCM-1CL “Avenger.”72  The HSV-X1 was a new 
commercially developed ship (the first one was delivered to the U.S. Navy in  
August 2003), so O&S data was not yet available.  The MCM-1 was chosen because of 
the similarities shown in Table 22. 
 
 MCM-1CL HSV-X1 
Tonnage 1,312 T 1,102 T 
Diesel Engines 4 4 
Length 224 feet 321 feet 
Draft 15 feet 12 feet 
Table 22.  Comparison of MCM “Avenger” to the High Speed Vessel (HSV) 
 
The MCM “Avenger” was very similar to the HSV.  Because of these similarities, 
O&S costs for the MCM were used as an analogy for the costs of the HSV. 
 
O&S for the Sparviero was found using the analogy method, with the provided 
data for the PHM-1CL “Pegasus.”73  The PHM-1 is no longer in U.S. Navy service, but it 
was the closest (because of the characteristics: Hydrofoil, aluminum hull, small combat 
craft, small crew) to the Sparviero. 
In the development of the personnel cost estimation, given the wide spectra of 
designators for military personnel, Navy and Marine Officers (O03), and Navy and 
Marine Enlisted (E06) were chosen as personnel employed for inspections/interdiction.  
The following are the characteristics that each one needed to fulfill the system’s  
scenario requirements. 
 
Navy Officer:  Additional qualification QC1 (SEAL-qualified, fleet experience). 
Marine Officer:  Parachutist and Combat Diver. 
                                                 
72 Sharpe, Richard, Captain, Royal Navy, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 91st ed., 1988-89,  
Jane’s Information Group Inc., 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA, p. 752. 
73 Ibid, p. 754. 
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Navy Enlisted:  E6, General Duty, and Operations Specialist. 
Marine Enlisted:  E6, Infantry Assault, Parachutist and Combatant Diver. 
 
Inputs:  The inputs for the Force alternative cost model came from a number of 
sources.  The procurement cost for the HSV-X1 came from the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command.74  For the O&S cost, the data came from the Navy Visibility 
and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database;75 and was 
provided by the Business Consulting Services Department.  These include O&S data for 
the SH-60B helicopter, and Navy and Marine personnel cost elements.  They also 
provided the O&S data for the MCM-1CL “Avenger,” and the PHM-1CL “Pegasus,” 
used in the analogy with the HSV-X1 and the Sparviero ships. 
Description:  In order to get the better cost estimation, given the different 
subsystems, the components’ costs were statistically summed to derive the total system 
cost, instead of adding the best “guesses” for each component.  Each of the components 
were quantified in terms of their statistical properties (mean, standard deviation, range, 
most likely, highest, lowest, etc.), and a Monte Carlo simulation was performed, varying 
each element in accordance with its statistical properties.  A cost probability distribution 




SBA Scenario:  The resultant costs of the major components for the alternatives 
for the SBA scenario are shown in Table 23.  A graphical depiction of the total expected 
costs for each alternative is shown in Figure 88. 
                                                 
74 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/, (accessed  
15 May 2005). 
75 Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs, http://www.navyvamosc.com/, 
(accessed 10 May 2005). 
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 "As-Is" Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
 N/A 1 HSV-X1 9 Sparviero Patrol Craft Total 
85  
Sea Marshals 
High N/A 301.4 937.6 1,239.0 280.8 
Expected N/A 263.2 657.9 921.1 257.8 
Low N/A 225.4 377.3 602.7 240.1 
95% Confidence Interval    
All in FY05$M     
N/A = Not Applicable.    
Table 23.  Alternative Component Costs and 95% Confidence Interval for the SBA Scenario 
 
The Force cost model results gave the expected value for the major components of 
each alternative and the high and low values for the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 88.  Force Cost Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for SBA Scenario 
 
The Force Group cost model results for the SBA scenario show that the Sparviero 
patrol craft (Alternative 1) was the most expensive.  The Sea Marshal Escorts 
(Alternative 2) were less than one-tenth as costly. 
 
SAW Scenario:  The resultant costs of the major components for the alternatives 
for the Small Boat Attack scenario are shown in Table 24.  A graphical depiction of the 
total expected costs for each alternative is shown in Figure 89. 
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High 34.8 34.8 167.7 237.3 34.8 85.2 30.1 150.1 
Expected 37.6 37.6 292.4 367.6 37.6 96.9 27.3 161.8 
Low 40.2 40.2 416.7 497.1 40.2 108.6 24.4 173.2 
95% Confidence Interval       
All in FY05$M        
Table 24.  Alternative Component Costs and 95% Confidence Interval for the SAW Scenario 
 
The Force cost model results gave the expected value for the major components of 
each alternative and the high and low values for the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 89.  Force Cost Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for SAW Scenario 
 
The Force Group cost model results for the SBA scenario show that the Sparviero 
patrol craft (Alternative 1) was the most expensive.  The Rapid Response Force 
Teams (Alternative 2) added cost to the “As-Is” System, but were approximately 
half as costly as Alternative 1. 
 
WMD Scenario:  The resultant costs of the major components for the alternatives 
for the SBA scenario are shown in Table 25.  A graphical depiction of the total expected 
costs for each alternative is shown in Figure 90. 
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 "As-Is" Alternative 1 Alternative 2 







High N/A 144.8 30.1 174.9 715.6 90.5 806.1 
Expected N/A 129.2 27.3 156.5 520.5 81.9 602.4 
Low N/A 113.6 24.4 138.0 324.8 73.3 398.1 
95% Confidence Interval      
All in FY05$M       
N/A = Not Applicable.       
Table 25.  Alternative Component Costs and 95% Confidence Interval for WMD Scenario 
 
The Force cost model results gave the expected value for the major components of 
each alternative and the high and low values for the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 90.  Force Cost Model Results Comparison of Alternatives for the WMD Scenario 
 
The Force Group cost model results for the SBA scenario show that the Sparviero 
patrol craft transport (Alternative 2) was the most expensive.  The SH-60B 
helicopter transport (Alternative 2) was approximately one-fourth as costly as 
Alternative 1. 
 
4.3.3 Analysis – Force Group 
The Analysis of the Force alternatives was done by plotting a benefit versus  
cost graph for the alternatives in each threat scenario.  This methodology allowed the end 
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user to be able to graphically see the relationship between the different alternatives, and 
provided the leeway to select the option best suited to budgetary considerations. 
Small Boat Attack Scenario:  Figure 91 shows the performance of the  
Force alternatives with respect to their costs against the SBA threat.  The Alternative 2 
Sea Marshal Escort teams were over 90% effective, at a relatively low cost (around 
$250M over ten years).  The Alternative 1 Sparviero Patrol Craft did not meet the desired 
performance, and had a ten-year system cost of almost $1B.  Thus, Sea Marshal Escort 
Teams offered a cost-effective defense against the SBA threat. 
 
Performance vs. Cost for Force Alternatives
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Figure 91.  Performance vs. Cost for Force Alternatives in SBA Scenario 
 
This graph shows the relative performance of each Force alternative with respect to 
the associated cost. 
 
SAW Scenario:  Figure 92 shows the performance of the Force alternatives with 
respect to their costs against the SAW threat.  The “As-Is” Sea Marshal System was fairly 
effective, at a ten-year system cost of less than $50M.  Although the Alternative 2  
Rapid Response Force was found to cost almost four times more than the  
“As-Is” System, while giving no performance gain, the results garnished from the SAW 
scenario modeling were slightly biased due to the scenario limiting operations to within 
the harbor boundaries.  Despite this artificial limit, this alternative was considered viable, 
and should remain within the system to counter longer lead-time threats.  The  
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Alternative 1 Sparviero craft on harbor patrol did improve performance to over 90% 
probability of defeat, but at a ten-year system cost of almost $350M. 
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Figure 92.  Performance vs. Cost for Force Alternatives in the SAW Scenario 
 
This graph shows the relative performance of each Force alternative with respect to 
the associated cost. 
 
WMD Scenario:  Figure 93 shows the performance of the Force alternatives with 
respect to their costs in the WMD scenario.  Both the Alternative 1 helicopter transport 
and the Alternative 2 Sparviero Patrol Craft transport transported the Sea Inspection 
teams to the 250 NM intercept point in 1½ hours.  However, the Alternative 1 helicopters 
performed this task at a ten-year system cost of less than $200M, while the Alternative 2 
Sparviero Patrol Craft cost over $600M. 
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Figure 93.  Performance vs. Cost for Force Alternatives in SAW Scenario 
 
This graph demonstrates that the performance of the two Force alternatives is 
identical, with widely differing costs. 
 
4.4 MODELING AND ANALYSIS – LAND INSPECTION GROUP 
4.4.1 Performance Model 
Approach:  The Land Inspection System Team utilized EXTEND version 6.0 in 
order to create an interactive, dynamic process model to represent both the current  
“As-Is” Cargo Inspection System and the proposed improved alternatives for the  
Port of Singapore.  Because of inherent differences in the processes, the “As-Is” System 
and the two alternatives were modeled as three similar, but distinct, Extend models.  The 
two alternative models had similar architectures, but different inspection methodologies. 
Measures of Effectiveness/Metrics:  All of the models were designed to measure 
the effectiveness of the system and implications in terms of commercial impact/delay 
cost.  System cost was tied to the alternative architectures, but was calculated separately 
from the model runs.  The system performance MOE was “the probability that the system 
defeats an attack” (Pdef).  “Defeat an attack” was defined as the system discovered and 
quarantined a cargo container containing a nuclear weapon.  This will be referred to as 
Pdef.  The commercial impact/delay cost metric is based on the amount of time a container 
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is delayed within the system because of a false alarm or search queue, and will be 
referred to as delay cost.  A false alarm was defined as any time a sensor in the system 
alerted the presence of a nuclear weapon when there was not one present. 
Assumptions:  The assumptions made for the models were two-fold.  First, 
assumptions were made to ensure the models were a valid representation of the current 
and envisioned alternative systems.  Secondly, assumptions were required to ensure the 
model results would allow for comparison of the required performance and cost metrics. 
The overarching assumption was that the model simulated the Inspection System 
at the Port of Singapore.  The varying traffic volume and cargo types associated with the 
port’s five large terminals were represented in the model as a single composite entity.  
Next, the throughput of the port was simplified based on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
research compiled during the problem definition and alternatives generation phase.  As 
stated in previous sections, because of Singapore’s role as an international hub and cargo 
transfer port, most of the cargo container traffic throughput goes through customs-exempt 
FTZs, while a small amount enters and exits the port into Singapore proper.  Our models 
assumed imports to Singapore accounting for 10% of daily throughput, and daily exports 
of 5%. 
The 2004 port statistics, provided by the Maritime and Port Authority of 
Singapore76 (MPA), were the baseline throughput used in the model.  At 21.34 million 
Twenty Feet Equivalent Units (TEUs) through per year, volume alone exemplified the 
challenge of cargo security.  This was a common baseline for both the Land Systems and 
Sea Inspection Groups.  All assumptions for the port capabilities, such as number of 
cranes, number of container movers, and number of operating terminals were also based 
on the 2004 port statistics provided by the MPA. 
Additionally, common sensor assumptions were created to facilitate accurate 
alternative scoring and comparison.  Due to a wide variation in sensor technologies and 
their respective capabilities and performance, a simplified and common sensor capability 
                                                 
76 Singapore Maritime Port Authority, Total Container Throughput, 
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/infocentre/pdfs/container-throughput.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2005). 
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was assumed.  For the “As-Is” System, an optimistic, best-case sensor probability of 
detection (Pd) of 0.99 was assumed.  The probability of detection was defined as the 
chance an inspection will discover a nuclear weapon if it is present.  The small amount of 
cargo inspected and sensors used allow for thorough and intrusive inspections.  If a 
container was searched, it was previously classified “suspect” and the inspection would 
lead to discovery of an intended weapon if it was present. 
The overarching assumptions were consistent for all three models.  The  
“As-Is” System-specific assumptions are based on Port of Singapore operations in 2004.  
The pivotal “As-Is” assumption was the method and percentage of cargo inspected by the 
system.  Besides the inspections done by Singapore Customs on the imports and exports 
of Singapore (which was previously stated as a negligible amount of cargo), the only 
container security procedures in place are by a team of six U.S. Customs and  
Border Patrol (CBP) agents stationed at the Port of Singapore.77  Their job is to identify 
cargo that is U.S.-bound, and inspect 100% of cargo identified as suspect.  The number of 
U.S. CBP inspectors was modeled at six.  Throughput statistics from 2002 and 2004 were 
assumed still valid for the model.  Using these statistics, the number leaving annually 
from the port that were U.S.-bound was 330,000 TEUs.78  Of these U.S.-bound 
containers, 6% were considered “suspect” and therefore inspected by the CBP team.79 
For the Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 models, the common alternative-specific 
assumption were that there was a 50% daily split between cargo destinations:  half of the 
cargo was assumed transferred from pier side to the FTZ storage zones, and the other half 
was assumed to be “daily turn-around” cargo that was quick-on/quick-off transshipment 
cargo.  The amount of cargo leaving and entering via Singapore proper followed the same 
                                                 
77 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Fact Sheet,” Cargo Container Security, 
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/factsheet_container_security.xml, (accessed 10 May 2005). 
78  U.S.Customs and Border Protection, “Singapore, the World's Busiest Seaport, Implements the Container 
Security Initiative and Begins to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo Destined for U.S.,” 
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/032003/03172003.xml, 
(accessed 10 May 2005). 
79 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Fact Sheet,” Cargo Container Security, 
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/factsheet_container_security.xml, (accessed 10 May 2005). 
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percentage assumptions as the “As-Is” model.  Additionally, the alternative models 
assumed a constant Pd for the for the passive and active system sensors. 
The main difference between the two alternatives was the in-storage inspection 
scheme.  For Alternative 1, the port-centric model seen in Figure 94, no intelligence or 
prescreening information was considered to decide if a stored container should be 
searched.  All containers therefore had an equal chance to be searched.  For Alternative 2, 
the trusted agent model seen in Figure 95, a container had a 2% to 3% chance of being 
randomly selected for search, and was inspected based on one the following three factors: 
 
1. Was the container seal intact or had the seal been tampered with? 
2. Did the container come from a certified shipper? 
3. Was there a discrepancy on the electronic manifest? 
 
The assumed values for these factors come from Wein, Wilkens, Baveja, and 
Flynn, and are as follows:  95% of containers are assumed properly sealed, 95% are 
assumed from certified shippers, and 95% of manifests are assumed discrepancy free.80  
The delay cost baseline was common between the two alternative architectures, and is 
discussed in depth in the follow-on “Individual Container Delay Cost Model.” 
 
                                                 
80  Alex Wilkens, Mena Baveja, and Steven Flynn, “Preventing the Importation of Illicit Nuclear 
Materials in Shipping Containers,” http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/facseminars/events/oit/pdfs/Abstract.pdf, 
































Figure 94.  Alternative 1 Model Diagram 
 
Alternative 1 establishes a network of sensors as a comprehensive in-port inspection 
system including as-is system sensors as well as new Sensor Systems and alert teams 
in order to achieve a higher Pd.  Sensor placement is at the entrance and exit of 










































Figure 95.  Alternative 2 Model Diagram 
 
Alternative 2 follows the same process as Alternative 1.  Additionally, Alternative 2 
includes an intelligence-based search. 
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Inputs:  The inputs for both the “As-Is” and Alternative performance models, the 
system’s Pdef was the conditional probability that, given there was an attack, the system 
would defeat it.  To model “given an attack,” all cargo containers sent through the model 
port contained nuclear material.  The number of containers discovered by the inspection 
regimen in the model containing nuclear material represented the number defeated.  
Delay cost due to false alarms was not calculated in the performance model. 
When measuring the delay cost portion of the performance models, the system’s 
ten-year commercial impact cost was determined by sending every container through 
with no WMD material onboard, “given no attack,” to measure the number of false 
alarms produced by the system.  These false alarms then create a delay time for each 
container, based on the number of sensor teams used to scan containers that were 
detected by the passive system. 
In addition to the assumed sensor values from the “Assumptions” portion, there 
are several architecture-specific input values that were varied.  After optimization, pair-
wise comparisons, and analysis of interactions, the sensor characteristics and number of 
teams were selected for each alternative.  Table 26 summarizes the values evaluated and 
chosen for inputs. 
 
Factors Values Evaluated “As-Is” Alt 1 Alt 2 
Number of Sensors 2 to 100 5 50 50 
Active P(detection) .3, .4, .5, .6, .85, .99 0.99 0.85 0.85 
Active P(false alarm) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Passive P(detection) .1, .6 0 0.6 0.6 
Passive P(false alarm) .01, .15 0 0.01 0.01 
Table 26.  Land Inspection System Variable Values 
 
This table represents the values used in evaluating the system alternatives and their 
respective outputs from the model. 
 
Flowchart:  Figure 96 is a representation of the logic used to decide which 
containers are inspected in the current system.  This logic was used in the model to 
determine the probability of detection of a nuclear weapon.  After a container entered 
































Figure 96.  “Current” Model Flow Chart 
 
“As-Is” System follows a sequential questioning process in order to find contraband 
in containers.  As a result, there are three possible outcomes of that process. 
 
Description:  The three models are designed to represent a systems-level view of 
a single day in the Port of Singapore.  Daily performance values were then extrapolated 
over a ten-year operating and support timeframe to determine both the effect of various 
security regimes on the flow of the large volume of commercial cargo container traffic 
and the ability of the system to defeat an attack. 
 
4.4.2 System Cost Models- Land Inspection Group 
4.4.2.1 Cost Breakdown Structure for Land Inspection System 
Alternatives 
Ten-year O&S costs of the alternatives were estimated by calculating all 
direct and indirect incurring costs.  These costs were analyzed by building a cost element 
structure, as shown in Figure 97, including:  personnel, procurement of equipment, 
maintenance, supplies, services, and training.  Applicable costs for the listed items in 
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each architecture were included, which were determined based on several sources for  



























Figure 97.  “As-Is” System Cost Breakdown Structure 
 
The figure illustrates the cost breakdown structure for the “As-Is” alternative.  The 
same breakdown was used for each item in the Port Centric and Trusted Agent 
alternatives. 
 
The initial cost used the Port of Singapore infrastructure and operations.  
From the “As-Is” architecture in Singapore, the costs were scaled for implementation of 
the system in the top 16 ports by volumes and cargo value that export to Singapore84 and 
is summarized in Table 27.  The teams and ports were assumed to be equally efficient at 
all 16 ports in order to use a scaling factor determined by ratio of cargo throughput.  A 
                                                 
81 EDO Corporation, Gamma-Cam, 
http://www.edocorp.com/documentation/gammacam_overview.pdf, (accessed 14 April 2005). 
82 Berkley Nucleonics, Radiation Detectors, http://www.berkeleynucleonics.com/radiation-detectors-
pager.htm, (accessed 14 April 2005). 
83 Physical Optics Corporation, LEXID X-Ray Imagine Device, 
http://www.poc.com/emerging_products/lexid/default.asp, (accessed 12 May 2005). 
84 Nanyang Technological University Library, Stat-Link, Annual Report for Imports, 
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/lib/stat/tti40.htm, (accessed 17 May 2005). 
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ratio of total throughput of each port to Singapore85 was used to compute how many 
sensors and operators were needed to inspect and process an equivalent percentage of 
containers.  For the “As-Is” architecture, these ports had to also be CSI participants.86  
This was done for comparison of the cost effectiveness between implementing systems in 
Singapore alone and/or in the top exporters to Singapore.  This addressed detecting 
threats before getting to the Port of Singapore. 
The “As-Is” System included: 
 
• Radiation Detection Pagers. 
• X-ray Imagers. 
• Gamma-Ray Imagers. 
 
Cost Element Cost($) 
Radiation Detection Pager System 45,500
Mobile X-Ray Imager-Truck System 18,216,500
Mobile Gamma-Ray Imager-Truck System 18,361,500
Total “As-Is” Land Inspection System 36,498,500
Table 27.  Ten-Year O&S Cost of “As-Is” Architecture 
 
This table summarizes what it cost to continue operating the current Land 
Inspection System. 
 
Alternative 1, Port Centric alternative included: 
 
• One Hundred Radiation Detection Pagers.28 
• Five mobile and Five fixed Gamma-Ray Imagers.27 
• Five Pulsed Fast Neutron Analyzers.87 
• Fifty High Purity Germanium Detectors.88 
• Fifty Flow Cytometry Detectors.89 
                                                 
85 The Review of Network Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 2, (June 2004):  p. 99. 
86 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, “Ports in CSI,”  
Border Security, http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ports_in_csi, 
(accessed 19 May 2005). 
87 Belbot, Michael, et al., Western Kentucky University, A Commercial On-Line Analyzer Using 
Pulsed Neutrons, www.wku.edu/API/publications/CAARI2000Coal.pdf, (accessed 25 May 2005). 
88 Interview with Thomas Mcgrann, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, site visit, (14 January 2005). 
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• Fifty Gas Chromatography/Ion Mobility Spectrometers.90 
• Five Inspection Data Fusion and Analysis Rooms. 
• Five Inspection Sensors and Facilities Communication Networks. 
• Five Three-Person Alert Teams.91 
 
The total cost for procurement and operation over ten years in the port of 
Singapore is summarized in Table 28. 
 
Cost Element Cost($) 
Radiation Detection Pager System 166,000 
Mobile/Fixed Gamma-Ray Imager System 29,871,500 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analyzer 34,182,500 
High Purity Germanium Detector 305,000 
Flow Cytometry Detector 405,000 
Gas Chromatography/Ion Mobility Spectrometry 5,270,000 
Inspection Data Fusion and Analysis Room 27,682,500 
Communication Network 82,500 
Alert Team 27,000,000 
Total Alternative 1 Land Inspection System 124,965,000 
Table 28.  Procurement and Ten-Year Operating Cost for Port-Centric Architecture 
 
The table summarizes the itemized cost of the Port-Centric alternative to include 
procurement and ten-year O&S. 
 
Alternative 2, Trusted Agent Architecture, included additional costs.  To 
be certified as a “Trusted Agent” there were standards and security measures that 
companies in the industry had to abide by similar to those required for C-TPAT 
certification92 as indicated in the Alternative Generation section.  The cost is based on 
certifying 10,000 companies.  The containers were also sealed with a mechanical tamper 
                                                                                                                                                 
89Chemicon International, APO-BRDU™, 
http://www.chemicon.com/Product/ProductDataSheet.asp?ProductItem=APT115, (accessed 15 May 2005). 
90 Business Communications Company, Biologic Detection Technologies:  Pyrolysis-Gas 
Chromatography Mobile Spectrometer, http://bcc.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0279-17730_ITM, 
(accessed 10 May 2005). 
91 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), Military Pay Chart, 
http://www.dod.mil/dfas/money/milpay/pay/paytable2005-rev1.pdf, (accessed May 2005). 
92 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, C-TPAT Fact Sheet and Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.customs.gov/xp/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/fact_sheet.xml, (accessed  
23 May 2005). 
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lock.  The cost reflects 1.75 million seals that can be reused over the ten-year  
time frame.39 
 
Alternative 2 (summarized in Table 29) includes: 
 
• One Hundred Radiation Detection Pagers. 
• Five mobile and Five fixed Gamma-Ray Imagers. 
• Five Pulsed Fast Neutron Analyzers. 
• Fifty High Purity Germanium Detectors. 
• Fifty Flow Cytometry Detectors. 
• Fifty Gas Chromatography/Ion Mobility Spectrometers. 
• Five Inspection Data Fusion and Analysis Rooms. 
• Five Inspection Sensors and Facilities Communication Networks. 
• Five Three-Person Alert Teams. 
• Automated Inter-port Information and Targeting Systems. 
• 1.7 Million Tamper Resistant Seals for Containers.93 
• Ten thousand Shipper/Manufacturer/Portal/Ship Security Certifications. 
                                                 
93 Schwartz Ephram, “GE Completes Trial of Smart Shipping,” Inforworld.com, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/01/11/HNge_1.html, (accessed 15 April 2005). 
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Cost Element Cost($) 
Radiation Detection Pager System 166,000 
Mobile/Fixed Gamma-Ray Imager System 29,871,500 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analyzer 34,182,500 
High Purity Germanium Detector 305,000 
Flow Cytometry Detector 405,000 
Gas Chromatography/Ion Mobility Spectrometry 5,270,000 
Inspection Data Fusion and Analysis Room 27,682,500 
Communication Network 82,500 
Alert Team 27,000,000 
Automated Inter-port Information and Targeting 19,500 
Tamper Resistant Seal for Containers 52,500,000 
Shipper/Portal/Ship Security Certification 17,500,000,000 
Total Alternative 2 Land Inspection System 1,767,748,450 
Table 29.  Procurement and Ten-Year Operating Cost for Trusted Agent Architecture 
 
The table summarizes the itemized cost of the Trusted Agent alternative to include 
procurement and ten-year O&S. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis – Land Inspection Group 
The “As-Is” model indicated very poor performance for defeating an attack.  
Using the variables from Table 29, the probability for defeating an attack is Pdef = 0.0011.  
Combining the Customs and Port Inspection System indicates that 98.6% of cargo exiting 
the port will not be subjected to any sort of active or passive search regimen.  The model 
was then run for all CSI participating ports exporting to Singapore instead of the  
United States.  This resulted in the numbers shown in Table 30.  The delay cost metric of 
the “As-Is” System was considered to be negligible, based on empirical research, because 
no significant delays were reported in the port of interest.  Specifically, the increase in the 
false alarm rate of the passive sensor is the key factor in increasing delay cost, as seen in 
Figure 98.  Additionally, passive sensor P(detection) is the primary factor concerning 
P(defeat), as also seen in Figure 98. 
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Table 30.  Summary of Results of MOEs for Alternatives 
 
The table compares the results for the “As-Is” System and the two alternatives.  The 
alternatives clearly outperform the status quo with respect to Pdetect, but come at a 
much higher cost. 
 
 
Figure 98.  Main Effects Plot for Delay Cost 
 
The active sensor Pd results indicate that the sensor Pd’s have minimal influence on 
the delay cost, while the Passive False Alarm rate is a delay cost driver. 
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While analyzing the first model run for Alternative 1, it was apparent that the 
overall system performance is influenced most by the strength of the Passive System that 
was installed in the port, as seen in Figure 99. 
 
 
Figure 99.  Main Effects Plot for System Pd 
 
The Active Sensor Pd does appear to have some significance, but not the large 
influence that the Passive Pd has on the overall system Probability of Defeat. 
 
Because of the overall systems perspective that the team took, it became beyond 
the scope of this project to delve into an intense analysis of an intrusive, “From Scratch” 
Passive Sensor System (but the team does recommend this as a focus for further study).  
The second iteration of Alternative 1 and the iteration of Alternative 2 instead focused on 
near-term, nonintrusive detection involving active search that does not require large 
commercial infrastructure changes. 
After analyzing the various active Pd sensor values and the number of active 
sensors employed, a “best-case” treatment was chosen for each case to compare and score 
the alternatives.  The value of 50 sensor teams was chosen based on the results seen in 
Figures 100 and 101, where the delay cost is minimized by reducing the queue wait to 0. 
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Figure 100.  Alternative 1 Sensor Variation and Cost Results 
 
Illustrates the point where the number of teams is sufficient to reduce the false 
alarm verification queue line to 0 wait. 
 
 
Figure 101.  Alternative 2 Sensor Variation Cost Results 
 
The “knee in the curve” is found as the point where the number of teams is 
sufficient to reduce the false alarm verification queue line to 0 wait. 
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The predicted probability of defeating an attack was raised significantly by 
installing a nonintrusive, hybrid passive/active Sensor Inspection System.  The obvious 
price paid for the increased probability of detection was the large impact/delay cost on 
the shipping and commerce industry, based on the higher false alarm rate.  There is also 
an additional commercial cost for the implementation of the Trusted Agent Certification 
System used in Alternative 2.   
After initial modeling results were complete, there still remained a concern to 
address weapons that are detonated or released at a pier, before the Singapore  
Land Inspection System was able to be utilized.  The system infrastructure was scaled to 
be placed in the top 16 exporting ports by volume into Singapore.  This accounted for  
47% of the cargo that is imported into Singapore.  The results for implementing each 
alternative in those ports are summarized in Table 31. 
 
 
Table 31.  Results of Implementing the System in Top 16 Ports 
 
The table compares the results for the “As-Is” System and the two alternatives for 
the 16-port expansion of the Land Inspection System.  Once again, the alternatives 
clearly outperform the status quo as far as Pdefeat, but come at a much larger cost. 
 
The cost model data and performance results were then combined to show a 
graphical representation of cost versus performance of the alternatives, both in Singapore 
and in the top 16 ports.  Figure 102 and Figure 103 are graphical representations of the 
results.  Through these figures it is apparent that Alternative 2 gives a higher Pdefeat over 




Figure 102.  Cost vs. Performance for Single Port 
 




Figure 103.  Cost vs. Performance for Top 16 Ports 
 
The figure illustrates the cost versus performance for each alternative implemented 
in the top 16 exporting ports to Singapore. 
 
4.5 MODELING AND ANALYSIS – SEA INSPECTION GROUP 
4.5.1 Performance Model – Sea Inspection Group 
Approach:  The important goal for the Sea Inspection Group during the  
model-building phase was to generate a model that would be reusable for each 
alternative.  The way in which the two alternatives were designed helped the team to 
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build this functionality.  Specifically, the Honor System incorporates Smart container 
technology added to the boarding team. 
For the performance runs, every ship was assumed to have hazardous material 
onboard and inspected by the system.  This allowed the model to give the Sea Inspection 
Group an overall probability of detection for the system.  After that, extra runs were 
performed using the generated probability of detection and false alarm to generate a 
queue length and time for analyzing the delay cost the alternative generated. 
MOEs:  One of the overarching MOEs of the model was the average percentage 
of inspections that were completed.  Due to the limitations on the number of teams and 
inspection time used as treatments, the model generated an output of how much of each 
ship was inspected.  In the performance runs, the overall average of the percentage of 
completed inspections was used as an MOE.  The value of this MOE was used to 
estimate the system probability of detection against each type of threat. 
Assumptions:  For Alternative 1—the Boarding Team Inspection System—there 
were some key assumptions.  In the model, ships arrived according to the exponential 
distribution with a certain mean time between arrival (MTBA).  The total number of 
container ships per year was estimated as 10,000 for modeling purposes.  To model the 
container ship sizes, values were obtained from Figure that showed the distribution of the 
number of ships versus ship sizes.  This was taken from actual data over a span of 40 
years.94 




Figure 104.  Distribution of Number of Ships vs. Ship Size 
 
This graph was used to retrieve the number of ships for different ship sizes.  It 
shows the number of ships built versus their speed.  The different colors represent 
the different ship sizes built over the last 40 years.  The Sea Inspection Group used 
the distribution to create Figure 104, which was then used in the Ship Generator 
function in the model to assign each ship generated a certain ship size. 
 
Using Figure 104, the distribution was then curve-fitted and random ship sizes 

























Figure 105.  Ship-Size Probabilities 
 
This plot of the ship size probability distribution gives the equation used in the  
Ship Generator function of the model.  It allows the Ship Generator to produce a 
realistic number of ships with appropriate ship sizes for the model.  The pink line is 
the actual curve generated by the data and the black line is a display of the equation 
to the right of the curves.  The R2 value represents how well the curve of the 
equation fits the curve from the data. 
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Boarding teams were then transported to the ship waiting to be inspected by 
helicopter or hydrofoil based on the Force Group’s alternatives.  After an inspection was 
finished, a one-hour delay was assumed for the teams to be ready for another inspection. 
This is based on an assumption of the boarding team returning to base or turning over to 
another boarding team. 
In the model, ships need the required number of teams to be onboard before the 
inspection would start.  The required number of teams were calculated and assigned to 
the ships by using the Ship Size Per Team (SSPT) variable in the model.  SSPT values 
depended on different Soak Time values and the inspection time located in Table 32.  
Soak time is defined as the time allowed for sensor detection per container.  The values in 
Table 32 were generated from the TDSI Land Systems Group inspection model results.  
The Land Inspection Group then provided the team with data that showed the effects of 
soak time to the maximum possible amount of cargo that a ten-man team could inspect, 
as shown by Figure 106.  When the maximum number of teams available for that 
treatment did not meet the required number of teams for that ship, the maximum number 
of teams available was assigned to the ship for inspection.  This assignment strategy 
resulted in some ships not being inspected completely. 
 
  Soak Time 
(Minutes/Container)
  1 2 3 
3 1,250 700 275 
5 2,250 1,300 650 
6 2,650 1,300 800 













8 3,750 2,250 1,150
Table 32.  SSPT Table Using Inspection and Soak Times 
 
The values in this table were used to calculate the required number of inspection 
teams to board the ship to be inspected.  Each number represents the inspection 
capability of a single team in terms of TEUs per certain period of time given the  
first column. 
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Search time vs container size (teu)






































Figure 106.  Effect of Inspection Time on Inspection Capacity (TEU) for Different Soak Times 
 
This graph was provided by the Land System students’ robotic search model 
modified to represent human search.  Table was filled with the corresponding 
numbers out of this graph for use in the model. 
 
It was also assumed that the false alarm rates of the individual sensor types 
needed to be combined together, as the false alarm of any type of sensor could cause the 
same results, as shown in Equation 5.  The same calculation for the combined false alarm 
rates were done for both Smart containers and the boarding team’s handheld devices. 
 
P(FA)=1-[(1-P(FANeutron)(1-P(FAGamma))(1-P(FAChem/Bio))(1-P(FAExplosives))]        Equation 5 
 
This equation was used in the model for determining the overall false alarm rate for 
each system.  The probability of false alarm was important because it was assumed 
that the false alarm rate of the Smart container devices would drive the queue size 
for the boarding teams. 
 
Alternative 2 was similar to Alternative 1, but with the added layer of  
Smart containers on all shipping containers.  Before the ships were targeted for 
inspection, the Smart containers provided the C3I System with a trigger that a container 
had detected hazardous materials.  The model assumed that 95% of the container ships 
 235
were equipped with Smart container devices on their containers and that the AIS used in 
the area was able to detect those without Smart containers.  The C3I System was also 
assumed to have a 99% probability of deciding to inspect a ship from a Smart container 
trigger.  The detection probabilities and false alarm rates of the Smart containers played a 
significant factor in the output since a detection or a false alarm generated a boarding 
team response. 
Inputs:  The inputs that went into both alternatives were initially the same due to 
the layered approach, but with added inputs for Alternative 2.  Both models had a MTBA 
and a SSPT input.  Inputs also included whether or not hazardous materials were onboard 
(Boolean), the inspection time, and the number of teams.  Alternative 2 included the 
added probabilities and false alarm rates for the Smart container devices. 
Flowchart:  The model flowchart, as shown in Figure 107, was developed to 
reflect each alternative as a function in separate swim lanes.  The “alternative selector” 





Figure 107.  Model Flowchart 
 
This flowchart represents the operation of the model.  Each alternative modeled was represented in different swim-lanes to clearly 
identify each alternative’s input and output variables.  Features such as the “alternative selector” allow the model users to select which 
alternative to represent when running the model. 
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Description:  The model began with the “Ship Generation” phase where every 
ship was generated using an exponential distribution with a calculated MTBA.  During 
this phase, the ship size was assigned to the ships using the distribution shown in Figure   
Depending on the “Alternative Selector” decision block value, the model continued its 
execution for either alternative.  This decision block acted as a router for the execution 
flow of the model. 
A timer started whenever a ship entered the “Boarding Team” block.  The 
required number of teams needed for the ship to be inspected in a certain amount of time 
(declared by “Inspection Time” variable) was calculated.  The model then assigned that 
number of teams to the ship.  If the required number of teams was not available at that 
moment, the ship waited until the required number of teams was available.  If the 
required number of teams was more than the maximum number of teams (declared by 
“Num Teams” variable), then the maximum number of teams that were available were 
assigned to the ship.  In this case, the ship could not be inspected thoroughly.  In doing 
so, the number of teams assigned to each ship, ship size, and SSPT were used to calculate 
a percentage of the ship that could be inspected.  Before the ship exited the “Boarding 
Team” block, this percentage value was accumulated in a block and then used to 
calculate an “Average Percentage Completed” value for each run. 
After the team assignment, the ship and the teams (this number was varied in the 
model for different treatments) were batched and sent to an activity block that 
represented the inspection activity and delayed both the ship and the teams for a certain 
period of time (declared by “Inspection Time” variable).  When the activity block ran out 
of associated time, an unbatching took place and the ship was back on its way (or pulled 
into a predefined place for detailed inspection in case of detection).  After the unbatching, 
the teams went back to their original pool for the next inspection assignment, which was 
represented by a fixed amount of time (one hour).  Because the inspection team was 
assumed to not cause the ship any delay during the inspection, the delay in the activity 
block was subtracted from the timer value of the ships.  By doing this, the delay figure 
for the ship included only the queue time. 
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For Alternative 2, the ship was diverted to the “Smart container” block before the 
“boarding team” block.  Then several decision blocks determined whether the ship had  
Smart container devices installed and the probability of detection for those Smart 
container devices.  These blocks routed the ship through the model and determined 
whether the hazardous material was detected or not.  It was assumed that the Smart 
container devices did not improve the detection capability of the handheld devices of the 
boarding teams, but did reduce the amount of the ship the boarding team needed to 
inspect due to device mapping.  If a ship was diverted through “Cleared” tank of the 
model, but did, in fact, carry a hazardous material it was counted as a failure.  Any ship 
directed to “Detected” tank proceeded to the “Boarding Team” block and received the 
same inspection procedures described in the boarding team model explanation. 
The treatments used in both alternatives are listed in the “Values Evaluated” 
column in Table 33.  This column represented the run plan of the model regarding the 
treatments and the values of those treatments.  A combination of all treatments were 
generated and entered into the model via a text file, providing 30 results for each 
combination output to a separate text file.  Then, each combination was analyzed and the 
team was then able to select the optimum treatment value set (listed in the  







.01, .025, .05, .075, .1
0.155, 0.198, 0.241, 0.284









Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Boarding Team 0.25 0.007 0.24 0.004
Smart Container N/A N/A 0.66 0.005
0.21 hr/ship 0.03 hr/ship 0.53 hr/ship 0.05 hr/ship
0 0 12,680 B$ 5,551 B$














































Commercial Delay Time (queue + false alarm)
P(detect)
 
Table 33.  Treatments and Evaluated Results for Model Runs 
 
This table provides a summary of the treatments and values tested for the 
alternatives and the values chosen to be optimum.  The bottom half of the table 
summarizes the output of the alternatives using the treatment values chosen above. 
 
4.5.2 System Cost Model – Sea Inspection Group 
Approach:  To obtain an accurate cost model, the Sea Inspection Group collected 
data on commercial equipment equivalent to what would be used in each alternative.  For 
each alternative’s list of gear, the group gathered three costs—a low, medium, and high.  
Using these three values, the triangular distribution was used to obtain a 95% confidence 
interval on the expected values of total costs for the different alternatives.  However, for 
some gear, there was only one piece of equipment that was the best option or was the 
only option available.  In these instances, that single cost value was used across all  
three values. 
MOEs:  The MOEs for the cost model were the MDP System acquisition cost and 
the MDP System Ten-Year O&S costs.  Also included in the MOEs of the cost model 
were the Commercial Costs and Commercial O&S costs in Alternative 2.  To start 
building the cost model, it was decided that all costs would be in FY05$.  The group then 
needed to decide what the team size would be and what the sensor makeup for that team 
would be.  The group decided the team size would be based on the Navy’s boarding 
teams used in Visitation, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS).  For this, there would need 
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to be 12 personnel per team, with two of them on the bridge for administration and 
external communications and the other ten conducting the inspection throughout the ship. 
Assumptions:  The requirements for the boarding team alternative meant that 
each person would carry a handheld radio for internal communication with the rest of the 
team.  Additionally, each team would also carry five chemical detection kits, five 
explosive detection kits, ten gamma/neutron detectors, and five biological detection kits.  
For the Honor System alternative, all of the above requirements remained the same, but 
each team would also have a Gamma Camera Imager/Laptop.  Figure 108 shows the 
Boarding Team Sensor costs for one team and Figure 109 shows the Honor System costs 
for one team.  It should be noted that the costs to acquire and implement the Smart 
container technology were not listed in the Honor System Costs.  It was assumed that this 
would be a commercial cost absorbed by the shipping companies, etc., and was listed in 
the overall Honor System Cost model, but was not added to the sensor costs.  Also, the 
costs were gathered directly from manufacturer’s Websites.  Lawrence Livermore 




Equipment Type Low Med High Expected Cost Variance Standard Deviation
Portable Radios (6 sets of 2) $240 $420 $840 $500 $15,800 $126
Headsets for Radio (12) $156 $180 $216 $184 $152 $12
Chemical Kits (5) $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $0 $0
Explosive Detector Kit (5) $575 $725 $135,000 $45,433 $1,002,774,410 $31,667
Gamma/Neutron Detector (10) $86,000 $86,000 $86,000 $86,000 $0 $0
Biological kits (5) $5,475 $5,475 $5,475 $5,475 $0 $0
1 Team Total $138,792 $1,002,790,362 $31,805  
Figure 108.  Boarding Team Sensor Cost (FY05$) 
 
This chart displays the cost for sensors for one boarding team in the Boarding Team 
System (Alternative 1).  This includes all handheld sensors used by the team.  Three 
different sets (low, medium, and high) were used to a 95% confidence interval for 
the cost of the sensors. 
 
Equipment Type Low Med High Expected Cost Variance Standard Deviation
Portable Radios (6 sets of 2) $240 $420 $840 $500 $15,800 $126
Headsets for Radio (12) $156 $180 $216 $184 $152 $12
Chemical Kits (5) $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $0 $0
Explosive Detector Kit (5) $575 $725 $135,000 $45,433 $1,002,774,410 $31,667
Gamma/Neutron Detector (10) $86,000 $86,000 $86,000 $86,000 $0 $0
Biological kits (5) $5,475 $5,475 $5,475 $5,475 $0 $0
Gamma Imager w/ Laptop $180,000 $180,000 $180,000 $180,000 $0 $0
1 Team Total $318,792 $1,002,790,362 $31,667  
Figure 109.  Honor System Sensor Cost (FY05$) 
 
This chart displays the cost for sensors for one boarding team in the Honor System 
(Alternative 2).  This includes all handheld sensors used by the team.  Three 
different sets (low, medium, and high) were used to a 95% confidence interval for 
the cost of the sensors.  The difference between this alternative and the Boarding 
Team System is the use of a gamma imager for active interrogation of containers for 
radioactive sources. 
 
In the final cost model spreadsheet, there are several columns for the total cost to 
support three, five, seven, or nine teams per shift.  To calculate exactly how many teams 
would be needed to support inspections, the team assumed a certain number of shifts 
would be used.  For example, if three teams per shift were used, there are three 8-hour 
shifts in one day.  Therefore, nine teams total were needed to support inspections.  This 
would be the “Gold” team and they would be in rotation for one week.  The following 
week would be the “Blue” team, with another nine teams in rotation for the next week.  
To allot for leave, sickness, overloads, etc., another full team was added, making the total 
number of teams to support three teams/shift inspections to 27 teams.  This logic 
followed for the other numbers of teams needed for ship inspections and the totals for all 
teams can be viewed in Figure 110. 
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Number of Teams/Shift 
Inspection 1 3 5 7 9
Total Teams Needed 9 27 45 63 81  
Figure 110.  Total Teams needed to Support Ship Inspections 
 
This chart shows the total number of teams needed for the number of teams used 
per shift for inspections.  This is based on eight-hour shifts and therefore three shifts 
per day.  Each three-shift period lasts for one week when another three shift period 
starts with another set of teams.  Given a third set of teams for back up and vacation 
time for the first two sets of teams, the total number of teams needed is derived. 
 
Once the costs were calculated for the sensors needed for an individual team, 
those values needed to be integrated with the overall cost model.  For the overall cost 
model, there were additional assumptions made for sensors, training, maintenance, etc.  A 
basic assumption to start the sea inspection model was that the actual personnel used to 
man the teams would be included in the Force Group’s cost model.  Figure 108 and 
Figure 109 represent the sensors costs for one team for one year.  These values were used 
in Figure 111 and Figure for the first year costs, as seen in the first row of these two 
tables.  Each year thereafter, it was assumed that there would be a 30% replacement cost 
for the sensors due to the nature of the environment the sensors would be operating in.  
This higher replacement cost also took into account maintenance costs. 
To have accountability of all the equipment, all gear would be checked in and out 
of an armory-type system.  The personnel running the gear locker would be responsible 
for general maintenance only (i.e., replacing batteries, etc.).  It was determined that the 
gear locker would be manned by the equivalent of two E-5s and would have four 
personnel on a yearly payroll.95  Breakage of handheld sensors was accounted for in the 
replacement costs of the sensors.  However, with the handheld radios that came with 
rechargeable batteries, back-up replacement batteries were still needed.  It was 
determined that each radio needed to have two extra batteries per year for replacements, 
accounted for in consumables. 
The training course was intended to train the teams for the threats they would be 
encountering and how to use the gear issued for inspections.  This course was not 
intended to train the teams for ship boarding (that was taken into account in the Force 
                                                 
95 http://www.dod.mil/dfas/money/milpay/pay/paytable2005-rev1.pdf. 
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Group’s cost data).  To obtain this, an analogy to an actual Army Radiological course 
lasting three weeks was used.96  The 120-hour course would be taught by two qualified 
instructors, but to effectively train all the boarding teams for the model, there needed to 
be four instructors on hand, paid on a yearly basis.  Their pay was based on the pay 
equivalent to an E-7 with 20 years in service.97  For the treatments of more than five 
teams per shift for inspections, having four instructors would not be enough to train all 
teams, so for treatments above five teams per shift, eight instructors were included in the 
cost data. 
While the group searched for comparative costs of equipment to be used in the 
inspections, several factors were considered.  While the best gear was desired, the group 
wanted to try to reduce the amount of gear each team would be carrying.  If there was a 
piece of gear that combined several tests, it was selected over others.  Ruggedness was 
also a factor, given the nature of the environment in which the gear would be used. 
Inputs:  Inputs for the Boarding Team Alternative cost data for the handheld 
radio were obtained through the Motorola Website.  Several versions of the Talkabout 
radio were available and were suitable for a shipboard environment.98  To free up the 
inspectors’ hands during the inspection, it was decided to have headsets for the portable 
radios and these figures were also obtained from the Motorola Website.  For the chemical 
kits, the group decided to use only one—the M256 military kit (available online), as it 
was the most cost effective option.  There were other kits available, but they were not 
capable of testing for blister, nerve and blood agents in the same kit.99  For the Biological 
detection this was another situation where there were several kits available, but the group 
found the Biowarfare Agent Detection Device (BADD) Box that included tests for 
anthrax, ricin, and botulism all in one portable kit, so this was the selection for all three 
cost values.100  The values for the explosive detection kits range from a simple swab kit 








for the low value to a handheld EVD 3500 detector.  The swab kit tested for only several 
explosive traces, but was good if the inspector knew specifically where to look.101  The 
handheld EVD 3500 was very costly but capable of detecting the presence of all threat 
explosives.102  If cost was not a factor, this would be the ideal detector for inspectors.  
Another case where only one cost was used in the model was with the Gamma and 
Neutron detector.  To keep a minimum on the amount of gear each team member was 
carrying, there was a piece of gear manufactured by Laurus Systems that was capable of 
detecting both gamma and neutron in one piece of gear, minimizing the gear being 
carried, so this was selected for the teams.103  The only additional piece of equipment that 
the Honor System Alternative included was the portable Gamma-Ray Imaging System 
manufactured by EDO Electronic Systems Group.104  Again, this was a situation where 
there was only one cost because there was only one piece of equipment that suited the 
exact needs of the inspection teams.  The costs for the Smart-container technology were 
obtained from various sources, to include Savi, General Electric, and Lawrence 
Livermore.  The team used these devices for cost data because each device is capable of 
having additional detectors added to detect chemical and biological agents as well as 
radiological devices.  Other devices not included were tamper/intrusion detection only. 
Description:  For 2005, all teams would need all gear and equipment to conduct 
ship inspections.  Therefore, the startup costs for the first year were to acquire all gear 
and equipment and all teams would be fully mission-capable the first year of 
implementation.  In addition, the shipping companies would be responsible for 
implementing the Smart-container technology on all containers within the first year. 
Alternative 1 was the Boarding Team System and one, three, five, and seven 
teams per shift inspection were the treatments for modeling.  The cost breakdown can be 
viewed in Figure 111.  Figure 112 shows the further breakdown of acquisition costs and 
total O&S costs for the ten years.  Note that for the Boarding Team alternative there were 
no commercial costs because the Smart containers were not used in that alternative. 



























Figure 111.  Boarding Team Cost Model (FY05$) 
 
This chart shows the ten-year cost for the boarding team alternative.  Included on 
the right side is the total cost for each of the team size requirements (1 team/shift,  
3 teams/shift, etc.). 
 
$37,408,735$26,341,188$16,933,481$7,525,77410 YR TOTAL OPER COST
$0$0$0010 YR TOTAL COMM COST




Figure 112.  Boarding Team Cost Breakdown (FY05$) 
 
This chart shows the ten-year costs for each total team numbers.  The ten-year 
operational cost is displayed at the bottom. 
 
Alternative 2 was the Honor System and three, five, seven, and nine teams per 
shift treatments were used for modeling.  It was assumed that the shipping companies 
would implement the Smart-container technology on all shipping containers the first year.  
Each year thereafter, assumed a 5% replacement cost due to aging, etc.  The cost 
breakdown can be viewed in Figure 113.  Figure 114 shows the further breakdown of 























Figure 113.  Honor System Cost Model (FY05$) 
 
This chart represents the total system cost for the Honor System (Alternative 2).  
The light blue section shows the cost of the Smart container devices, which is the 
major difference between the two alternatives. 
 
$8,760,336,442$8,738,940,735$8,715,885,188$8,694,489,48110 YR TOTAL OPER COST
$8,659,574,000$8,659,574,000$8,659,574,000$8,659,574,00010 YR TOTAL COMM COST




Figure 114.  Honor System Cost Breakdown (FY05$) 
 
This chart shows the ten-year costs for each total team numbers.  The ten-year 
operational cost is displayed at the bottom. 
 
Analysis: Figure 15 represents the main effects of each treatment.  This plot 
allowed the Sea Inspection Group to determine if any of the individual factors 
significantly contributed to “percentage completed.”  It is apparent due to each curve 
being nearly horizontal that there is little impact on this MOE due to the change in any of 
the treatment values except for the number of teams.  It was imperative to compare these 
values with the delay cost plots for each alternative.  Without comparison, the treatment 
value from the performance run results looked like an optimum point, but would have 
inadvertently caused the maximum delay cost.  By comparing two sets of output data, the 
































Type Alternative P(Random Inspection)
Inspection Time Soak Time Num of Teams
Main Effects Plot (data means) for Percentage Completed
 
Figure 115.  Main Effects for Treatments 
 
This plot summarizes the effects of each treatment to the “Average Percentage 
Completed” value for both alternatives.  The slope of the lines in each small plot 
represents the effect amplitude.  More slope means more effect.  For example, the 
main effects of the number of teams plot can be interpreted to mean that using more 
than three teams per shift does not affect the output in a significant way. 
 
The main effects for the delay model from the treatments are shown in Figure 
116.  Outputs of the delay model helped the group complete the trade-off analysis and 
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Main Effects Plot (data means) for Delay Cost
 
Figure 116.  Main Effect Plot for Boarding Team System 
 
This plot shows the relative impacts of each treatment on the delay cost of  
the alternative. 
 
It was observed that the boarding team delay cost was not affected if the number 
of teams was at least three.  The lowest delay cost was observed between three teams and 
five teams.  Since the delay cost of three or five teams was almost the same, the group 
decided to have three teams in Alternative 1.  It was also observed that the boarding 
teams could be allowed a maximum false alarm rate of 11% before significant delay cost 
was observed.  Therefore, the Sea Inspection Group chose 11% as an alternative choice.  
Another finding from the main effects plot was that allowing the inspection teams seven 
hours to complete the inspection did not add any significant delay cost for the system.  
This seven-hour inspection period would also increase the amount of time each inspector 
could spend on each container and therefore was selected for the system.  Finally, it was 
seen that the Boarding Team Inspection System could allow 5% of the ships to be 
randomly inspected without causing significant delay to commercial shipping.  For this 
reason, 5% was chosen as a value for use in the overall model. 
A similar approach was followed for the treatment selections in Alternative 2.  
The resultant plots for the Honor System (Alternative 2) are shown in Figure 117.  From 
this graph it is easy to see that nine teams/shift reduced the delay cost far more than the 
other selections and the resultant minimal delay cost made up for the increase in cost due 
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to number of sensors and manpower.  It can also be seen that the best value for Smart 
container false alarms was 15.5%.  In our model, this means that as long as the C2 
element can reduce the number of ships it sends inspection teams to down to 15.5% of 
the total number of ships that come into the port the system will not cause significant 
delay costs to shipping.  The C2 element must be able to use the AIS information, 
Intelligence, and other resources to reduce the number of ships it sends inspection teams 
to.  The Sea Inspection Group also selected eight hours for the inspection time in the 
Smart Container System.  The delay cost incurred while allowing the inspection teams 
more time for inspection was not significant in our model.  It was initially assumed that 
giving the inspection teams any more than six hours to inspect a ship would lead to much 
greater delay costs. 
Finally, the Sea Inspection Group chose 1% as the value for probability of random 
inspections.  It was felt that with the increased number of inspections, real or from false 
alarms, the need for random inspections was not necessary, but adding a small percentage 
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Figure 117.  Main Effects Plot for Smart Container System 
 
This plot shows the relative impacts of each treatment on the delay cost of  
the alternative. 
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As can be seen in Table 34, the delay cost for a single ship in a year for 
Alternative 1 (the Boarding Team System) was .01 million dollars.  This means that, on 
average, the system caused $10,000 worth of delay to each ship.  The delay cost for a 
single ship in Alternative 2 (the Honor System) was .02 million dollars and means that 
the cost to each ship in the system is approximately $20,000. 
In order to fully understand the impact to commercial shipping, this per ship cost 
must be summed for each ship that gets inspected in each alternative as in Table 34.  The 
total delay cost to shipping for Alternative 1 then becomes 130 million dollars and for 
Alternative 2 becomes 330 million dollars. 
As can be seen in Table 35, the delay cost associated with at sea inspection is 
quite high when using these assumptions for either of the alternatives.  A major 
difference that should be noticed is that in the Boarding Team Inspection System 5% of 
the total ships are being inspected by a human boarding team, whereas in the Honor 
System, over 16% of the ships are being inspected by humans. 
 
MOE/Metrics “As-Is” Alt 1 Alt 2 
Percent Cargo Inspected 0% 100% 100% 
P(Detect | Inspect) 0% 25% 25% 
P(Detect) WMD on Ship 0% 25% 25% 
Commercial Delay Cost ($M) 0 .01 .02 
Commercial Cost ($M) 0 0 10 
MDP System Cost ($M) 0 17 100 
Total System Cost ($M) 0 17 110 
Table 34.  Model Results for Each Alternative in Tabular Form 
 
Table 34 shows the results of each model in tabular form.  Of note, the commercial 
delay cost for Alternative 1 is $10K, while Alternative 2 is $20K; but total system 
cost is ten times higher due to the total number of teams involved.  Also, these 
results are for one ship in the system. 
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MOE/Metrics “As-Is” Alt 1 Alt 2 
Percent Inbound Ships Inspected 0% 5% 16.5% 
P(Detect) WMD on Ship 0% 25% 25% 
Overall Pd WMD Inbound 0% 1.2% 4.1% 
Commercial Delay Cost ($M) 0 130 330 
Commercial Cost ($M) 0 0 12,680 
MDP System Cost ($M) 0 17 100 
Total System Cost ($M) 0 147 13,110 
Table 35.  Model Results for Each Alternative 
 
Table 35 shows the results of each model in tabular form.  Of note, the commercial 
delay cost for Alternative 1 is $130M, while Alternative 2 is $330M.  The total 
system cost is much higher for Alternative 2, but three times the amount of ships are 
inspected in Alternative 2.  These results are for all ships entering the Port of 
Singapore. 
 
4.6 DAMAGE MODELS 
The SEA-7 Cohort developed damage models for each threat scenario to allow an 
evaluation and analysis of the performance, or level of defeat, that each integrated system 
architecture produced.  The SBA damage model derived attack damage cost from the 
distance at which the response force defeated the explosives-laden attacking speedboat.  
The SAW damage model determined attack damage cost from the speed at which the 
tanker impacted the pier.  The WMD damage model obtained damage cost from the 
distance at which the WMD device detonated from the pier; however, during simulation 
runs, a WMD attack was assumed to be either completely defeated due to detection at a 
safe distance, or the full damage occurred if the WMD was not detected.  In all scenario 
damage models, damage cost was the result of a combination of the following costs, as 
applicable:  structural repair, loss of life, environmental cleanup, and lost commerce. 
 
4.6.1 Small Boat Attack Scenario Damage Model 
The SBA damage model was designed to evaluate the overall performance model 
results.  It was based on results garnered from the DOD Explosive Safety Board Blast 
Effects Computer, version 4,105 which predicts the airblast from an amount of explosives 
at sea level.  The DOD Blast Computer was used with the assumptions of a 1,000-lb TNT 
explosive, lightly cased and detonated at sea level.  The relative over pressure at range 
                                                 
105 Air Force Safety Center, “Explosive Site Planning,” 
Tools,.http://afsafety.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Weapons/oteam_site_planning.htm#tools, (accessed 20 February 2005). 
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was then compared to known failure points of structures.  With this information, it was 
determined that sheet metal panels would buckle if this explosion occurred at 65m, and 
oil tanks would rupture if the explosion was at 35m.  These calculations lead to the 
distribution of damage from the modeling results. 
The cost of the damage associated with the SBA was a compilation of the repair 
and salvage costs for the ship that was attacked, as well as the cost of environmental 
cleanup.  For the purpose of this exercise, the HVU was assumed to be a crude oil tanker, 
similar to the French-flagged MV LIMBURG.  The scenario HVU was assumed to be 
carrying in excess of 90,000 tons of crude oil in a single-hulled tanker.  The Estimating 
Cleanup Costs for Oil Spills model,106 Figure 118, was then used to compute estimated 
damages for the scenario. 
                                                 
106 Dagmar Schmidt, “Estimating Cleanup Costs for Oil Spills,” 1999 International Oil Spill 




Figure 118.  Oil Spill Intelligence Report Oil Spill Per-Tonne Cost Estimation Model 
 
This model was used for the environmental cleanup costs for the spills associated 
with the MDP scenarios.  This model takes into account the location of the spill, the 
amount of shoreline contamination, the cleanup methodology, the type of oil spilled, 
and the amount spilled. It does not include any environmental damage fines, or lost 
revenue, associated with a degraded fishing habitat. 
 
With the spill occurring in Asia, with major shoreline oiling of heavy crude oil, 
and a mechanical manual cleanup strategy, the estimated cleanup cost was $39,054 per 
ton.  With the spill occurring in Asia, with moderate shoreline oiling of light fuel oil, and 
a mechanical manual cleanup strategy, the estimated cleanup cost was $8,600 per ton.  
These represented the worst- and best-case scenarios for an oil spill in the Straits of 
Malacca.  The damage was then equated to the cost through an equation linking the 
probability of successfully defeating the attack outside of 65m, between 65m and 35m, 
and inside of 35m to the cost of the damage associated with an explosion at that range.  
The environmental damage cost was computed for both a heavy crude spill and a light 
fuel spill, and the average was used for the damage model.  Figure 119 shows the three 
levels of damage. 
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Small Boat Attack Damage Model
Insights:
• Majority of cost coming from Environmental cleanup
• Driven by Type of contamination and amount of 
shoreline affected
Assumptions:
• 90,000 ton spill
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Figure 119.  SBA Damage Model 
 
The damage model for the SBA scenario assumed that the detonation of 1,000 lbs of 
TNT outside of 65m from the hull of an oil tanker would only cost $10,000 for paint 
and glass repair.  Alternatively, the same blast occurring inside of 35m would cause 
full damage. 
 
4.6.2 SAW Scenario Damage Model 
The SAW scenario established the foundation of the myriad of assumptions 
utilized in the development of the SAW model.  From the established scenario, the model 
was based on an 8,000-ton, 113-meter vessel loaded with 90,000 tons of raw crude oil.  
All calculations were established assuming an ambient air temperature of 82°F and 90% 
humidity.  Initial pier damage calculations evaluated the relative energy of the ship at the 
following speeds: 5, 10, 15, and, 20 kts versus the strain rate of a modern pier.  The pier 
strain rates were based on March 2001 construction data from the deep-draft pier at 
Changi Naval Base, Singapore.  All calculations assumed the attack occurred at Mean 
Low Low Tide, the most widely accepted standard in the industry.  The model assumed a 
direct collision, and reconstruction costs were based on analogy utilizing new 
construction costs interpolated per square foot, adjusted for economies of scale.  The 
economic impact portion of the SAW model derived from the construction timeline, 
versus economic losses per day.  The daily cost was based on Singapore’s average daily 
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maritime commerce.  The environmental cleanup costs surpassed all other costs 
associated with the SAW scenario, therefore special consideration was given to the 
accuracy of these cost estimates.  Ship repair costs were evaluated using a direct analogy 
with the repair costs of the LIMBURG oil tanker.  Figure 120 shows the results of the 
SAW damage model as a relationship of total damage cost to impact speed.  The mean 























Figure 120.  SAW Scenario Damage Model 
 
The SAW damage costs assumed an 8,000-ton, fully loaded oil tanker rammed into a 
pier in Singapore.  Damage costs included ship repair, pier reconstruction, economic 
impact, and environmental cleanup. 
 
4.6.3 WMD Scenario Damage Model 
In order to design a WMD model that would provide reasonably understandable 
outputs, limiting assumptions in addition to those established in Threat Scenario 3 
(WMD), were established.  The weapon utilized in Threat Scenario 3 was established as a 
1970s-era, 20-KT, Soviet-made, nuclear device—the same yield as the weapon employed 
at Nagasaki. 
This weapon was chosen primarily due to the following considerations:  1) This 
kind of nuclear weapon would be a relatively attainable nuclear device, with damage 
results significant enough to produce more harm than current conventional devices, and 
2) destruction effects of 20-KT nuclear devices were more accurately documented than 
other nuclear detonation yields.  The most important assumption was that the weapon was 
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ground-detonated.  If terrorists were able to propel the weapon to 1,850 feet above sea 
level, the destructive effects would be enhanced significantly, resembling the destructive 
effects observed at Hiroshima. 
The WMD damage model represented three categories of economic impact: 
 
1. Destruction of structures. 
2. Economic impact associated with the loss of productive capability. 
3. Cost of life. 
 
The model for the destruction of structures was based on the following standard 
destructive categories:  Window Breakage, Wood-Framed Building Destruction, 
Multistory Brick, and Multistory Reinforced Concrete Offices.  Destructive arcs were 
calculated at:  the Port of Sembawang and at the following distances east of Sembawang, 
within the channel:  ½, 1½, and 3½ miles.  Portions of destructive effectiveness were 
interpolated, but no information was extrapolated.  Reconstruction expenses ranged from 
$0 to $284 FY05M. 
Economic impact was computed using the ratio of the area destroyed (modeled in  
section 1) to the total area of Singapore, per projected reconstruction period, versus the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Estimated economic impact ranged from  
$0 to $400 FY05M. 
Cost of life was the primary factor in the WMD damage model.  Loss of life 
calculations utilized a ratio of the overall area established where overpressure would 
reasonably exceed 35PSI, and a stochastic model representing the conversion of objects 
into missiles due to the explosion, versus the corresponding population in the affected 
area.  Each life below age 70 was valued at $3.7 FY05M referencing an Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) cost-benefit analysis conducted in 2002, which revised 
previous estimates of the economic feasibility of removing arsenic from drinking 
water.107  These results were adjusted to reflect the current price index.  Life cost 
estimates ranged from $0 to $193,584 FY05M, far surpassing the other two portions of 
                                                 
107 OMB Watch, “Pricing the Priceless,” 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/616/1/134?TopicID=3, (accessed 15 February 2005). 
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the cost model, as seen in Figure 121.  Integration of the three cost factors provides cost 
estimates ranging from $566 to $194,282 FY05M. 
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Figure 121.  WMD Scenario Damage Model 
 
The WMD Damage Model assumed a 20-KT, Russian-made, nuclear weapon 
detonated in Singapore harbor.  The model included costs based on the destruction 
of structures, economic impact, and cost of life. 
 
4.6.4 Integrated Architecture Models 
The SEA-7 Cohort developed integrated system architecture models in order to 
obtain values for overarching MOEs and Metrics for each architecture combination of 
system alternatives (see Figure 122).  The integrated architecture models, as represented 













































































































Figure 122.  MDP Overarching Modeling Plan 
 
The Overarching Modeling Plan pictorially showed the process of utilizing 
Integrated Architecture Models to transform inputs from individual system 
performance and cost models into the desired performance measure outputs. 
 
For calculating MOE 1 (Performance) and MOE 2 (Risk) in the SBA and the 
SAW threat scenarios, the integrated architecture model used Time-To-Go (TTG) until 
the attack was complete as the common element passed between system models.  The 
integrated architecture model for the WMD threat scenario used a Bayesian model in 
which probabilities of inspection and detection for the various systems were linked to 
give the final outcome.  Metric 1 (Commercial Impact) and Metric 2 (MDP System Cost) 
were directly calculated as a summation of the system costs for all architecture system 
combinations, regardless of threat scenario.  However, Commercial Impact (Metric 1) for 
the WMD threat scenario also included commercial delay costs that resulted from queue 
delays and false alarm delays in the cargo inspection process.  These commercial delay 
costs were calculated by running the delay time output from the integrated architecture 
model through the Shipping Delay Cost Model to determine a cost estimate. 
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4.6.5 WMD Scenario Results 
4.6.5.1 MOE 1 Performance 
Approach:  The performance model for Scenario 1 (WMD Attack) was 
designed to incorporate the overall performance values for WMD detection from each 
functional group within the MDP Group.  The first task was to identify the performance 
output by creating a “probability tree” shown in Figure 123.  The various paths of the tree 
represented the likelihood of finding WMDs in a container, or conversely not finding 
WMDs in a container (attack success), given that WMDs were in a container. 
Figure 123.  Probability Tree for Overarching WMD Performance Model 
 
This figure shows the notional probability tree used in creating the overarching 
performance model for the WMD scenario.  The overarching model incorporates all 
of the performance inputs from each group within the MDP Group. 
 
Once the different system values were assigned to the model, a matrix was 
created in a Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheet to account for all 109 combinations of five 
 
Performance = Pr(WMD Found)
Risk (Attack Damage) = Pr(WMD Not Found) x Attack Damage Cost
Integrated Architecture Model
























































systems each with three alternative architectures.  Using Bayes’ theorem for conditional 
probability, a model representing Figure  was developed.  This model computed the 
various combinations of probabilities for “WMD found” and was built as an imbedded 
equation within the same spreadsheet.  Performance values for each group’s alternatives 
were then inserted into the equation for a particular combination.  Thus, the performance 
value, or the overall probability of finding WMDs onboard a ship, was generated. 
MOEs: 
 





• Sensors can detect all high interest vessels.  The Sensor Group Systems 
design assumes that all high interest vessels are using the AIS 
implemented in the region. 
• C3I decision-making performance can be represented by a number 
(probability) – This allows the use of a probability for modeling purposes. 
• All cargo can be separated by the Land Inspection System.  The Land 
Inspection System is capable of searching each container individually 
instead of a mass of containers for more precise detection capabilities. 
• Enemy possesses no ability to adapt to system.  This is a simplifying 
assumption for modeling purposes. 
 
Inputs (as seen in Figure 124): 
 
• Probability of Land Inspection. 
• Probability of Detection given a Land Inspection. 
• Probability that the Sea Inspection System detects the WMD. 
• Probability that the Sensors System detects the ship. 




Figure 124.  Inputs to WMD Scenario Performance Model 
 
This figure shows the performance inputs for the WMD scenario performance 
model from each group within the MDP Group. 
 
Description:  As seen in Figure , the Excel™ model for Land Inspection,  
“As-Is” and Alternative 1, the probability that a land inspection occurs and the 
probability that detection occurs given there was an inspection, constituted the first and 
second branches of the probability tree, respectively.  The third branch contained the 
probability that the Sensor System identified the ship.  Since the Sensor System was 
designed to have a probability of identification of 1.0, the outcome of this branch was 
always positive.  The fourth branch was the probability that the C3I System 
recommended the appropriate vessel to the Sea Inspection System.  The final branch was 
the probability that the Sea Inspection System detects the WMD. 
The Extend model for Land Inspection Alternative 2 followed the same 
path above with a branch added before the probability of land inspection to account for 
the probability that cargo comes from a trusted shipper, and the probability that the 
trusted shipper would “find” or at least deter WMDs. 
Results:  Each combination of the WMD scenario ExcelTM model 
performance values were plotted against the relative combination of system alternatives.  
Three distinct series groups of points with similar performance ranges were observed, as 
in Figure .  These three regions were due to performance increases of the Land Inspection 
System.  Within these groups, smaller spikes occurred in groups of eight.  The smaller 
spikes were due to performance improvements in the C3I System. 
 
Scenario Land Land Pd Land Insp Sea Sea Pd Sensors Sensors Pd C3I C3I Pd
As-Is 0.99 0.02 As-Is 0 As-Is 1 As-Is 0.2
WMD 1 0.88 0.47 1 0.25 1 1 1 0.35
2 0.94 0.74 2 0.25 2 1 2 0.68
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Figure 125.  Plot Showing Increase in Performance Due to Land Inspection System Across 
Combinations 
 
This figure shows the increase in performance of the MDP System as combination 
number changes.  Note the three regions of similar performance due to the Land 
Inspection System alternatives.  The smaller spikes within these regions represent 
performance improvements due to the C3I System alternatives. 
 
4.6.5.2 MOE2 Risk (Attack Damage) 
Approach:  The risk model for Scenario 1 (WMD Attack) was 
determined from the complement of the performance model.  Risk was calculated by 
multiplying the probability of failure (1 minus the probability of finding WMD) by the 
WMD scenario attack damage cost. 
MOEs:  The expected damage cost resulting from the system architecture 
failing to find WMD given that WMD is present. 
Assumptions:  Same as WMD scenario Architecture Performance Model. 
Inputs:  Same as WMD scenario Architecture Performance Model. 
Description:  Same as WMD scenario Architecture Performance Model. 
Results:  Each combination of the WMD scenario ExcelTM model risk 
values were plotted against the relative combination of system alternatives (see  
Figure 126).  Similar to the performance graph, three distinct series groups of points with 
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similar performance ranges were observed, due to performance increases of the Land 
Inspection System. 
 



































Figure 126.  Plot of Combination Number vs. Risk 
 
Risk was calculated by multiply the probability of attack success by the cost of 
failure.  There were three regions of similar performance due to the Land 
Inspection System alternatives. 
 
4.6.5.3 M1 Commercial Impact 
The Commercial Impact Integrated Model estimated both of the separate 
costs incurred by the commercial maritime industry: system costs and delay costs.  These 
costs are inversely related.  Specific examples of commercial system costs included the 
cost to purchase and maintain Smart containers and the cost to maintain a “Trusted 
Shipper” certification.  Delay costs were opportunity costs representing the lost revenue 
the commercial maritime industry forfeited in order to implement a specific alternative 
architecture.  These costs have been determined in the Shipping Delay Cost Model.   
Both categories of commercial impact were evaluated for each combination of 
alternatives:  “As-Is,” Alternative 1, and Alternative 2.  The resultant combination 
outputs denote the cost of each system alternative combination.  There were 109 separate 
combinations (results shown in Figure 127, which represent 109 individual cost 
alternatives, for system costs and delay costs.  The land alternatives represented in 
combinations 36 to 109 represented a majority of the shipping delay costs, while  
sea inspection Alternative 2 imposed the most serious cost fluctuations to the alternative 






commercial costs differs from all other portions of the integrated model, but this anomaly 
is the result of differing concepts of accepted risks.  Alternative 2 is clearly less risk-
adverse than Alternative 1. 
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Figure 127.  Commercial Impact for WMD Scenario 
 
The Commercial Impact Costs for all 109 system architecture combinations shows 
the significant influence of the Land Inspection System alternatives, and the 
influence of the Sea Inspection System alternatives on Commercial System Costs. 
 
4.6.5.4 M2 MDP System Cost 
The MDP System Cost Integrated Model evaluated the MDP System Cost 
for all system architecture combinations.  In keeping with the rest of this project, all 
figures were in FY05$M, and covered a time period of ten years.  As previously 
discussed, there were 109 separate cost combinations the WMD System could utilize to 
combat WMD infiltration.  Evaluation of these combinations clearly suggested that the 
Land Inspection system costs drove the overall system costs.  The large changes seen in 
alternatives 36 represents the change from the land “As-Is” System, to the two Land 




















Figure 128.  MDP System Costs for WMD Scenario 
 
The MDP System Costs for all 109 system architecture combinations show the 
significant influence of the Land Inspection System alternatives.  The large shift in 
the data indicates architecture combinations without a Land Inspection System to 
those with Land Inspection System Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. 
 
Analysis:  The graph in Figure 129 shows a comparison of performance 
and cost for the “As-Is” and Alternative Systems. 
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Figure 129.  Alternative Performance vs. Total System Cost 
 
The graph shows that Land Inspection gives the required performance, but at great 




In the performance versus cost comparison, the desire was to have the 
highest performance with the least cost as indicated by the “desired” arrow in Figure 129.  
The improvements provided by alternatives to Sensor and Sea Inspection Systems 
improved performance over the current system.  The improvements to C3I capabilities 
further increased performance, but did not meet the requirement threshold of 60%.  Land 
Inspection, combined with improvements to C3I, increased performance well above the 
requirements threshold, but at a cost of over $50B. 
The graph in Figure 130 shows a comparison of risk and cost for the  
“As-Is” and Alternative Systems. 
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Figure 130.  Alternative Risk vs. Cost 
 
The graph above shows a low-cost gain from adding Sea Inspection and improving 
Sensors and C3I. 
 
In the risk versus cost comparison, the desire was to have the lowest risk 
with the least cost as indicated by the “desired” arrow in Figure 131.  As expected, the 
effects of each alternative on risk mirrored their effects on performance.  The 
improvements to the Sensors and Sea Inspection Systems reduced risk the least.  Land 
Inspection significantly reduced risk, but at a very high cost. 
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Land Inspections “Trusted Agent” System included implementation in 15 
high volume ports of origin.  Sensitivity analysis was performed by reducing the number 
of “Trusted Agent” ports.  The results are shown in Figure 131. 
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Figure 131.  Effect Reducing “Trusted Agent” Land Inspection Alternative Implementation on 
Performance and Cost 
 
Decreasing Highest-Volume ports of origin using Land Inspection System reduces 
cost, but performance stays above requirement.  The series of numbers above the 
points (1, 5, 10, 15) indicated the number of ports where the Trusted Agent” System 
was implemented. 
 
Decreasing the number of “Trusted Agent” ports moves performance 
versus cost toward the desired “high Performance/Low Cost” region of the graph in 
Figure .  Yet, the decrease in performance is minimal, compared to cost reduction, when 
reducing the number of trusted agent ports from 15 to 1.  However, it must be 
acknowledged that a “smart” enemy is not assumed.  This means, as expected, the effects 
each reducing the number of Trusted Agent on risk mirrored the effect on performance, 
as shown in Figure 132.  The combination of Coastal Radar Stations (X-band) + HFSWR 
(Sensor Alternative 1), a boarding team inspection (Sea Inspection Alternative 1), a 
network centric C3I System, and reducing the number of high volume “Trusted Agent” 
ports, provided minimum risk at the least cost.  However, reducing the number of 
“Trusted Agent” ports does not consider an “Intelligent” adversary.  Terrorists will 
simply not utilize ports that are considered “Trusted Agents.” 
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Figure 132.  Effect Reducing Trusted Agent Ports on Risk and Cost 
 
Decreasing Highest-Volume ports of origin using Land Inspection System reduces 
cost, but risk stays below the other alternatives. 
 
4.6.5.5 SAW Scenario Results 
For the SAW scenario the attack timeline used time to go for measuring 
the time of the scenario.  The attack began at TTG0.  The Sensors System detected the 
attack at TTG1.  The C3I System decided to engage at TTG2 and the Force System 
responded and defeated the attack at TTG3.  This TTG3 was evaluated against 0.  If 
TTG3 was less than 0, the attack was successful with full damage.  If TTG3 was greater 
than 0, the defeat distance was calculated from TTG3 and the attack damage was 
determined from the scenario Attack Damage Model.  Luckily, the C3I System was 
capable of near instantaneous identification of intent, well outside of the harbor limits, 
therefore allowing the maximum engagement range for the Force alternatives of  
five miles. 
For this threat there were 11 combinations of alternatives between the  
“As-Is” System and the alternative combinations developed by the Force, Sensor, and  
C3I alternative designs.  These combinations were compared on the basis of performance 
against the attack, as well as the cost of the respective alternatives.  It was discovered that 
C3I and sensors were severely limited by the scenario.  Even the “As-Is” System was 
evaluated as adequate for the scenario selected as it met the requirement for 80% 
P(defeat) as seen in Figure 133.  This shows that for close in altercations, the “As-Is” 
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System is functional and sufficient.  However, this does not account for SAW 
engagements outside of the defined harbor area.  If the scenario were to be expanded 
outside of the harbor limits, the results might differ dramatically.  This is a possible realm 
for future work, as it was not addressed with this study. 
The best performance of all of the alternatives came with the use of Force 
Alternative 2, using a combination of patrol craft and Sea Marshals.  This allowed over 
91% of all SAW attacks to be stopped with no damage to port facilities.  Figure 133 
shows the different combinations of alternatives and their respective probabilities of 
defeating the SAW threat. 
 




















Figure 133.  P(Defeat) vs. Alternative Combination 
 
This graph shows the different P(Defeats) as associated with the combinations of 
C3I, Sensors, and Force alternatives.  The first two points represent the  
“As-Is” System and the Force Alternative 2 System.  The other points show the 
relative ineffectiveness of changing the C3I and Sensors alternatives. 
 
Figure 134 shows the improvements that could be made by adding the harbor 
patrol craft to the existing Sea Marshal force.  Because of the capabilities of both Sensors 
and C3I alternatives, the Force alternatives were allowed to engage at the maximum 
range, as defined by the scenario.  Hidden behind this is the fact that it was the scenario 
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that restricted the findings.  If the Force alternatives were allowed to engage beyond the 
harbor limits, the C3I and Sensors alternatives would have a much more noticeable 
impact on the results. 
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Figure 134.  Time-To-Go vs. Sensor-C3I Combination 
 
Time to go (TTG) following Sensor detection and C3I analysis/decision for the nine 
different Sensor-C3I System combinations.  Sensors Alternative 2 has the biggest 
effect on giving the desired high TTG.  C3I has a smaller effect. 
 
4.6.5.6 MOE2 Risk (Attack Damage) 
The risk associated with the SAW scenario was a compilation of the costs 
associated with both the reconstruction of the damaged port facility, the repair to the 
SAW vessel, the environmental cleanup costs, and the lost revenue to the port.  It became 
apparent that the major cost driver was the environmental cleanup costs.  Using the 
approved oil spill cleanup model, with a 90,000-ton spill within the port facility, the cost 
of cleanup would exceed $2.2B (FY05$). 
To calculate the risk, the probability of successfully stopping the SAW 
attack was subtracted from one.  The resulting probability was then multiplied by the cost 
of an attack.  This was done for every combination of Sensor, C3I, and Force alternatives 
and can be seen in Figure 135. 
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Figure 135.  Risk vs. Alternative Combination Number 
 
4.6.5.7 M1 Commercial Impact 
There were no commercial impact costs associated with the  
SAW scenario. 
 
4.6.5.8 M2 MDP System Cost 
In the SAW scenario, Land and Sea Inspection did not actively participate 
so their costs were not considered in the evaluation of combinations.  Because of their 
absence, C3I drove system costs, while Force and Sensor alternatives caused only 
fluctuations in the MDP System Cost, as seen in Figure 136.  The three peaks in the cost 
combinations displayed in alternative combinations 5, 8, and 11 represented C3I 
Alternative 2.  At a system cost of $ 2.9B, C3I Alternative 2 constituted at least 96% of 
the total costs in three combinations included in C3I Alternative 2.  C3I Alternative 1 
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Figure 136.  MDP System Costs for SAW Scenario 
 
The C3I alternative drove the MDP System Cost for the SAW scenario.  The three 
peaks in the data show that C3I Alternative 2 was by far the most costly. 
 
4.6.5.9 SAW Analysis 
The SAW scenario reflected several insightful findings.  The major insight 
was that the scenario that was selected to test the system actually was a restriction to 
determining the full system capabilities.  It was believed prior to modeling, that the 
performance of the system would be best tested by looking at the scenario that 
represented the smallest reaction time possible.  This was determined to be an attack 
discovered within the port limits.  However, C3I modeling showed that it was possible to 
determine an attack before hostile intent was shown, therefore allowing the Force 
alternatives the maximum engagement range of five NM.  Figure 137 shows the 
performance of the alternative combinations with respect to their costs.  This shows that 
it is possible to spend more money on C3I and Sensors alternatives, with no  
performance gain. 
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Figure 137.  P(Defeat) vs. Cost for SAW Alternatives 
 
This graph shows the nonexistent impact that C3I and Sensors had on the results of 
the SAW scenario.  The major driver of performance was the Force alternative. 
 
The risk followed a similar pattern.  Very little risk was mitigated due to 
C3I or Sensor alternative manipulation.  The majority of the risk was countered by the 
choice of Force alternative.  Figure 137 shows the risk associated with the alternative 
combinations. 
 
4.6.5.10 SBA Scenario Results 
The SBA scenario was originally designed to test the systems against a 
small, fast-moving threat that gave very little warning.  This was thought to be the 
hardest of the scenarios for all of the MDP Subgroups, because it required extensive 
amounts of detailed identification and analysis to accurately determine hostile intent.  
However, it was soon apparent that the amount of time given for a SBA scenario would 
restrict any type of reactionary force, except for a point defense force.  The two 
alternatives that were developed by the Force Group included a Sparviero hydrofoil on 
random patrol and an embarked Sea Marshal option. 
Both of these options were considered independently of the C2 and 
Sensors alternatives, as it would be overwhelming for sensors to attempt to track and 








available that would meet the time restrictions imposed by the scenario.  The C2 was 
assumed to be onboard the combatants, ether in the form of the Combat Information 
Center (CIC) on the Escort vessel, or as the Sea Marshal team leader on the HVU.  It was 
assumed that the platforms would have to have sensor capabilities to identify the target, 
and would have the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in place to engage the target after 
identification. 
 
4.6.5.11 MOE1 Performance 
Overall, the Sea Marshals in Alternative 1 were able to completely defend 
92.5% of all HVUs that they were deployed on, and mitigated the damage to another 
2.5%.  This allowed only 5% of all SBA attacks to be deemed a full success with the 
associated damage and environmental impact.  The Sparviero random patrol option of 
Alternative 2 allowed for only a 60% success rate.  These findings are reflected in  
Figure 138. 
 
Force Performance Model Results for 
































Figure 138.  P(Defeat) vs. Alternative Combination Numbers for SBA 
 




All of these results relied heavily on the assumption that hostile intent 
would be known with certainty, before the engagement commenced.  This assumption 
was made on the initial belief that C3I would be able to determine hostile intent; 
however, as the modeling work progressed, this assumption became less valid. 
The SBA scenario was an excellent test for the Force alternatives, but 
offered no insight as to the benefits gained by expending resources in either the C3I or 
Sensors alternatives.  This was largely due to the time restriction placed on the study. 
 
4.6.5.12 OE2 Risk (Attack Damage) 
The risk associated with the SBA threat was calculated in a similar manner 
to the risk associated with a SAW scenario.  The probability of the Force alternative 
stopping the attack was subtracted from one.  The resulting probability, the probability of 
successful attack, was then multiplied by the expected cost of a small boat attack.  The 
cost of an attack was based on the SBA Damage Model discussed previously.  Figure 139 
shows the risk associated with each Force alternative. 
 
Risk Results for Weapon of 























Figure 139.  Risk vs. Alternative Combination Graph 
 
This graph shows the risk associated with each of the Force alternatives given that 
there is an attack. 
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4.6.5.13 M2 MDP System Cost 
Force was the only group that contributed system costs to the effort to 
thwart a SBA.  There was no “As-Is” System.  Alternative 1 set up a flexible system of 
reactionary forces, while Alternative 2 established a Sea Marshal Program that was less 
adaptive, but extremely cost efficient, as can be seen in Figure 140. 
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Figure 140.  MDP System Costs are Represented Solely by the Force Group 
 
This graph represents the MDP System Costs for the Force System alternatives, 
since they were the only system that contributed in the SBA scenario. 
 
4.6.5.14 Analysis 
Analysis of the SBA scenario showed that Alternative 2 (Sea Marshal 
escort) was the only alternative that was effective at countering the SBA threat (see 
Figure ).  The Sparviero hydrofoils used on random patrol only gave 60% probability of 
defeat.  However, the patrol craft gave an additional potential gain in the realm of 
deterrence.  The presence of armed hydrofoils patrolling the Straits would indicate that 
efforts were underway to counter terrorist threats; however, determining the deterrence 
gained was beyond the scope of this study. 
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Figure 141.  Performance vs. Cost for SBA Scenario 
 
This graph shows the cost versus benefit for the Force System alternatives in the 
SBA scenario.  The Sea Marshal escort was not only the sole alternative that met the 
desired performance criteria, but it was also cost-effective. 
 
 
